This is the crux of one of the most insightful, easy-to-read, and concise titles on Iran’s regional—and indeed international—relations.
The Pistachio Tree – Iran and the Arabs throughout a Century: 1914–2013 (Shageret Al-Fostoq – Iran wal-Arab fi Qarn: 1914–2013) is a 130-page book by Moustafa El-Labbad, one of the most informed and thorough Egyptian analysts specializing in Iranian and Turkish politics.
While the book was issued only a few months ago, El-Labbad had actually completed its text before he passed away in the autumn of 2019, in his 50s. Still, the argument of the book stands solid, even against the backdrop of the current US-Israeli (or rather Israeli-US) war on Iran.
Examining the foreign policy choices of Iran from the beginning of World War I in 1914 to 2013 in the midst of the upheavals of the Arab Spring, El-Labbad screens the constants of Iranian foreign policy, particularly concerning its immediate neighbourhood: essentially the Middle East, but also Eurasia. The core of this policy, he writes, could best be compared to that of the pistachio tree, an Iranian landmark.
The pistachio tree, El-Labbad explains, is a symbol of hard labour and resolve. It takes seven to ten years for a planted tree to produce its first harvest. For this to happen, the tree must overcome the harsh nature of the dry land in which it grows by expanding its roots deep and wide. Ultimately, when the pistachios are ready to harvest, they appear so appealing that Iranians call them “the smiling pistachios”.
It is precisely this pistachio-tree mix of patience, resolve, and charm that defines Iranian foreign relations, as El-Labbad writes, “irrespective of the governing ideology of its ruling regime”.
The book explains that Iran, an ancient and deeply rooted civilization, has long harboured misgivings about the intentions of its immediate neighbours, whether Arabs, Russians, or Turks. Consequently, it has acted to protect its interests through carefully calculated political choices, seeking a curious balance between good-neighbourly relations and Machiavellian manoeuvres, particularly on the Arab-Israeli front.
From the early 1920s through the 1940s, El-Labbad writes, Iran encouraged the establishment of Israel on the land of historic Palestine and even helped facilitate Jewish migration from Iran and Iraq to the new state. The objective, he explains, was to keep the Arab world absorbed in its struggle with Israel, thereby deterring it from antagonizing Iran, particularly through the sizeable Arab minority living in Iran’s southwest near Iraq.
Indeed, El-Labbad argues that fear of possible cross-border ties between Iran’s Arab minority and neighbouring Arab populations partly explains Tehran’s insistence on calling the Gulf the Persian Gulf, rather than the Arab Gulf, as it is referred to in many Arab states.
Particularly troubling for Iran, El-Labbad writes, was the rise of pan-Arabism under Gamal Abdel-Nasser, who went so far as to sever Egypt’s diplomatic relations with Iran in 1960 in response to provocative statements by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi about the Palestinian people. During these years, the shah maintained a close strategic partnership with Israel.
However, Iran was uneasy about the devastating Arab defeat by Israel in 1967. According to the book, Tehran feared that once the Arab threat diminished, Israel would feel less compelled to maintain close relations with Iran.
Later, when Anwar Sadat came to power, Iran saw the beginning of a new regional era. The Shah reached out to Arab states, particularly during the 1973 war. Iran provided Egypt with oil and helped airlift Saudi volunteers to the Syrian Golan Heights. Yet, as El-Labbad reminds readers, at the very same time, Iran was also sending oil and military aid to Israel.
The book shows that Iran-Israel relations continued in indirect ways even during the early years of the Islamic Republic established in 1979. During the Iran-Iraq war, a weakened Iran reached out to Israel—despite having severed official diplomatic ties—to obtain arms through secret channels. In doing so, El-Labbad explains, Tehran relied on Israel’s interest in weakening Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. He also notes that it was during the Iran-Iraq war that Israel carried out its strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor.
Despite years of rhetorical hostility between Iran and Israel, El-Labbad argues it would be a mistake to interpret Iran’s support for militant movements in the Arab world, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, as merely an expression of anti-Israeli sentiment. Rather, he suggests that these groups primarily serve Tehran’s broader strategic ambition of establishing regional influence.
El-Labbad also recalls that in 2003 Iran was willing to negotiate a “grand bargain” with the United States regarding its positions on Israel, its support for militant groups, and even its nuclear programme, which had become a growing concern for Israel and Western governments. According to the book, it was the hawks within the administration of George W Bush who rejected the proposal.
At the same time, El-Labbad emphasizes that despite Iran’s deep suspicions of its Arab neighbours, there are cultural and religious ties that cannot be ignored, particularly Islam. “Some of the great Muslim scholars, and for that matter Arab language dons, are actually of Iranian origin,” he writes.
Iran, the book suggests, has consistently sought to maintain broad regional influence. This partly explains why Tehran initially described the Arab Spring protests as an “Islamic Awakening”, before later becoming deeply involved in suppressing the uprising in Syria in support of the ruling regime there.
Overall, the book offers a concise yet comprehensive historical context for Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbours. It is rich in intriguing details. It notes, for example, the interest of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the writings of Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, “to the extent that he translated some of Sayyid Qutb’s works”. It also recalls the close relationship between Iran’s legendary prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh and the Arab world in the 1950s, rooted in shared anti-imperialist sentiment. The book further examines the role of Al-Azhar—the most prestigious Sunni scholarly institution—in outreach to the Shia community during the era of Nasser.
The book is published by the Lebanon-based Hachette-Antoine. More titles by El-Labbad are expected to be released later this year by the same publisher.
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