What begins as a limited operation can gradually expand, drawing in new actors, widening the battlefield, and raising the stakes far beyond the initial plan.
Few scholars have examined this pattern more closely than Robert A. Pape, the American political scientist whose work on coercive strategy and air power has influenced military and foreign-policy debates in Washington for decades.
Pape, a professor at the University of Chicago and director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, first gained international recognition with his book Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Published in the 1990s, the study challenged one of the central assumptions of modern military doctrine — that bombing campaigns alone can compel states to surrender.
He examined dozens of air campaigns from World War II to the late Twentieth Century and reached a conclusion that unsettled many strategists. Air power can destroy infrastructure, disrupt command systems, and impose enormous costs, yet it rarely forces governments to capitulate. Societies under attack often prove more resilient than military planners expect. External pressure can even strengthen domestic cohesion, making political surrender less likely.
This insight lies behind a concept that has gained renewed attention during the current war involving Iran: the “escalation trap.”
The idea is straightforward. A war begins with a limited use of force intended to compel the adversary to alter its behaviour. When that pressure fails to produce the expected political result, leaders face a choice. They can reconsider their strategy, or they can increase the level of force in the belief that stronger pressure will succeed where the initial effort did not.
More often than not, escalation becomes the chosen path.
As Pape wrote recently in his analysis of the unfolding US-Israel war on Iran, escalation traps appear when “early battlefield success produces strategic disappointment.” In such situations, policymakers often interpret the failure to achieve political results not as a problem of strategy but as evidence that the campaign has not gone far enough.
The pattern is visible in the current confrontation.
The opening phase of the war in late February saw large-scale US and Israeli airstrikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure and military leadership. The strikes inflicted substantial damage and eliminated several senior commanders. From a military perspective, the operation was tactically effective.
Yet the political outcome proved less decisive. The Iranian regime remained intact, and Tehran demonstrated its capacity to retaliate through missile attacks and regional pressure.
That gap between battlefield success and political result is precisely the condition Pape has long warned about.
“The biggest illusion in the Iran war,” he wrote recently, “is that the United States controls escalation.” The remark reflects a broader concern among strategists that conflicts initiated as limited operations can quickly acquire dynamics of their own.
One reason is that adversaries adapt. States confronted by superior military force rarely respond by confronting that power directly. Instead, they look for ways to impose costs in areas where their opponent is more vulnerable.
In the case of Iran, much of that pressure has focused on strategic geography, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. The narrow passage linking the Persian Gulf to global shipping routes carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply. Any disruption there can reverberate immediately through international energy markets.
Iranian strategy increasingly reflects what analysts describe as horizontal escalation — shifting the conflict away from direct military confrontation toward areas where economic consequences become global. Missile strikes, attacks on regional infrastructure, and threats to maritime traffic all serve this purpose.
Pape has warned that the Strait could become the most dangerous theatre of the conflict. In one recent assessment he noted that mining the Strait of Hormuz could dramatically escalate the war and take weeks to clear, highlighting how easily a regional confrontation could disrupt global energy flows.
When conflicts reach this stage, their consequences extend far beyond the immediate battlefield. The war is no longer confined to military targets; it touches the infrastructure of the world economy.
For Pape, the most dangerous moment in a war rarely occurs at the beginning. Early phases are usually marked by caution and limited objectives. The greater risk emerges later, when the conflict enters what might be described as its middle phase — the point at which casualties have occurred, resources have been committed, and political reputations are tied to the outcome.
At that stage, retreat becomes politically difficult. Leaders fear that stepping back may appear as weakness. Allies demand perseverance, while adversaries interpret restraint as an opportunity to push further. Escalation begins to appear easier than compromise.
History offers many examples of this trajectory. The Vietnam War began with a small advisory mission before evolving into a massive military intervention that lasted more than a decade. NATO’s campaign in Kosovo in 1999 was initially presented as a short air operation but expanded as Serbian resistance continued. Even the Russia–Ukraine war, which many expected to produce a rapid outcome, has turned into a prolonged conflict.
Each began with limited expectations. None remained limited.
This is what Pape means by an escalation trap. Military actions provoke counteractions, each round raising the stakes. Over time, the conflict becomes less about the original political objectives and more about avoiding defeat.
Iran, Pape argues, has spent years preparing for precisely such a confrontation. Rather than matching Western military power directly, Tehran has developed strategies designed to raise the cost of conflict across the region — through missile capabilities, regional alliances, and the ability to threaten maritime trade.
If those dynamics deepen, the conflict may increasingly move beyond the battlefield into the global economy. Recent fighting has already unsettled shipping routes and heightened volatility in oil markets. What began as a military confrontation is gradually intersecting with the arteries of international energy supply.
The opening phase of the war may therefore already be behind us. The more consequential decisions lie ahead.
For Pape, the lesson of modern warfare is clear. Escalation often appears logical in the moment. Yet, once conflicts enter the spiral of retaliation and counter-retaliation, controlling their trajectory becomes far more difficult.
By then, the war no longer belongs to the leaders who believed they could keep it limited.
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