First, NATO seems to have managed the objections of some member states regarding participation in the operations, particularly Spain. President Trump’s praise of the Secretary-General of the alliance suggests that NATO has taken a decision to participate in the operations.
This is evident from the arrival of French, British, and Spanish naval units in the region, in addition to the deployment of Australian military assets. These developments indicate that an international coalition is gradually taking shape to strike Iran.
This also suggests that American and Israeli missile stockpiles—despite repeated statements by senior officials in both countries that they remain sufficient and have not been depleted—may be under pressure. The American insistence on obtaining support from other countries indicates concern that these stockpiles could be exhausted before the Iranian regime collapses.
At present, Iran appears to be fighting alone against all these countries. France and Britain have clearly become involved. Although they describe their participation as defensive, the interception of missiles heading toward Israel or toward other countries in the region constitutes direct participation in the conflict.
The US president has also held contacts with Kurdish leaders, including the Talabani leadership of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which controls Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq, and the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which dominates the rest of the Kurdistan region in northern Iraq. Contacts were also made with leaders of Iranian Kurdish opposition factions based in northern Iraq.
The initial objective of these American contacts was to persuade the Peshmerga forces affiliated with the two main Kurdish parties in northern Iraq to participate in a ground operation against Iran. However, those Kurdish leaders rejected the proposal. Their refusal reflects a variety of reasons related to the nature of the political situation in Iraq, the position of the Popular Mobilization Forces toward any such move, and the fear that the political gains achieved by the Kurds could be lost.
As a result, American and Israeli attention has shifted toward Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. Israel has worked since the beginning of discussions about striking Iran to unify five Kurdish factions. It should be noted that relations between Israeli intelligence, particularly the Mossad, and Kurdish actors at various levels are long-standing and historically rooted.
There has been discussion that these Iranian Kurdish factions might attempt to move into border areas and seize control of Kurdish provinces inside Iran, in an effort to encourage other opposition forces—whether Iranian or otherwise—to seize control of areas under their influence.
In reality, such thinking reflects a misunderstanding among some American strategic circles regarding the internal situation in Iran and the capabilities of Iranian Kurdish groups. For example, Kermanshah province contains a large population of Shiite Feyli Kurds who adhere to Twelver Shiism and support the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih.
A second and more important point is that Turkey will not allow the establishment of a Kurdish entity in this region that could inspire or expand into Kurdish areas within Turkey itself. Ankara has firmly rejected such a possibility. Moreover, the most prominent faction among these Iranian Kurdish groups is linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the United States itself has previously designated as a terrorist organization.
If the American-Israeli strategy of mobilizing Kurdish actors were to succeed, it could complicate US policies in Syria. Washington has recently sought to scale back Kurdish autonomy there and integrate Kurdish forces into broader Syrian governance structures. If Iranian Kurdish groups were to succeed—an outcome I consider highly unlikely—it would encourage Kurdish authorities in Syria to insist on maintaining their autonomous arrangements and could complicate American efforts to promote integration.
Inside Iran, opposition movements that had grown stronger in recent years have faced severe repression. At the beginning of the military operations, the Iranian regime adopted strict internal measures that do not align with the need to consolidate popular support during such a crisis. Many moderate figures who had initially supported the regime following the first wave of strikes were arrested.
These developments appear to have encouraged American and Israeli calculations that internal unrest could be exploited. The targeting of police stations, security warehouses, and related camps seems intended to allow opposition forces to obtain weapons and confront the regime internally. However, such calculations overlook the role of the Basij, which is spread throughout the country in cities, towns, and villages and serves as one of the regime’s primary security instruments.
In my view, the war will last longer than the four weeks initially estimated and could extend for several months.
The key question now is whether Iran can withstand these pressures or whether the continued strikes will fundamentally alter the course of the conflict and open the door to developments that were not previously anticipated.
The process of selecting a new Supreme Leader after the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will represent an important moment and a signal to the outside world. If the chosen figure is somewhat less rigid—not necessarily moderate, since the Iranian political system as a whole remains hard-line—but more aware of the risks facing the regime, developments could move in a different direction.
This brings to mind a phrase that our professor of international relations, Dr. Ibrahim Saqr, at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, used to repeat when explaining crises in international politics: politics is the art of the possible—indeed the utmost possible.
Taking the balance of power into account, if preserving the Iranian state and regime is what is possible, then the utmost possible step for Iranian decision-makers would be to recognize that Iran cannot defeat the United States or Israel militarily. Instead, they could adopt political positions that acknowledge this reality, particularly since Trump seeks to achieve some form of victory. Otherwise, the fighting will continue and losses will increase.
The question then becomes whether Iran’s new leadership will rise above its grief and internal problems and adopt the principle of tactical restraint that it has used before. When Ayatollah Khomeini accepted the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war, he famously said, “I am drinking the poisoned chalice.”
The new leadership could therefore move in this direction and accept the mediation initiatives currently being proposed. The nuclear program has already been severely damaged and could be temporarily abandoned, especially since Iran retains the ability to revive it in the future, having already approached the nuclear threshold. The missile program has also suffered heavy blows, and if the war continues it could be destroyed entirely. Preserving what remains while negotiating a ceasefire in exchange for lifting sanctions could therefore become a realistic option.
Iranian strikes against Gulf states have also changed the nature of the situation in the region. Attacks on civilian targets and the resulting losses will undoubtedly alter Gulf attitudes toward Iran in the coming years. Gulf states had previously provided Iran with economic channels that helped mitigate sanctions, particularly through food exports and other goods. This role is likely to end.
In the coming years, Gulf states will likely strengthen their military capabilities. Air defense systems in those countries—especially in the United Arab Emirates—have demonstrated their effectiveness by intercepting more than 90 percent of the missiles launched against them. As a result, we are likely to see the reconstruction of regional air defense systems and the development of stronger joint defense cooperation among Gulf states.
Israel, which led the war and persuaded Trump to launch military operations, will seek to continue these operations to achieve its objectives. The question remains whether the Iranian leadership will allow Israel to capitalize on this opportunity.
The conclusion is that the war will likely continue for several weeks. In the coming period, strikes will increasingly target economic infrastructure alongside military targets in an attempt to push public opinion inside Iran against the regime. At the same time, Iranian strikes against Gulf states are likely to decline significantly as Tehran reassesses the negative consequences of those attacks.
*The writer is a senior adviser to the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies ECSS
*This article is published in collaboration with the Egyptian Center for Strategic studies.
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