Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine delivered a briefing on Operation Epic Fury on 2 March, outlining the objectives and progress of the campaign.
“We are now roughly 57 hours into the operation in the initial phase. CENTCOM’s focus was the systematic targeting of the Iranians’ command and control infrastructure, naval forces, ballistic missile sites and intelligence infrastructure [and was] designed to daze and confuse them,” he said.
“We will now begin to expand inland, striking progressively deeper... creating additional freedom of manoeuvre.”
The US-Israeli military campaign against Iran has now entered its second week of nonstop operations, yet Iranian ballistic missiles and drones continue to be launched. These strikes have not been limited to Israeli airspace, as in the 12‑day war of 2025, but have also targeted US forces across the Gulf region, reaching as far as Cyprus and the British base at Akrotiri.
This escalation raises a critical question: how are the parties to the conflict managing the war at the level of military planning? How are appropriate weapons selected for each mission?
In his book The Indirect Approach, UK military strategist B.H. Liddell Hart laid down a fundamental principle for achieving superiority in combat: sustained pressure through attrition. Yet, he argued, genuine victory comes from striking in ways the enemy least anticipates. Flexibility, or maintaining multiple options, combined with speed and the mobility to hit the adversary’s “Achilles’ heel”, can induce paralysis in both the enemy’s mind and command structure.
In the opening phase of the US-Israeli air campaign against Iran, the objectives were clear: establish air superiority and prepare the space for subsequent operations. This mission was carried out through the combined air operation (COMAO) concept of 50 to 100 aircraft assigned to specific sectors.
Each wave of attack began with cyberattacks and electronic jamming against early-warning radar using specialised aircraft such as the EA‑18G Growler equipped with AN/ALQ‑99 and AN/ALQ‑249 pods. In parallel, EC‑130 Compass Call aircraft disrupted communications, isolating air-defence battalions before systematically destroying them to secure flight corridors for follow-on strike packages.
The offensive then shifted to long-range stand-off weapons — cruise missiles like the AGM‑154, AGM‑158, AGM‑84K, and BGM‑109 Tomahawks, alongside Israeli systems such as Ice Breaker, Golden Horizon, and Rampage.
These weapons allowed strikes from safe distances, minimising exposure to ambushes by mobile air defence units or decoys around ballistic missile launchers. To add momentum, loitering munitions such as the US LUCAS drones and Israel’s Delilah missiles were employed.
Once the enemy defences showed signs of collapse, the campaign transitioned to lower-cost precision weapons, including glide bombs (GBU‑39 and Spice‑250ER), Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), and Spice kits (sophisticated guidance systems), as well as armed drones like MQ‑9 Reaper, Eitan, and Hermes‑900 carrying missiles such as the AGM‑114 Hellfire and Mecholit.
The success of the initial phase relied on carefully sequenced steps executed at speed with maximum flexibility. Stealth aircraft like the F‑35 and F‑22 penetrated defences, while heavy fighters such as the F‑15 and F/A‑18, alongside strategic bombers, delivered large payloads.
This combination provided commanders with the luxury of choosing the most suitable weapon for each target, balancing cost, availability, and survivability.
The Iranian response came just three hours after the launch of the US-Israeli air campaign. Tehran fired some 300 ballistic missiles, not only at Israel but also at US bases and positions across the Gulf.
Despite possessing newer missile systems, Iran relied heavily on designs developed in the 2000s such as the Emad and Qadr to provide the bulk of the salvo. These were supplemented by more advanced types, including the Kheibar Shekan and Haj Qassem aimed at Israel, alongside tactical short-range systems like the Fateh and Qassem Basir.
The missile strikes were carried out in parallel with waves of suicide drones of various models.
The objective of this broad offensive was to stretch US defensive efforts beyond Israel, forcing them to cover a wider theatre. By expanding the scope of the attacks, Iran sought to disrupt not only American defensive planning but also that of European forces deployed to support Israel.
French, Italian, and British contingents stationed in the Middle East were among the targets, underscoring Tehran’s intent to complicate coalition operations and dilute their ability to concentrate on a single front.
As a form of combat adaptation, the US intensified its strikes to destroy Iranian ballistic missile launchers, reducing missile attacks by 90 per cent and drone strikes by 75 per cent. Yet, this adjustment was met with a counter‑adaptation from Tehran. In the second phase, Iran shifted its missile and drone deployment strategy, relying on mobile launchers, constantly changing firing positions, and disguising trucks to resemble civilian vehicles.
Small platforms were also used to launch drones and cruise missiles, while the target set itself was altered. Iranian forces began striking US long‑range early‑warning radars and THAAD batteries, the most advanced systems for intercepting ballistic missiles, in the UAE, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
Neutralising these assets, which are difficult to replace quickly, effectively struck at the “Achilles’ heel” of the American defensive architecture.
On the weapons level, although the intensity of the attacks on Israel declined, Iran introduced more sophisticated systems, including hypersonic missiles such as the Fattah and the Khorramshahr, considered among the best in its arsenal.
It also deployed Shahab‑3 missiles with cluster warheads dispersing over an 8 km radius, which are nearly impossible to intercept, but highly effective in depleting valuable air defence interceptors. The main Iranian strategy was the production of low‑cost munitions built from easily sourced components, enabling rapid replacement and sustained use.
Coastal missile batteries exemplified this approach: despite US claims of neutralising Iran’s naval forces’ shore‑based systems remained operational and even fired at an American aircraft carrier late in the week.
Although the strike failed, the persistence of such systems underscored Washington’s inability to guarantee secure passage for trade and oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. US commanders themselves admitted that the US Navy lacks ships to provide continuous escort operations without risking its destroyers.
The conflict has now entered a phase of relentless resource attrition. According to estimates from the University of Pennsylvania, Brown University, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a single day of the US-Israeli campaign costs approximately $891.4 million.
The first 100 hours alone amounted to $3.7 billion. Should the war continue for two months, the total expenditure is projected to range between $40 and $95 billion, depending on the deployment of ground forces and the pace of munitions resupply.
Caine acknowledged that the campaign is increasingly reliant on lower-cost, high-stock munitions. While this adaptation could reduce the intensity of the strikes, it allows for more concentrated and rapid operations aimed at compelling the adversary to yield quickly.
On the Iranian side, despite heavy losses, the involvement of Iraqi militias has eased the burden of sustaining attacks on US positions in Iraq and Kuwait. Meanwhile, Hizbullah’s entry into the conflict in Lebanon has provided additional momentum, maintaining pressure on Israel and reducing the strain on Iranian defences compared to the opening days of the campaign.
In this way, Tehran has also found its own method of adaptation.
At the outset of the campaign, the US and Israeli forces focused on neutralising Iran’s surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking systems. This raises the question: how effective is Iran’s targeting today? The answer lies in Russian and Chinese support. Unlike previous rounds of assistance, this time the backing has not come in the form of weapons deliveries, but rather through technical expertise and intelligence-sharing.
According to the US network CNN, “Russia is providing Iran with intelligence about the locations and movements of American troops, ships and aircraft… Much of the intelligence Russia has shared with Iran has been imagery from Moscow’s sophisticated constellation of overhead satellites. It is not clear what Russia is getting in return for the assistance.”
China’s role has been pivotal in enhancing Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. By shifting guidance systems to rely on the BeiDou‑3 (BDS‑3) satellite network, Iranian weapons now benefit from advanced features such as complex frequency hopping and Navigation Message Authentication (NMA), which prevents spoofing.
As a result, Israeli jammers can no longer mislead drones into false coordinates, and accuracy has improved to a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of less than five metres.
Equipped with a two‑way tactical data link, Iranian controllers can redirect missiles and drones at ranges of up to 2,000 km to evade interception by US and Israeli defences. This adaptation forces defenders to rely on direct “hard kill” interceptions using costly air defence missiles, while simultaneously diverting fighter aircraft from offensive missions to chase Iranian drones.
In effect, the strategy not only drains valuable defensive stockpiles but also adds another layer of pressure on attacking forces.
So how could this war end? According to Liddell Hart, “in war, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the opponent without loosening his foothold and balance can only be possible through an immense margin of superior strength in some form, and, even so, tends to lose decisiveness.”
Applied to the Iranian case, this balance has not yet been lost despite the elimination of most of the country’s senior commanders in one of the most innovative and sophisticated US air campaigns in recent history.
The Iranian regime remains intact, which suggests that a new variable will be required to break the deadlock. Otherwise, the war risks devolving into a prolonged war of attrition, continuing until one side’s stockpiles fall below a critical threshold that undermines its ability to sustain operations.
*The writer is a senior researcher at the Egyptian Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS).
* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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