Instead, it reflects a turn toward the option of waging war and unleashing military operations. This time, that choice appears more explicit, clear, and direct on the part of both the United States of America and Israel than was the case during the June 2025 war.
This article focuses on the debate surrounding the relationship between resorting to diplomatic options and resorting to military ones. In reality, one similarity between the American–Israeli war of June 2025 and the war launched by the same two parties against Iran beginning on 28 February is that in both cases, the war erupted suddenly while an American–Iranian negotiating process, albeit indirect, was underway.
In both instances, active mediation by the Sultanate of Oman was taking place regarding the Iranian nuclear file, which is presumed to be the main issue of dispute under negotiation between the United States of America and Iran. The similarity does not stop there. In both cases, the war was launched shortly after the Omani mediator, as well as American and Iranian negotiators, announced that the indirect talks were making some progress. This raises many important questions concerning the relationship between the military and diplomatic options in both situations.
The first question concerns the credibility of the American recourse to a diplomatic, negotiated solution in the first place: whether the current US administration was genuinely serious about adopting a diplomatic solution, or did it merely present such an approach to the outside world to divert the attention of countries and global public opinion away from its intentions to wage war against Iran regardless of the outcome of the diplomatic negotiations.
Additionally, whether this approach was intended to give the Iranian side a misleading impression that Washington would not resort to military action, thereby inducing a degree of relaxedness in Tehran’s preparedness and precautionary measures against a potential American–Israeli attack.
The second question seeks to interpret whether the U.S. administration was indeed serious about pursuing the diplomatic track and engaging in negotiations, but in both instances, prior to the June 2025 war and before the February 2026 war, concluded from the course of negotiations that it would not obtain the results it sought through diplomatic means. Consequently, the United States of America decided to shift direction and adopt the military option, in full prior coordination and cooperation with the Israeli government.
The third question concerns why no confidence was placed in the Omani mediator’s ability to bridge the gap between the two sides, the United States of America and Iran, especially given statements by the Omani Foreign Minister, as well as by the Iranian Foreign Minister and several senior American negotiators in the hours preceding the outbreak of war, indicating that the negotiations had achieved some progress, even if they had not reached final agreements or produced a comprehensive settlement on all disputed issues. The continuation of the negotiating process might have offered further opportunities for progress.
Addressing these three questions requires presenting several considerations. First, according to numerous official Israeli and American sources in the days following the outbreak of the American–Israeli war on 28 February 2026, coordination between the two sides to launch the latest war had been underway for several months, and the date for its commencement had been agreed upon weeks in advance.
Second, genuine commitment to a diplomatic path would have required avoiding the sharp escalation in confrontational rhetoric and discourse at both the political and media levels, and instead throwing weight behind a series of quiet, undisclosed diplomatic efforts, whether direct or through third parties, to defuse political tensions between the United States of America and Iran, particularly over disputed issues foremost, among them has been the Iranian nuclear file.
Third, there is the relationship between the internal popular protests in Iran against the policies of the ruling government in January 2026 and the U.S. administration’s decision to adopt the military option in dealing with the Iranian file while abandoning diplomatic alternatives.
It appears that these protests may have encouraged the US administration to move forward, and even accelerate, the decision to wage war on Iran, amid a conviction that the protests had weakened the Iranian government’s grip on the state institutions.
It is worth noting here that the US president publicly supported the protesters, warned Iranian authorities against using violence against them, and promised them American support. This does not preclude claims that the United States of America, and perhaps Israel as well, may have played some role in contacting certain opposition figures inside or outside Iran who have supporters within the country and encouraged them to protest against the Iranian government.
In conclusion, from the perspective of the science and art of diplomacy, managing disputes between the United States of America and Iran should have involved calm, low-profile methods if there were a genuine intent to resolve conflicts and reduce tensions through peaceful means. Such efforts should not have relied on escalating public pressure through the media or on a strategy of “brinkmanship,” similar to the policy Washington pursued in the Middle East during the 1950s, which ultimately proved to be a failure at the time.
Diplomatic engagement, conducted efficiently and effectively behind closed doors, whether directly or through third parties, should have been the path followed toward achieving positive outcomes and peacefully resolving disputes between Washington and Tehran.
However, it is clear that Washington, in coordination and cooperation with Tel Aviv, chose the path of escalation and military action against Iran, viewing it, from the perspective of both governments, as more successful in achieving their objectives than the diplomatic track. The coming days will answer questions about the outcome of this war and whether it will indeed achieve the goals of Washington and Tel Aviv, or whether the winds will blow contrary to their expectations.
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