One dimension of this strategy appears linked to Tehran’s potential effort to leverage control over strategic maritime corridors, possibly laying the groundwork for broader coordinated naval disruption across a wide geographic space.
Such a move would aim to unsettle the international environment while sending a clear warning to global actors against becoming more deeply involved in the war alongside Washington.
This could occur through the disruption of maritime navigation in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global trade—particularly oil shipments—passes. Recent reports suggesting that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has asserted control over the strait—despite persistent US denials—have intensified global anxiety regarding the security of this critical waterway.
Should the Strait of Hormuz be effectively closed, the consequences would represent both a strategic shock and a major economic upheaval, potentially triggering sharp increases in global oil prices and sending tremors through the international economy.
In such a scenario, Tehran might consider expanding the geographical scope of the conflict with the United States and Israel by targeting their interests at other critical maritime chokepoints. One possible direction would be westward toward the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, located at the southern entrance of the Red Sea.
Such a move could be carried out through one of Iran’s most prominent regional allies, the Yemeni Houthi movement, a development that would likely accelerate the militarization of the Red Sea. This corridor is among the most important arteries of global commerce, with more than 23 percent of international trade passing through it.
By spreading instability across several strategic regions—beyond the Persian Gulf to include the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa—Tehran could significantly increase the operational costs of the military campaign against it while demonstrating its capacity to destabilize a wider regional order.
These dynamics reinforce growing concerns that the Horn of Africa could emerge as a new theater in the ongoing Middle Eastern conflict.
This possibility is further underscored by the region’s rising strategic importance in the calculations of several international and regional actors. The United States and Israel, for example, have shown increasing interest in strengthening their presence in the area, including through cooperation with Somaliland.
At the same time, the Horn of Africa hosts a dense network of foreign military facilities established by powers seeking to safeguard their geopolitical interests and strategic influence. Countries such as China, France, Italy, and Turkey maintain significant military or security footprints in the region. Should Tehran seek to escalate its confrontation with Washington beyond Iranian territory, the Horn of Africa could therefore become a critical pressure point.
Legitimate Targets
From Tehran’s perspective, the Horn of Africa represents an extension of the strategic architecture underpinning Western interests, particularly those of the United States. If the conflict escalates beyond manageable limits, the region could become a potential arena for targeting American and Israeli interests.
Such a development could serve as leverage to push the international community toward exerting pressure on Washington and Tel Aviv to de-escalate their military campaign against Iran, while simultaneously warning other international actors about the risks of becoming entangled in the conflict.
Paradoxically, expanding the confrontation into the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa would threaten not only American and Israeli interests but also those of numerous international and regional actors. Several Gulf states, for instance, depend heavily on the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea shipping lanes for the transportation of their oil exports to global markets. Disruptions in maritime navigation through the Red Sea could, therefore, trigger a broader regional crisis, potentially leading to the further militarization of commercial shipping routes and increasing maritime security risks.
In the short term, such developments would likely intensify global economic uncertainty while exacerbating geopolitical polarization among major powers. From Tehran’s perspective, the resulting economic and security repercussions might shift part of the blame toward Washington and Tel Aviv, particularly if the conflict leads to significant disruptions in global trade and energy markets.
Under these circumstances, Iran could pursue escalation as a means of pressuring the United States while demonstrating its capacity to open multiple fronts simultaneously and threaten international interests in strategically sensitive areas. The ultimate objective would be clear: raise the cost of undermining Iranian interests across the Middle East.
A Ready Regional Proxy
In the event of further escalation between Tehran and Washington, Iran retains several strategic tools in its confrontation with the United States. One of the most significant is the Houthis in Yemen, which has not yet fully activated its military capabilities since the outbreak of the conflict.
Despite issuing threats to intervene should hostilities intensify against Iran, the Houthis have so far refrained from launching large-scale operations. However, their potential entry into the conflict could place the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea at serious risk. Renewed Houthi attacks on vessels transiting this corridor would once again threaten international maritime traffic at one of the world’s most critical chokepoints.
The Houthis understand that the success of a US–Israeli campaign aimed at toppling the Iranian regime would represent an existential threat to their movement. Their ideological alignment with Tehran, combined with their dependence on Iranian logistical support, military training, technical expertise, and financial assistance, strengthens the likelihood that they would intervene in support of Iran.
Consequently, the Houthis could expand their military activities in the Red Sea in an attempt to ease the pressure on Tehran while simultaneously raising the economic costs of the conflict for the international community. Their strategy might include renewed maritime attacks aimed at disrupting global trade and energy supplies, as well as missile and drone strikes against Israel and American interests in the Horn of Africa—including the US military base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.
There is also the possibility that the Houthis could exploit their relationship with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab militant group, encouraging intensified militant operations designed to destabilize the broader regional environment.
Potential Arenas of Confrontation
Several countries in the Horn of Africa—including Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya, along with the self-declared state of Somaliland—have condemned Iranian drone attacks on Gulf states, describing them as unjustified aggression. Notably, however, these reactions have largely avoided direct criticism of the initial US–Israeli strikes against Tehran.
Within Iran’s broader strategy of transforming maritime chokepoints into arenas of confrontation with Washington, Djibouti holds particular significance. Its geopolitical importance stems from its location overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the presence of multiple foreign military bases on its territory, including the US military facility at Camp Lemonnier.
From Tehran’s perspective—and potentially that of its Houthi allies—Djibouti could therefore become a strategic target through which American interests might be threatened. Similar to previous attacks on US military facilities in the Gulf region, strikes against installations linked to Western powers in Djibouti could transform the country into a stage for broader geopolitical confrontation.
Such a scenario would place Djibouti in a highly precarious position. The country lacks robust conventional deterrence capabilities and does not possess advanced air defense systems comparable to those of larger regional states. As a result, it could be compelled to rely on the protection of foreign military bases located on its territory—potentially drawing additional actors, such as France, into the conflict.
Another potential arena of confrontation could emerge in Somaliland. Should Israel attempt to use the territory as a launch platform for operations against the Houthis or Iran, Houthi forces might respond with missile and drone attacks targeting the region. The Houthis have already warned, roughly two months ago, that they would target any Israeli military presence in Somaliland.
Such developments could transform Somalia and its surrounding territories into a new arena for proxy warfare, further destabilizing the fragile security landscape of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The region already faces a complex security environment marked by political instability and maritime insecurity in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—conditions that could deteriorate further if the conflict expands.
Dangerous Consequences
Any escalation in the military confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other carries serious consequences across multiple levels. Disruptions to critical maritime corridors—particularly the Red Sea—could widen the conflict by drawing additional powers into the confrontation as they seek to protect their vital economic and strategic interests.
Energy-importing states would likely search for alternative routes to secure their oil supplies should the Strait of Hormuz become inaccessible. In reality, the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are not isolated passages but rather integral components of a connected maritime system linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea within the broader geopolitical architecture of global shipping routes.
If shipping companies begin avoiding the Red Sea entirely, global trade flows and supply chains could suffer significant disruption. Economies that rely heavily on maritime transit revenues—particularly those bordering the Red Sea—would face considerable economic pressure.
At the same time, the Horn of Africa appears increasingly vulnerable to becoming a proxy battlefield between Washington and Tehran and their respective allies. Should tensions continue to escalate in the Middle East, the conflict could spill into the region, posing serious threats to the stability and security of the Horn of Africa as a whole.
In sum, the current regional landscape remains open to multiple scenarios regarding the possible expansion of the US–Israeli–Iranian confrontation beyond the Middle East. It is premature to conclude that Tehran has exhausted its strategic leverage. The Red Sea may still represent a powerful strategic card that Iran could deploy in an effort to compel Washington to reconsider further escalation.
By threatening maritime navigation at key chokepoints—most notably the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb—Tehran could reshape the trajectory of the conflict and potentially prolong the duration of military confrontation across the region.
*The writer is an Associate Researcher at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
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