Israel resumed its expanded attacks on Lebanon this week after Hizbullah joined the war in the early hours of 2 March.
Southern Lebanon, the south and north of the Litani River, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs were heavily bombarded by Israeli forces, with strikes targeting major southern and Bekaa towns, including Tyre, Nabatieh, and Bint Jbeil.
Israeli special forces landed in Nabi Chit in the Bekaa Valley, where an Israeli unit attempted to search for the remains of an Israeli pilot captured in Lebanon in 1986.
The arrival of the Israeli forces triggered fierce clashes with local residents, who were joined by resistance fighters and military personnel who rushed to their assistance. The confrontation resulted in the deaths of 41 Lebanese people, including three soldiers, and left 20 wounded.
By the beginning of the second week of the war, the overall toll had risen to around 394 Lebanese killed, including 83 children and 42 women. Some 1,130 people had been injured, including 254 children and 274 women.
Israel also carried out targeted assassinations against five Iranian military commanders belonging to the Al-Quds Force, who were reportedly meeting in a hotel in the Raouche area on Beirut’s Corniche.
Other than the military strikes, Israel’s most powerful weapon in this new round of fighting has proved to be its evacuation warnings to many towns and districts in Lebanon.
During the previous war, Israeli forces would typically warn a specific area to evacuate before bombing it, claiming that Hizbullah military sites were located there. Such warnings were usually directed at one or two towns in the Bekaa or the south of the country, or at one or two neighbourhoods in Beirut’s southern suburbs.
This time, however, evacuation warnings issued by the Israeli military have extended to nearly all neighbourhoods in the southern suburbs of Beirut, in addition to more than 140 towns across the south and Bekaa.
Although the threatened strikes have not been carried out in every area where evacuation warnings were issued, the warning itself was a form of threat.
On the first day of the Israeli assault on Lebanon, around 90,000 Lebanese people evacuated their homes in approximately 50 towns that had received evacuation warnings. Most of these residents were originally from southern Lebanon and had previously been displaced, before returning to their towns or settling in nearby areas.
However, when evacuation warnings were issued the following day for the entirety of Beirut’s southern suburbs, the number of displaced people surged, exceeding the capacity of the relief agencies to provide adequate assistance.
The Israeli military warned residents of districts in the southern suburbs of Beirut, including Haret Hreik, Laylaki, Burj Al-Barajneh, Hadath, Chiyah, Bir Hassan, and others, prompting hundreds of thousands of people to leave the areas.
About one million people have been displaced from Beirut’s southern suburbs. However, the Lebanese government announced that only about 517,000 individuals had officially registered as displaced, including 117,000 accommodated in government-run shelters.
The majority of the displaced have had to rely on their own means, either by renting alternative housing or staying with relatives in areas beyond the range of Israeli bombardments. Others have remained without shelter, sleeping on the streets or staying in their cars.
This has been compounded by the fact that many of the displaced have been forced to flee for a second time, having already relocated to alternative accommodation that itself fell within the scope of the Israeli targeting.
During the first days of the Israeli assault, Lebanon was not only suffering from the aftermath of the bombardments. Its streets were filled with displaced families searching for alternative shelter, while others had spread out along Beirut’s Corniche waiting for accommodation to become available.
This intense humanitarian pressure is clearly intentional, as Israel has sought to exert pressure on Hizbullah’s social base in an effort to break the public support the party enjoys.
Following decisions by the Lebanese government to prohibit Hizbullah’s military activity, fractures appeared within the party’s political alliances. Only its own ministers objected to the government’s decisions, suggesting that the majority of the political class decided to hold the party accountable for its decision.
Public sentiment, however, has remained less settled. Although the sudden mass displacement appeared designed to generate popular anger over Hizbullah’s unilateral decision to enter the war, the reality has proved more complex.
A first response took the form of a wave of sympathy that was largely politically neutral. People sought to provide immediate assistance to the displaced by offering shelter, distributing Iftar and Sohour meals, and providing blankets, bedding, and winter clothing, particularly as a severe cold spell has swept across Lebanon in recent days.
The aim of these campaigns is to convey a message of Lebanese humanitarian solidarity, irrespective of regional or sectarian affiliations, or even of differing political views regarding the war.
These efforts have been particularly active in Beirut and its surrounding areas, where displaced families initially concentrated, before extending northwards as some families made their way there.
A second response was less politically neutral. People then were willing to provide assistance, whether through hosting displaced families or volunteering services, but they did not openly express political loyalty to Hizbullah.
Several video clips have circulated showing verbal confrontations between displaced people displaying partisan slogans or playing songs supportive of Iran and members of host communities rebuking them.
In some cases, the displaced have been compelled to remove such symbols and refrain from promoting Hizbullah’s political messaging.
In some instances, notices attributed to the municipality of Tripoli have circulated online urging residents renting apartments to displaced families to report the names of their tenants to the municipality. This measure has been justified as a precaution intended to prevent the sheltering of Hizbullah figures pursued by Israeli forces, which could expose such residences to potential strikes.
Others have criticised the step as excessive, arguing that it involves the disclosure of sensitive personal data and could threaten the safety of both the displaced and the hosts.
A third response, largely associated with constituencies aligned with political currents opposed to Hizbullah, has seen people being generally reluctant to host displaced families in their areas. The concern is that doing so might expand the scope of Israeli targeting to include these localities.
This position reflects the political orientation of those who regard Hizbullah as a longstanding rival and who view the current war as a rare opportunity to weaken the party and hold its supporters accountable for providing it with popular backing, particularly after recent government decisions stripped Hizbullah of its political cover.
It is difficult to determine which of these three tendencies predominates within Lebanese public opinion. But the seeds of internal discord are clearly present. The scale of public anger over Hizbullah’s decision to reignite the war could channel resentment not only politically against the party but also socially against its support base, raising the risk that internal tensions could erupt alongside the external conflict.
At the same time, resentment among the displaced communities towards the government has been steadily growing. This is partly linked to the government’s recent decisions criminalising Hizbullah’s military activities, but more fundamentally it is linked to what many perceive as a failure to provide adequate assistance to the displaced.
Although a number of shelters have been opened in schools, public facilities, and some places of worship, the sudden scale of the displacement has overwhelmed both government and community capacities to meet the rapidly rising needs.
Meanwhile, some pro-Hizbullah influencers’ hostile reactions to the government have prompted official interventions. The authorities have arrested several people on charges of incitement to violence and detained some Hizbullah members who were openly carrying weapons in the streets.
Although the causes of the internal rifts appear evident, Lebanese civil society, whose role became particularly visible during previous crises, including the protest movement of 2019 and the aftermath of the Beirut port explosion in 2020, appears to be working to contain them.
Civil society groups have mobilised to assist displaced families regardless of their political or religious affiliations. Some groups who acknowledge their opposition to Hizbullah’s decision to enter the war reject the idea of punishing its supporters or discussing accountability in the midst of a humanitarian emergency.
In the meantime, Hizbullah has not yet provided the financial compensation it has traditionally offered to its supporters during periods of war. Displaced families are instead relying on public shelters, personal savings, and civil-society relief initiatives.
This situation may challenge Hizbullah in maintaining the loyalty of its support base. Just as it may need to repair its political alliances, it may also be required to undertake a similar process within its own constituency.
For now, there is no clear indication that circumstances are shifting in Hizbullah’s favour. It is certain, however, that the party is in a battle for survival politically, socially, and militarily.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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