The fierce war raging between America, Israel, and Iran is escalating and pushing into dangerous territory, with fuel depots having been struck and civilian infrastructure shattered. But there is another war unfolding alongside it, no less brutal or intense – a war of entangled political wills.
This struggle is not only between the US-Israel alliance and Iran, but also between Washington and Tel Aviv themselves, and even within America’s own corridors of power, over how, when, and on what terms this war will finally end.
Complicating matters further, Iran now has a new supreme leader. Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, killed along with several family members on the war’s first day, has assumed power.
In his earliest days in office, Mojtaba has already sent unmistakable military and political signals: Iran will end this war on its own terms, according to its own clock.
With so many conflicting and interwoven agendas at play, the war’s end could come within days or stretch on for weeks more. No one knows which will give way first, the weapons or the wills behind them.
Tehran’s response to the pronouncements of US President Donald Trump that the United States should have a role in determining the next supreme leader unfolded with a kind of austere, almost theatrical irony. The system selected the one figure least imaginable from Washington’s perspective: Khamenei’s son.
In a single gesture, the Iranian state signalled that not only would external pressure fail to shape the succession, but it would produce precisely the opposite outcome.
A reformist politician close to the administration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian framed the moment as follows: before the assassination of Ali Khamenei, the possibility of Mojtaba’s succession circulated quietly but uneasily within elite circles, he told Al-Ahram Weekly.
In other words, Mojtaba’s rise was conceivable, but far from predetermined.
War rearranged those calculations almost overnight. Once Ali Khamenei was killed and Trump publicly suggested that Washington should be consulted regarding the selection of the next supreme leader, the logic of Iranian politics shifted from internal debate to external defiance.
Institutions that ordinarily compete for influence, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Expediency Discernment Council, the Assembly of Experts, the presidency, and the parliament, suddenly found themselves aligned by a shared imperative: demonstrating that the architecture of the Islamic Republic remains sovereign and unbroken.
In that context, selecting Mojtaba was no longer merely a personnel decision. It became a political message written in bold strokes: the leadership line remains intact, the regime has not been decapitated, and the name Khamenei continues to anchor the state.
Yet, the office he inherits is burdened with extraordinary weight. Iran now stands at perhaps the most precarious strategic juncture since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. It is engaged in open confrontation with both the United States and Israel, while relations with neighbouring states across the Gulf are strained to a degree not seen in decades.
Notably, Iran has sharply escalated its rhetoric in both word and deed since Mojtaba Khamenei became supreme leader.
“If you look closely at the statements coming from IRGC commanders, the message is unmistakable: Tehran wants a different regional security architecture, one that includes firm guarantees against attacks driven by the United States and Israel,” the Iranian politician said.
“The existing model is no longer acceptable. If Iran does not secure such guarantees, the war is unlikely to end anytime soon.”
He said that Iran has absorbed devastating blows, not least the assassination of the supreme leader, the killing of dozens of senior commanders, and the destruction of critical military and civilian infrastructure. For that reason, he said, Tehran will not settle for a simple ceasefire or a return to the region’s current security arrangements.
Under successive blows and with positions vacated by the assassination of their occupants, Iran today operates in a largely decentralised manner. Day-to-day strategic and military coordination rests largely with Ali Larijani, who, as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, functions as a central node in wartime decision-making, alongside Ahmad Vahidi, commander of the IRGC.
These figures form the operational spine of the war effort, translating ideological direction into concrete strategy.
The government under Pezeshkian carries a different but equally critical responsibility: maintaining the fragile rhythms of everyday life such as fuel distribution, food supply, and price stability, so that the state’s economic and social machinery does not seize up under the pressure of war.
Security across the country is distributed across several layers. The volunteer networks of the Basij forces operate within cities as a form of social surveillance and rapid mobilisation, while the regular forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran army guard borders and strategic infrastructure.
Above them all stands the IRGC, tasked with the most difficult mission of the moment: managing the direct confrontation with American and Israeli military power while simultaneously preserving the deterrent networks Iran has built across the region.
Within this architecture, Mojtaba Khamenei’s immediate role may be less that of a battlefield commander and more that of a gravitational centre.
Supreme leadership in Iran is as much about maintaining equilibrium among powerful institutions as it is about issuing directives. The system must continue to function without appearing shaken; continuity itself becomes a form of strategy.
While Mojtaba Khamenei’s immediate priority will be coordinating the war effort with the nation’s political and military institutions, several crucial issues demand his attention.
Chief among these are the future of Iran’s nuclear programme, the management of a struggling economy, the fight against corruption, and the increasingly volatile issue of public and personal freedoms, widely regarded as the regime’s true “Achilles heel”.
The long-term nuclear posture of the new supreme leader represents one of the most critical and uncertain variables on his agenda.
The late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s fatwa against the production of nuclear weapons had been a cornerstone of Iran’s official stance. However, with his death, the religious and political foundation of that ban has been profoundly shaken.
Shia jurisprudence allows followers to choose a new “source of emulation” upon the death of a marja, a high-ranking Shia cleric, and a successor is not bound by his predecessor’s edicts.
Mojtaba Khamenei, described as more hardline than his father and propelled to power by a security apparatus that has overseen a significant expansion of the nuclear programme, may now see the ultimate deterrent as the only guarantor of the regime’s survival.
And while the war dominates the headlines, the new leadership is acutely aware that its long-term survival hinges on navigating profound internal crises.
The regime’s legitimacy has been gradually eroded by years of economic mismanagement, corruption, and the suppression of personal freedoms.
Managing factional dynamics within the regime’s core will also be a delicate task. The reformist movement, blamed by conservatives for trusting Washington during past nuclear negotiations, has been effectively sidelined.
Nevertheless, Mojtaba Khamenei is expected to avoid decisions that could spark internal unrest, particularly given that Iranians have largely rallied behind their country during the war.
“Maintaining public support for the government is the absolute priority,” the Iranian reformist politician emphasised to the Weekly.
The regime is expected to continue the cautious social liberalisation that has taken shape in recent years rather than attempt to restore the heavy-handed security controls once imposed on personal freedoms, controls that have already loosened following several nationwide protests.
“I don’t believe the new supreme leader will devote his attention to the strict enforcement of the headscarf law, as some fear,” the Iranian politician explained.
“Among conservatives there is considerable support for the new leadership, yet many young people remain anxious about a possible return to restrictions on personal freedom and dress. Personally, I see no reason to expect a reversal on this front.”
The new Iranian leadership will need all the internal support it can muster to continue a difficult and costly war with America and Israel. Iran has embraced a strategy of “horizontal escalation”, transforming the conflict with the United States and Israel from a bilateral confrontation into a regional conflagration.
By launching hundreds of missiles and drones at both military and civilian targets across all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Tehran aims to exact a prohibitive cost on the United States and its regional partners.
The objective is to pressure the Gulf leaders into urging Washington to de-escalate.
This approach, however, carries the immense risk of achieving the opposite and potentially forging an unprecedented security alignment between Israel and the very Gulf states Iran has been trying to improve relations with.
Amid the raging war, the narratives emerging from Washington and Tehran could not be more divergent.
Trump, in a series of interviews with the American media, has signalled a strong desire to bring the military campaign to a close, framing the conflict as mission accomplished.
“I think the war is very complete, pretty much,” he told the US network CBS News, asserting that Iran’s military capacity has been shattered.
This declaration of effective victory appears to be designed to create the political space for an exit strategy.
Pressure for such a strategy is mounting from multiple fronts. Allies in the Gulf and Europe are growing anxious, but the most immediate pressure point is the global economy.
Oil prices have surged past $120 a barrel, a spike that threatens to ignite a worldwide economic crisis and has already rattled American markets.
Trump’s acknowledgement that “certainly people have talked about” acquiring Iranian oil suggests an awareness that the current path is economically unsustainable and that post-war arrangements may already be under consideration.
Yet, any exit strategy requires a partner willing to stop fighting. Iran is refusing to play that role. Despite devastating blows to its infrastructure, the Iranian leadership is hardening its stance.
An IRGC spokesman has declared that Iran’s armed forces are prepared for “a large-scale war lasting at least six months at the same level”.
The IRGC has also vowed to shut down regional oil shipments if US and Israeli operations continue. “Not one litre” will pass if the attacks persist, it has warned.
It has further emphasised that Iranians, not Washington, will decide how the war ends, declaring that “security in the region will be for everyone or for no one.”
The Iranian calculus appears to be that the country can absorb punishment while continuing to inflict it on US and Israeli assets and regional allies. This leaves the Trump administration with a profound strategic dilemma.
An air campaign alone cannot topple the regime, and the prospect of deploying ground troops remains, in Trump’s words, “nowhere near consideration”.
Continued bombing risks provoking more painful Iranian retaliation against soft targets in Israel and the Gulf, while rising oil prices threaten the global economic order.
The goal, therefore, shifts from military victory to managed disengagement.
Washington’s task is not only convincing Iran that the war is nearing its end but also convincing Israel. And that may prove the most formidable challenge of all.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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