In such moments, the ability of political systems to maintain cohesion and manage the complex crises produced by war is put to the test. Wars also reveal the nature of the relationship between authority and society, as well as the resilience of the political and social arrangements upon which regimes rely.
This reality becomes particularly significant in the case of the American-Israeli war on Iran, given the complex nature of the Iranian political system that emerged following the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Iranian system is characterized by an intricate overlap between religious, revolutionary, and military institutions within an ideological framework that views confrontation with external enemies as one of the central sources of its legitimacy and continuity.
In this context, the American-Israeli war against Iran, and the intensive military strikes targeting the leadership structure of the Iranian regime, have placed this institutional architecture under an unprecedented test—particularly as the attacks reached the first rank of political and military leadership and culminated in the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. These developments represent more than a mere military blow; they constitute a pivotal moment that raises fundamental questions about the regime’s ability to adapt to the shock of losing its leadership and about the capacity of its institutions to maintain cohesion amid simultaneous internal and external pressures.
The importance of this question is further heightened by the transformations that Iranian society has experienced over the past two decades. These include demographic changes and the rise of a younger generation that is less connected to the narratives of the Islamic Revolution, as well as mounting economic and social pressures that have reshaped the relationship between the state and society. At the same time, the Iranian opposition—both inside and outside the country—remains diverse and fragmented.
From this perspective, understanding the dynamics of Iran’s domestic front during wartime becomes essential. The future of the Iranian regime will not depend solely on the outcomes of the military confrontation but will also be shaped by societal reactions, the positions of political elites, and the capacity of state institutions—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the security apparatus—to manage the post-shock phase. Accordingly, this paper seeks to examine the features of Iran’s domestic landscape under the conditions of war by analyzing the prevailing social mood within Iranian society, the map of political opposition forces, and the limits of their capacity to influence potential political change.
Social sentiment inside Iran
Iran today faces an exceptional moment in its political history in light of the current war and the unprecedented military developments that have struck the first rank of the regime’s leadership, culminating in the assassination of the Supreme Leader. However, a reading of the trajectory of the Iranian regime since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 indicates that its continuity has not been dependent solely on individual political leaders. Rather, it has relied on a complex institutional structure that includes the Revolutionary Guard, the religious establishment, and the security apparatus—institutions that have played a central role in protecting the regime and managing crises over the past decades.
At the same time, social and political transformations within Iranian society in recent years reveal a noticeable decline in levels of popular support for the regime among wide segments of the population, particularly among young people who did not experience the founding moment of the Islamic Revolution and who therefore feel less connected to the ideological narratives that shaped the regime’s legitimacy. This shift has been reflected in repeated waves of protest that security forces have temporarily contained, only for them to re-emerge in more intense forms, revealing a deeper crisis in the relationship between the state and segments of society.
Iranian society can be described today as experiencing a state of compounded shock resulting from the initial strike carried out by Israel and the United States, which led to the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei along with dozens of senior figures in the country. This occurred despite Iran’s repeated declarations of readiness for further rounds of confrontation, suggesting that the security and intelligence penetration had reached advanced levels, extending to the highest ranks of leadership.
The first dimension of this compounded shock stems from the fact that the country was subjected to a war imposed upon it despite ongoing negotiations and optimistic statements regarding them. The second shock relates to the loss of leadership and the subsequent transition within the regime, as well as the scale of the losses resulting from the first wave of strikes. This shock affects all political currents in the country, as its impact has been observed among supporters and opponents of the regime alike. The third shock concerns the economic crisis, which Iranian society understands will inevitably intensify during the war and in its aftermath.
These three shocks have created a deep state of social uncertainty characterized by a mixture of fear, anger, and hope linked to expectations of change. This mixture of sentiments became visible following the announcement of the Supreme Leader’s death, as images from inside Iran showed both official mourning among regime supporters and celebrations among some opposition groups in certain areas of the country, reflecting a profound psychological division within Iranian society.
For analytical purposes, Iranian society can be divided into four main social blocs.
The first bloc consists of the hardcore pro-regime constituency, which includes the Revolutionary Guard, the Basij militia, segments of the clergy, and state employees. This group views the war as a war against Iran itself rather than merely against the regime. Consequently, it adopts a nationalist and mobilizational discourse emphasizing the need to defend the state while warning against scenarios of state collapse that could lead to fragmentation similar to what occurred in Iraq or Syria. Although this bloc does not represent the largest segment of society, it remains the most organized and influential due to its control over key political, economic, and military resources.
The second bloc is composed of those angered by the deteriorating economic situation, including both regime supporters and critics. This group represents the largest segment of Iranian society and includes the shrinking middle class, bazaar merchants, workers, and employees. Economic hardship is the main factor shaping the mood of this bloc. The collapse of the currency and rising prices triggered widespread protests in late 2025 when Tehran’s bazaar merchants began demonstrating against declining purchasing power and soaring costs. The protests later expanded to include university students, oil workers, teachers, and truck drivers, making it one of the largest protest waves in the history of the Islamic Republic. Yet this bloc is not necessarily revolutionary; rather, it can be described as a protest bloc that is angry about economic conditions but wary of the chaos that could follow the collapse of the regime.
The third bloc is the younger generation, which represents the most significant social transformation in Iran. With the country’s median age around thirty-five, many young Iranians did not experience the formative events that shaped the ideological foundations of the regime, such as the Islamic Revolution or the Iran-Iraq war. As a result, they tend to be less responsive to ideological and populist rhetoric. This generation appears less religious in its outward behavior, more culturally oriented toward the West, more connected to the world through digital communication, and more aspirational regarding standards of living. Young people formed the backbone of the protest movements that took place in 2022, 2025, and early 2026. Consequently, they represent the social group most inclined toward demanding structural change within the state, even though they lack a unified political organization.
The fourth bloc consists of ethnic minorities, including Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, and other groups. However, these minorities do not share a uniform political outlook. For example, the Azeri population tends to be more integrated into the state, and the late Supreme Leader himself was of Azeri origin. By contrast, Kurdish, Baloch, and Arab groups have at times engaged in armed or semi-armed resistance.
Among these groups, the Kurds are considered the most organized and militarily capable minority opposition force within Iran. At the beginning of 2026, Kurdish armed activity intensified along the Iranian border from Iraqi Kurdistan after several Kurdish parties unified within a political and military alliance, taking advantage of the Iranian security apparatus’s preoccupation with suppressing domestic protests.
The Kurdish fighters, commonly known as the Peshmerga—meaning “those who face death”—have accumulated extensive combat experience over decades, particularly in Iraq and Syria in battles against ISIS.
The issue of ethnic minorities has therefore re-emerged as a potential pressure point during the current war. The United States and Israel have indicated support for Kurdish opposition groups operating from Iraqi Kurdistan in order to encourage incursions into Iranian territory. Iran responded quickly by targeting the headquarters of these groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly in the Sulaymaniyah area.
The Iranian Opposition at home and abroad
The Iranian opposition has re-emerged as a political pressure card in recent months as American and Israeli discourse increasingly referred to supporting protest movements within Iran. There have also been attempts to promote the political image of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former Shah. However, this external bet on regime change through opposition forces faces serious political and practical obstacles. Efforts to reshape Iran’s political landscape collide with deep fragmentation among opposition groups and the absence of a unified alternative capable of confronting the regime either inside or outside the country.
The Iranian opposition—both domestically and abroad—consists of heterogeneous individuals, movements, and organizations, including both armed and non-armed groups.
Among opposition forces active abroad is the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) led by Maryam Rajavi. It is one of the most organized and well-funded opposition groups and dominates the opposition coalition known as the National Council of Resistance of Iran. However, the organization enjoys little popularity within Iran itself, where many question its funding sources, political orientation, and connections with Western governments.
Another group consists of monarchist supporters backing Reza Pahlavi. This current has significant influence in foreign media networks and maintains a strong presence on social media. The Pahlavi family seeks to attract young Iranians with promises of political freedoms and a more open and prosperous society. Nevertheless, monarchists face significant criticism inside Iran, even among those who favour regime change, as many of them prefer the establishment of a democratic system rather than a return to monarchy—especially given the monarchists’ perceived closeness to Israel and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Both the MEK and monarchist groups tend to welcome external pressure that weakens the Iranian regime, hoping that military defeat could open the door to political change. Yet the limited popularity of monarchist leadership inside Iran became evident during recent protest waves, despite repeated messages directed to the Iranian public by Reza Pahlavi and his family.
There are also armed opposition groups operating abroad, including Kurdish factions such as the Kurdistan Freedom Party, which operates from Iraq and has previously called on Iranian Kurds to attack regime targets. Such calls have not translated into widespread action, largely due to the strict security measures imposed by Iran along its border with Iraq.
Inside Iran, opposition forces remain less organized and more fragmented due to political repression and the absence of a unified leadership structure.
One component is the reformist current, which is often described as opposing the conservative faction dominating Iran’s political institutions. Reformists have historically attempted to operate within the framework of the state rather than outside it. Prominent figures associated with this current include former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, current President Masoud Pezeshkian, former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, and cleric Mehdi Karroubi. Reformists generally oppose war against the regime and regard the current conflict as a war against Iran itself. They fear that war provides the regime with justification to tighten repression and strengthen its security grip, while also fearing the collapse of the state.
Another component includes small political parties, many of which were established before the Islamic Revolution and represent ideological currents ranging from Islamist to nationalist to leftist and communist. One example is the banned Tudeh Party, which issued a statement on 28 February 2026 condemning the American-Israeli war on Iran and calling for the unity of national and peace-oriented forces to end the conflict.
Additionally, youth movements, student activists, and human rights advocates have gained visibility in recent years, particularly after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. Prominent figures include Masih Alinejad, Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi, Nasrin Sotoudeh, and writer Sahar Delijani. These movements focus primarily on human rights, women’s rights, and political reform.
Finally, there are armed groups inside Iran, including Kurdish organizations, Ahwazi Arab factions, and Sunni Baloch groups such as Jundallah and Jaish al-Adl, which periodically carry out attacks against Iranian security forces in border regions.
Conclusion
The analysis above indicates that the primary challenge facing the Iranian opposition—particularly inside the country—is the absence of a unified organizational framework capable of mobilizing society and presenting a credible political alternative. No opposition coalition has succeeded in unifying the various currents or building a political project capable of gaining broad legitimacy to speak on behalf of Iranian public opinion.
While the current war and military strikes place the Iranian regime under unprecedented pressure, they do not necessarily mean its rapid collapse. The regime continues to rely on a strong institutional network—most notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij forces—which remain capable of containing crises.
In light of these dynamics, the most likely scenarios point toward the continuation of the regime in a modified form or a transition of authority within the ruling elite, possibly accompanied by limited reforms aimed at containing internal and external pressures.
*The writer is a Senior Researcher at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
* The article appears in Arabic on the website of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
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