While the battles rage, the scope of the war expands, discontent grows, oil and gas prices are exploding, and fears of a severe inflationary wave are escalating. However, the fundamental question is whether Washington will achieve its goal, which is to get rid of the old Iran and engineer a new one.
At the moment, there are fears that the Gulf states will be drawn into the war against their will, and according to Cairo's assessment, this step will lead to a long-term confrontation between the Gulf states and Tehran. Egypt believes that the consequences of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi entering the war will cause a long-term drain, while Cairo rules out the possibility of the Iranian regime falling in the foreseeable future, believing that it is still capable of adapting to the current situation despite the attacks against it.
Cairo is seeking peaceful, political solutions to end the war, believing that Gulf intervention will only fuel its regional expansion. This, it fears, will lead to each side using its full capabilities, including escalating the activities of Hezbollah and armed groups in Gaza, and potentially intensifying attacks by Shia militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen against the Gulf states.
The Egyptian elite believes the region is ablaze, and the longer the war drags on, the more likely new actors will intervene. They find it perplexing that the United States is yielding to Israeli aggression and Benjamin Netanyahu's claims of imminent victory.
Military experts, however, seem unconvinced by such pronouncements. Vladimir Prokhov, an expert at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, considers this confrontation a risky and costly gamble, ruling out the possibility of toppling the Iranian regime or achieving decisive strategic objectives through airstrikes alone.
While Tehran has undoubtedly suffered painful blows, it appears far from defeat or collapse. Many experts assert that Iran possesses, according to US National Intelligence Estimates, "the largest stockpile of ballistic missiles in the Middle East," with some missiles having a range of 2,000 kilometers. Based on data from strategic and international studies centers, this formidable arsenal includes numerous long-range missiles capable of reaching Israel and posing a genuine threat.
Retired Turkish Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, one of the originators of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine, shared his views on a potential war between Iran, the United States, and Israel on the "X" platform. He presented a compelling perspective, highlighting the following points:
1. For the United States, the fundamental issue lies in the legitimacy of this war. It entered the war without congressional approval, and its public support does not exceed 25%. This is insufficient for a superpower to wage a protracted war. American public opinion will soon begin to question more loudly: "Is this for our national security or for Israel's?" History, from Vietnam to Iraq, demonstrates that the United States cannot sustain a prolonged war with such internal divisions.
2. Diplomacy no longer builds trust; it has become merely an extension of military maneuvering. If plans are drawn up on the battlefield while negotiations continue at the negotiating table, no country will ever take security guarantees seriously again. This points to a fundamental crack in the global order.
3. The United States consumes enormous quantities of advanced munitions. Production of long-range interceptor missiles and precision-guided missiles is limited. If 800 critical interceptor missiles are produced annually, and two are launched for every Iranian missile, a few hundred engagements will deplete an entire year's production. Moreover, the rare metals needed for these systems are dependent on Chinese supply chains. This war threatens to deplete stockpiles allocated to the Pacific region, and if a crisis were to erupt in Taiwan tomorrow, the United States could run out of munitions. In addition, Iran is vast. Long-range operations require refueling and the establishment of remote bases, placing a significant logistical burden on sustaining air and naval forces in the region. As Bahrain weakens, the importance of distant bases like Diego Garcia becomes apparent, meaning that Aegis destroyers require a full week to return to service.
4. Iran’s culture of resistance is underestimated. The loss of Khamenei would ignite a wave of asymmetric resistance. We are talking about a society that has endured 47 years of sanctions and experienced the Iran-Iraq War. It is unrealistic to expect internal divisions at this stage. External attacks do not cause disintegration; they strengthen cohesion. A proud people like the Iranians are capable of this.
5. Alarm bells are ringing in the Gulf states. Stability is essential for monarchies with Shia citizens, and the actions of Israel and the United States undermine this stability. Every missile that hits a national symbol like the Burj Al Arab or a U.S. base weakens confidence in the “American security umbrella.” Gulf capitals now realize that Israeli decisions gamble with their peace, which may force them to distance themselves from Washington or adopt a more hawkish military stance. In either case, instability escalates.
6. Closing the Strait of Hormuz would disrupt the global balance. The Houthis' involvement in Bab el-Mandeb would significantly increase insurance costs. Container shipping and energy exports from China to the European Union would be severely affected. The US and European economies cannot withstand oil prices exceeding $150 per barrel. Such a shock to the energy sector would generate political pressure within weeks.
7. Pakistan is also a significant factor. As a nuclear power, its military ties with Saudi Arabia are crucial. It is no coincidence that the war between Pakistan and the Taliban erupted at the same time as the US and Israel engaged in a war with Iran, and as India and Israel grew closer. The aim was to distract Islamabad. Trump's praise of the Pakistani leadership was also not a coincidence.
8. For Turkey, the picture is clear: this is blatant Israeli aggression backed by US military power. Ankara understands that if Iran falls, the pressure will directly shift to Turkey. Therefore, standing with Iran is a geopolitical imperative. The unification of Kurdish groups in Iran is a major security concern for Turkey. Ankara must support any moves that prevent these groups from uniting to form a Kurdish satellite state.
9. The US is waging a war without legitimacy, with weak popular support, and wasting precious resources against a country whose resilience it underestimates. Iran will not collapse quickly, and regime change is unlikely. At the present moment, the parties directly involved in the crisis, and the victims of the war, are teetering between pushing for further escalation and regional and international actors racing against time to achieve de-escalation and begin negotiations. Frankly, the war camp is stronger and more vocal than the peace camp.
So, what does the war between Iran and America hold in store for the coming days? According to estimates, there are three possible scenarios.The first involves striking specific Iranian military targets under the guise of a "short-range, focused strike." These strikes would destroy the infrastructure of the Revolutionary Guard and severely cripple Iran's missile capabilities in a military operation lasting approximately two weeks to a month, until the resulting political changes become apparent.
This scenario is hampered by a crucial point: Iran's deployment of low-cost drones in the war, the downing of which costs many times their price. This could prove a significant obstacle, potentially prolonging the conflict.
The second scenario revolves around bringing about genuine change within the Iranian regime, allowing for the emergence of a political faction more willing to negotiate with the West. This would mean that strikes targeting the regime's military core would force political figures within the leadership to alter their approach and become more receptive to Western demands. Among these figures are President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi. Israeli voices do not seem to favor this scenario, as they do not differentiate significantly between the reformist and hardline factions within the Iranian regime and believe that the complete collapse of the regime is the objective.
The final scenario suggests an open war and a comprehensive regional conflict. Western research centers have warned against this scenario, which relies primarily on Iran expanding its strikes in the region, drawing other parties into the war and achieving its objectives. We are witnessing a slide towards this outcome.
Another point raised by speculation is the issue of the Kurds in Iran. After American reports suggested Trump might exploit and arm Iranian militias to attack and overthrow the regime, analysts believe Iran may witness Israeli moves in this regard, aimed at creating a Kurdish entity within Iran to provoke Turkey and potentially push the latter to intervene directly in a highly sensitive matter for its national security.
It will take a few days or weeks at most for the picture to become clear: either a de-escalation after the most intense escalation in years, or a war with unpredictable outcomes.
Ultimately, the war is still in its early stages, and no one knows when or at what point the parties to the crisis will decide to "stop," swallow the bitter pill, and return to serious negotiations.
However, what complicates matters is that regional and international powers want Iran "weak enough" so as not to pose a threat, yet simultaneously "strong enough" so as not to collapse. But to what degree is it weak, and to what degree is it strong? That is the question.
*The author is a senior writer at Al-Ahram newspaper.
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