The role that wars and revolutions play in international relations and the world order is not unlike that of weddings and funerals in communities and interpersonal relations. They are watershed events that call for consultation and advice from experts on the complex affairs relating to the histories of the winners and losers involved in events.
This year the most crucial issues arose as soon as the US and Israel went to war against Iran. Those issues were discussed by political and strategic affairs experts, with a particular focus on the most pressing question from the opening hours of the war: when will it end? In earlier times such a question would have been dismissed as absurd. In these times, the surplus of news presses the media to keep moving from one event to the other, focusing on what is of greatest interest to viewers. The war on Iran is not immune to this effect, even though it is the fourth Gulf War – the first being the eight-year-long Iraq-Iran War. This became known as the first Gulf War and its repercussions were felt across the region and the world. The second Gulf war erupted after Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Kuwait was liberated on 26 February 1991 thanks to the US-Arab alliance that fought Operation Desert Storm. The third Gulf war broke out when the US decided to launch an all-out invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam and replace the regime to the system Iraq has today. The current, fourth Gulf war is the same as its predecessors in terms of its complexity, which interweaves the Palestinian question, the Israeli question, and varying degrees of US involvement.
Returning to our central question, with previous wars, it was impossible to tell when they would end once they started – and certainly not within the first hour. It has been two weeks since the outbreak of the current war. This is the blink of an eye in the lifespan of wars in this region – let alone international wars – despite the grave developments we have already seen.
What we do know is that both sides of the conflict are determined to persist and ultimately to prevail. Although the balance of power has clearly favoured Israel and the US from day one, the expectations of Zionist and US leaders did not pan out. The Iranian nation did not rise up to overthrow the regime, opening the gates of Tehran to the invaders. Iran has long been accustomed to confronting invasion head-on or through “militias” acting as forward defence.
The fourth Gulf war became complicated barely after it started. This occurred despite the assassination of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and despite the intensive US and Israeli bombardment of Iranian towns and cities, turning some neighbourhoods into replicas of the destruction the world has seen in Gaza.
The Iranian response came as a surprise. Rather than focusing primarily on Israeli targets, it aggravated the world’s pain by making others feel what it is like to be deprived of energy in the modern state. Iran’s attacks against the Arab Gulf states excluded none. Within hours, Iran had launched some 2,700 missiles on those states. A small number reached areas where American forces are stationed, while most struck civilian areas, including airports and locations connected with oil and tourism.
There was no regard for neighbourhood ties, religion, shared history, or even considerations that might encourage mediation to ease the burden on Tehran. Instead, there was a lot of vented anger and vengefulness. This, moreover, was despite the lack of cause, especially given the good relations that had existed before the war between Tehran and Arab capitals.
Like all wars in history, the fourth Gulf war will end. This time, however, the end will not come in the near future, for reasons that historians might find odd. In earlier wars there was never a figure like Donald Trump, who revived the role of the individual in history through “soundbites” in which he diminishes the opponent and boasts of victory. Nor had earlier wars seen a state whose leadership had been so severely compromised during the brief interval between the 12-day war in June 2025 and the current war that erupted on 28 February.
The road is long and rough between assessing the balance of power at the outset of a war and implementing a strategy capable of achieving victory or peace. The US, lacking a vision of its own, surrendered its fate to Israel. As a result, it shelved the peace initiative for Palestine and reconstruction of Gaza while Israel waged a campaign of destruction in Lebanon. Meanwhile Iran’s priorities were not entirely devoted to defending Tehran and the religious establishment in Qom. It also sought to spur its Hizbullah militias into action.
This is a strange war, and it is escalating.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 19 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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