This question is tied to the objectives and determinants of American behaviour and the extent to which it aligns with Israeli calculations regarding the overthrow of the Iranian regime.
It is also linked to the limits of the regime’s ability to endure and exert pressure on regional states, particularly the Gulf countries, given their geographical proximity, their hosting of US military bases, and their pivotal role in managing the global economy.
Moreover, it is related to Iran’s capacity to continue obstructing maritime navigation and imposing constraints on global trade movement.
The United States may be able to initiate war or decide to go to war on its own, but it cannot end it according to its own vision alone. This is what is often described as the “quicksand dilemma,” because the conclusion of the conflict depends on other factors related to the calculations of its ally (Israel), the pressures of regional partners (the Gulf states), the reaction of the adversary (Iran), and the condition of global markets, particularly in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.
At times, the adversary may even see an advantage in continuing a limited confrontation, viewing it as an opportunity to improve its negotiating position or political standing. Iran, for its part, seeks to demonstrate its ability to endure, whether to its own population, the region, or the international community.
At the same time, the governing vision of the Iranian ruling elite, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), holds that negotiations with Washington do not offer real guarantees for de-escalation.
This perception has been reinforced by the multiple rounds of negotiations in Muscat and Geneva, which ultimately ended in war that not only destroyed military infrastructure and vital facilities but also eroded the political trust necessary for any meaningful negotiations.
This comes alongside continued statements by US Central Command, emphasizing that the Iranian regime has for years represented “the primary threat to peace and stability in the Middle East,” as reflected in its statement published on 13 March on the platform X.
In addition, the American administration, particularly President Donald Trump, has displayed inconsistency in its expectations regarding the outcome of the war, blurring the distinction between overthrowing the regime and merely changing its behaviour.
In remarks to Fox News on 13 March, Trump expressed confidence that the Iranian people would move to overthrow the current regime after the American–Israeli attack. Yet he later acknowledged in an interview broadcast on Friday that such an outcome might not occur immediately.
This ambiguity points to the possibility of further escalation, as the warring parties attempt to target increasingly painful vulnerabilities while potentially drawing new actors into the conflict and widening the geographic scope of confrontation.
Layers of complexity
Each new piece of information or strategic shift is likely to produce new answers regarding the “day after” the war, whether through a US declaration formally ending the conflict, an Israeli decision regarding escalation, or an Iranian gesture of cooperation or response to calls for de-escalation.
Despite the enormous volume of articles, analyses, and policy assessments produced by newspapers and research centres regarding the US–Israeli war against Iran, a significant degree of uncertainty remains surrounding the question of the “day after.”
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed this uncertainty following his meeting with President Donald Trump. In an interview with the German television channel ZDF on 4 March, he acknowledged that he still lacked answers about how the situation in Iran might evolve after the war.
It can therefore be said that many unresolved issues surround the “day after” the war, particularly those related to the limits of change in the ongoing military confrontation between the warring parties.
Iranian political system after the war
No structural changes have occurred within the Iranian political system during the war, despite the heavy losses Tehran has suffered in its ballistic missile capabilities, naval forces, air defenses, nuclear facilities, and security institutions, as well as the targeting of key figures such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior commanders within the army, the Revolutionary Guard, intelligence services, and command-and-control centres.
These strikes were absorbed rapidly, as if contingency plans had already been prepared to deal with the worst scenarios the country might face at a given moment, particularly during the early hours of the war.
Despite the enormous military power and exceptional destructive capabilities possessed by the United States and Israel, they had not, by the 15th day of the war, succeeded in overthrowing the Iranian regime or even paralyzing its political will to endure and survive.
According to an analysis published in the Financial Times by Simon Gass, the former British ambassador to Tehran, Washington’s main mistake lies not in underestimating Iran’s military power but in misunderstanding the nature of the regime itself.
The Iranian system is not a simple hierarchical pyramid that collapses with the killing of its leader. Rather, it is a system that has developed over decades around the principle of resilience in the face of external pressure and Western sanctions. Heavy strikes may weaken it or exhaust it militarily, but they do not necessarily lead to its disintegration.
The Iranian political system remains complex in terms of the internal balance of power, which is still concentrated in three key institutions: the supreme leader, who embodies religious and revolutionary legitimacy; the Revolutionary Guard, which controls military power, economic networks, and operational structures; and the government, which manages the country’s internal affairs. Iran is therefore not a personal dictatorship but a multi-centred authoritarian structure.
The supreme leader remains the decisive authority, yet his role also involves managing internal political balances. This helps explain why the regime has not collapsed even when one of these centres of power has been subjected to severe blows. In this context, resilience in the face of external attack becomes part of the regime’s own legitimacy.
This dynamic appears not to have been fully understood by President Trump or by the strategic elite surrounding him. Ideological regimes of this kind are often capable of suppressing popular protests that periodically emerge.
Social anger exists, and the economy is under pressure, but there is no cohesive opposition infrastructure capable of transforming social unrest into a structured political project for regime change.
Iran lacks a unified opposition leadership and the organizational networks capable of translating street protests into a political transition. Social dissatisfaction alone is insufficient to produce revolution.
Moreover, the Iranian regime recognizes that external aggression can temporarily reinforce national cohesion, even within divided societies.
Managing relations between Iran and regional states
The future management of relations between Iran and regional states remains one of the central challenges facing many countries in the region, particularly the Gulf states, Jordan, and Iraq. These countries have seen their territories, facilities, and airports repeatedly targeted despite not being direct participants in the war.
Meanwhile, countries such as Egypt and Morocco have issued official statements condemning Iranian policies, indicating that nearly half of the Arab states may approach Iran’s external behaviour with caution and apprehension.
In this context, Iran has shifted in perception from a neighbouring state requiring pragmatic engagement to a source of threat for many regional actors, reflecting a strategic logic summarized as: if my ship sinks, all other ships must sink with it.
If the war ends without a decisive military shift, or more likely with the survival of the Iranian regime, then Iran after 28 February will not be the same as Iran before that date. Iran has lost much of its air defences and significant portions of its naval and air forces, while continuing to lose missile launch platforms and weapons depots daily.
At the same time, the naval and aerial blockade imposed by the United States and Israel has prevented Tehran from importing weapons, equipment, or spare parts from Russia or China. This weakening could affect its relations with neighbouring states and extend to its ties with proxy groups in conflict-ridden Arab countries. Saudi writer Abdulrahman Al-Rashed has described this situation as “living with a broken regime.”
However, the dilemma lies in Tehran’s attempt to emerge from this weakened position by projecting an image of renewed toughness while simultaneously maintaining rhetoric about prioritizing good-neighbourly relations. Such rhetoric must ultimately be translated into practical policies.
In an effort to preserve relations with Gulf countries, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian issued a direct apology on 7 March, stating, “I apologize to neighbouring countries; we harbour no hostility toward them.” He added that Iran must work with neighbouring states to ensure security and peace.
However, these statements have been received with scepticism. In an interview with Sky News, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani stated that Gulf Cooperation Council states had been working together to formulate a collective position emphasizing that they wished to see the Iranian president’s statements translated into action.
He added that while these discussions were underway, the same Gulf states were simultaneously being targeted by attacks, an experience that significantly reduced the political credibility of Pezeshkian’s remarks.
Any constructive future relationship between Iran and the Gulf states will therefore require distinguishing between the policies that preceded the war, those pursued during the conflict, and the strategies that will define the postwar environment.
Reassessing Gulf dependence on US security system
The postwar environment may also prompt Gulf states to reconsider their reliance on the American security umbrella that has defined the region since the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.
Questions may arise regarding the reliability of the United States as a partner capable of protecting regional allies from existing threats or emerging security risks. This could encourage greater exploration of regional security arrangements within an increasingly unstable Middle East, where cooperation among regional actors may become necessary to safeguard national and regional security.
The United States appears primarily concerned with protecting its own interests and supporting Israel’s security, without necessarily extending the same level of protection to other allies in the region. This perception could lead Gulf states to rethink the future of their defence systems and to strengthen institutionalized military cooperation among themselves.
Restoring Gulf economic stability
A major challenge will confront Gulf states, albeit to varying degrees, in the aftermath of the war: the rapid restoration of energy production after weeks of disruption caused by Iranian attacks on major energy facilities.
Statements issued by major regional energy companies, including QatarEnergy, Bahrain’s Bapco, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), indicate that the conflict has damaged supply chains, energy infrastructure, and financial flows.
This disruption has shaken the long-standing image of the Gulf as an “oasis of stability,” raising concerns about the vulnerability of energy supplies in global markets. Preventing this perception from becoming entrenched will therefore be a central priority for Gulf governments.
The risk of Lebanon sliding into civil war
Lebanon represents another potential flashpoint. One possible scenario is the outbreak of a civil war exceeding in intensity the Lebanese civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990.
Israel is likely to continue targeting Hezbollah even if the war with Iran ends, viewing the current moment as a strategic opportunity that may not recur following the shock of the Al-Aqsa Flood and Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict since 2 March.
Israel may seek to eliminate any future threat originating from Hezbollah’s strongholds in southern Beirut and southern Lebanon. In this context, a ground invasion remains possible, potentially resulting in the destruction of Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure and transforming parts of the country into battlefields resembling Khan Younis in Gaza.
This risk is heightened by Lebanon’s severe economic crisis, which the World Bank has described as one of the worst crises globally since the mid-19th century.
Securing maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz
Ensuring the flow of maritime navigation and global trade through the Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most urgent challenges. Even before the war ends, the United States is likely to prioritize reopening the strait after its near-closure, which disrupted the passage of nearly one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade.
Iran has demonstrated its ability to increase the costs of risk for vessels attempting to transit the strait, not necessarily by mining the waterway or physically blocking it, but through the use of drones, intermittent attacks on tankers, or the issuance of threats that raise insurance premiums and psychological uncertainty.
In this sense, the financial and psychological costs imposed on global shipping become a weapon in themselves. President Donald Trump pledged on 14 March that the United States would ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open “one way or another,” warning that Washington could intensify strikes along the Iranian coastline and continue targeting Iranian vessels.
Ambiguous plans
The plans for the “day after” the war remain ambiguous. A significant body of analysis suggests that Washington and Tel Aviv do not share identical visions regarding the outcome of the conflict, prompting some observers to distinguish between “Trump’s war” and “Netanyahu’s war.”
Previous experiences in Gaza and Venezuela illustrate the complexities of externally driven regime change. Iran, as a state, differs fundamentally from Hamas as a movement, and replicating the Venezuelan scenario, where an alternative leadership was quickly elevated, would be far more difficult in Iran’s political system.
At the same time, the postwar environment will require the establishment of new governing principles for relations between Iran and the states of the region, particularly in the Gulf. Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Doha have come to recognize that Iran’s message during the war was not directed at any single Gulf capital.
Airports, ports, hotels, energy facilities, digital infrastructure, and civilian neighbourhoods across the region were all placed within the potential targeting range. Strategic choices regarding security alliances, defence policies, and foreign relations themselves became potential targets.
In this sense, Iran has shifted from a discourse emphasizing the priority of neighbouring relations to a strategy of confrontation that directly implicates its neighbours. Whether Tehran will ultimately recalibrate its regional approach remains uncertain.
What is clear is that the region is entering a new phase characterized by volatility, widening margins of surprise, and a diminished capacity for reliable prediction in an international and regional environment where political leaders appear increasingly determined to reshape the political order of the Middle East.
* The writer is head of the Arab and Regional Studies Unit at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
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