After nearly 13 days of confrontation between the US and Israel on the one hand and Iran on the other, the strategic picture of the war has begun to clarify. What initially appeared to be a rapid and decisive military campaign has gradually revealed deeper contradictions between political objectives, operational realities, and domestic constraints inside the US.
One question concerns the strategic calculations of the US, particularly the ambiguity surrounding the objectives of the military strike and the contradictions in Trump’s own statements. Another is Iran’s strategy of time and cost escalation, and how Tehran seeks to transform the conflict into a political and economic burden for the US and its regional allies. No day-after scenario is available, which is strange considering the ambitious nature of the American campaign. During the first 40 seconds of the opening strikes, reports indicated that up to 40 senior Iranian military and political figures had been targeted; the supreme leader had been assassinated. This tactical approach reflects a decapitation strategy that strikes at the leadership and command structure of the Iranian system.
By weakening the regime’s capacity to respond and triggering internal fragmentation, the war aimed for regime change, which would further the strategic interests of the US and Israel: the collapse of the current Iranian political system, the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, the weakening of Tehran’s regional proxy networks, and the long-term neutralisation of the Iranian threat to Israel. But the unexpected resilience of Iran’s internal political structure quickly complicated these calculations. Instead of fragmentation, the Iranian system demonstrated institutional cohesion, while the security apparatus remained largely functional.
As a result, the American narrative gradually shifted from regime change to behaviour modification. This shift is clearly reflected in the contradictory statements issued by President Donald Trump. In one message posted during the escalation, he declared, “Iran is no longer the bully of the Middle East… it has become the loser of the Middle East, and it will remain so for decades.” These contradictions highlight a deeper issue: the absence of a clearly defined strategic end. Trump now spoke of controlling the future leadership of Iran, invoking Venezuela. At another point, the administration reportedly explored engagement with opposition groups in northwestern Iran, attempting to open a second political front against the regime.
Such shifting objectives raise a critical strategic question: What exactly constitutes victory? But US behaviour can only be assessed in the light of domestic political constraints within the US. According to one survey, 59 per cent of Americans oppose the strikes on Iran, while 60 per cent believe Trump lacks a clear plan for managing the conflict. Moreover, 62 per cent argue that further military action should require congressional approval, and 60 per cent oppose deploying ground troops. These numbers are politically significant because they intersect with the approaching 2026 mid-term elections, in which the Republican Party risks losing congressional support if the conflict becomes prolonged or costly. Senior officials in the administration appear aware of these pressures. Directed at Americans, statements by the secretary of defense and the secretary of energy have increasingly emphasised operational success and economic stability.
According to estimates by strategic studies institutes, the first 100 hours of the war cost approximately $3.7 billion, or $891 million per day. The majority of that cost relates to precision strike munitions and air defence interceptors, highlighting the intensity of missile exchanges. Such expenditure may appear manageable in the short term. However, prolonged operations could quickly transform the war into a financial liability, particularly if global energy markets are destabilised. Disruptions in the Persian Gulf shipping routes have already raised maritime insurance premiums. Should these disturbances translate into higher gasoline prices in the US, the political incentive for Trump may shift towards negotiating a political settlement rather than prolonging the conflict any further.
The US retains overwhelming military capabilities, coordinated through US Central Command (CENTCOM), which manages operations across the Middle East. Recent statements by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that Iran’s missile launch frequency has declined, indicating damage to its military infrastructure. Meanwhile, the secretary of defense highlighted the sinking of an Iranian naval vessel described as the first torpedo sinking of an enemy ship since World War II. Such announcements serve many purposes. They demonstrate operational superiority, reassure allies, and maintain domestic confidence in the campaign. But air power alone rarely results in regime change. Without ground forces, the ability to reshape Iran’s political system remains extremely limited. At present, there appears to be little appetite in Washington or among the American public for a large-scale ground invasion.
Part of the American calculus relates to time. While Washington seeks rapid results, Iran’s strategy relies on extending the time and cost of the war. Iranian leaders appear convinced that President Trump does not want a prolonged war that drains American resources or requires congressional authorisation for extensive ground operations. Consequently, Iran seeks to extend the duration of the conflict without triggering a full-scale confrontation. By calibrating its escalation through missile strikes, maritime disruption, and indirect operations, Iran aims to transform each American strike into a political and economic burden for Washington. One of the clearest examples of this strategy is the campaign against the Gulf, the purpose of which seems to be to internationalise the crisis rather than achieve immediate military gains. In this context, the threat to close off the Strait of Hormuz should be understood primarily as a negotiating tool. Full closure would provoke a massive international response and damage Iran’s own exports. However, partial disruptions or targeted attacks on shipping can raise global energy prices and in this way put pressure on the US.
Some estimates suggest that a sustained conflict could raise oil and gas prices by 20-25 per cent, directly affecting industrial economies in Europe and Asia. Such an outcome would inevitably generate diplomatic pressure on Washington to contain the escalation. This raises the question of the war undermining US-Gulf strategic relations.
In another statement, Trump went further, asserting that Iran had effectively surrendered to its neighbours: “Iran, suffering the horrors of war, apologised and surrendered to its neighbours in the Middle East and promised not to fire on them again.” Yet reality belies these claims. The remarks referenced statements by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who expressed regret over attacks affecting Gulf states. However, the apology was conditional, linked to the demand that Gulf territory should not be used for further strikes against Iran. At the same time, hardline factions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps openly expressed reservations, revealing a gap between the political and military wings of the Iranian state. The Gulf dimension adds another layer of complexity to the conflict, since recent reports indicate that three of the four largest Gulf economies have begun discussing the financial strain imposed by the war, with rising defence costs and global market disruptions forcing them to reconsider external spending.
This development carries strategic implications for Washington. During Trump’s 2025 visit to the Gulf, several states pledged hundreds of billions of dollars in investments in the US. If Gulf governments reduce overseas investments to stabilise their domestic budgets, the economic consequences could be significant. Indeed, discussions of reviewing investment commitments have reportedly attracted attention in the White House. Such developments raise the question of whether these economic repercussions were incorporated into the strategic calculations behind the strike. For the US, the challenge lies in defining a realistic objective that can justify the war while avoiding prolonged escalation. For Israel, the priority remains reducing Iranian military capabilities and limiting Tehran’s regional influence. For Iran, the central goal is regime survival and the gradual increase of pressure on its adversaries. Trump recently suggested that ending the war would be a “joint decision” with Benjamin Netanyahu, an unusual formulation that underscores Israel’s influence on the war. Wars rarely end through absolute victory, concluding rather when the cost of resuming them exceeds their perceived benefits. The most likely outcome is that all parties will eventually lower their objectives, seeking a political arrangement that allows each side to claim a version of success. Whether such a transition occurs sooner rather than later depends largely on how fast the costs of the war begin to outweigh its strategic profits.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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