Such a view overlooks the fundamental differences between the system of Velayat-e Faqih and the Ba'athist system of rule. The former is built on a solid ideological foundation, whose supporters defend it to the very end, while the latter rests on a mixture of ideology and interests. Not all those who joined the Ba'ath Party were true believers in its principles; for many, affiliation with the party served primarily as a means of social mobility.
In this regard, I recall revisiting, many years ago, the writings of the well-known American political scientist Ted Robert Gurr on political violence. I had reservations about his proposition that groups engaged in violence retreat from it once its costs rise. My reservation stemmed from the fact that such a proposition cannot be generalized and does not apply to ideologically driven groups. For them, violence is viewed as jihad in the path of God, and the greater the sacrifice, the greater the reward. For this reason, the Ba'ath Party collapsed and turned into clandestine cells with the fall of Saddam Hussein. However, the assassination of the Supreme Leader has not led—and will not lead—to the collapse of the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih.
Some observers have gone further, arguing that although the assassination of the Supreme Leader was carried out through a complex Israeli intelligence operation—details of which were reportedly hinted at in a recent report published by the Financial Times—there may also have been internal complicity from within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Particular attention has been directed to the role of Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, who survived several explosions that killed Iranian officials and members of allied groups.
The argument is that the Revolutionary Guard opposed the relative flexibility shown by Ali Khamenei when he agreed to resume negotiations with the United States despite its aggression against Iran. While nothing is impossible in politics, such an interpretation is difficult to imagine. The Revolutionary Guard constitutes the hardened core that protects the Supreme Leader and serves as his foremost line of defense, even when disagreements arise. Ruhollah Khomeini himself once demonstrated pragmatic flexibility under the force of circumstances when he “drank the poisoned chalice” at a time when the revolution was at its peak. What can nevertheless be inferred from such arguments is that ideologically driven groups in Iran may be willing to do almost anything to defend revolutionary purity and preserve the principle of guardianship as they understand it.
This interpretation ultimately converges with another line of analysis suggesting that developments in the American-Israeli confrontation with Iran could lead to hardliners tightening their grip on power in Iran. That possibility, of course, cannot be ruled out.
The essence and ideological foundation of the Iranian system, therefore, differ fundamentally from those of the former Iraqi regime, and this difference leads to divergent trajectories for the two models. Moreover, the type of American intervention that replaced one Iraqi regime with another would be incapable of achieving the same result in Iran.
This raises another legitimate question: has the American administration even settled its position on whether regime change in Iran is desirable? The answer is no. What primarily concerns Donald Trump is changing the Iranian regime’s stance on issues of regional security, not necessarily overthrowing the regime itself. The contradictions in Trump’s statements regarding regime change reflect the tension between his pragmatic calculations and Israeli pressure. At times, he says he does not seek the overthrow of the regime; at other times, he encourages the Iranian people to storm state institutions. Sometimes he claims that there is no viable alternative from within, while at other times he says that new leaders—emerging since the beginning of the latest war—have asked to speak with him. At yet another moment, he mocks the fact that some Iranian officials with whom an understanding might have been possible have been killed during the war.
Yet the fact that Iran’s situation differs greatly from Iraq’s does not mean that the Iranian regime faces no serious challenges as it fights what it sees as an existential battle for survival.
The first challenge is economic, and both persistent and intensifying. It is true that the continuation of the war exhausts the Israeli side and embarrasses the American administration before Congress and public opinion, as well as before the wider international community, which may see the United States as a dominant global power unable to subdue a regional state. But it is equally true that every additional day of war, and every expansion of its scope, increases the economic burdens on the Iranian state.
The second—and perhaps more dangerous—challenge lies in the severe security breaches that the Iranian system has so far failed to address, despite the large number of agents it continues to arrest. Unless this vulnerability is closed, Iran’s plans, capabilities, and even the movements of its officials will remain vulnerable to targeting. When the Israeli prime minister declares that any successor to the Iranian Supreme Leader will be assassinated, this suggests that Israel still possesses operational tools inside Iran and is capable of using them to empty state institutions of their leadership cadres.
This leads to a third challenge related to the accelerating elimination of military and political leaders. Objectivity requires acknowledging that this system possesses a remarkable ability to replace personnel and adapt to shocks. At the same time, however, the successive removal of layers of military and political leadership does not simply represent a transition from one level of experience to another; it also risks undermining confidence in the regime because of its inability to protect its own officials.
Finally, there is the challenge associated with the presence of a segment of Iranian society that has lost some of its sympathy for the regime in the current war compared with the previous one, because the regime has not moved a step forward. I have debated this issue with those who doubt it, pointing to what is often said about the Persian character and its refusal to submit to foreign intervention. Indeed, the widespread public condemnation of the assassination of the Supreme Leader was unmistakable. Yet logically it is difficult to imagine that young women—such as the Iranian woman who publicly burned a picture of Khamenei only weeks before his assassination—would suddenly raise his portrait after he was killed in an Israeli strike. Not everyone is capable of distinguishing between the primary contradiction with an external enemy and the secondary contradiction with the political system.
In any case, Iran’s internal dynamics remain the most important factor in the equation of the current war. They will determine the future of the Islamic Republic, not the United States and not Israel.
*The writer is a Professor of political science at Cairo University
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