Turkey is seeking to lead accelerated diplomatic efforts to halt the war on Iran. Ankara has stressed the “necessity of ending all hostilities and adhering to a diplomatic solution,” while strongly opposing the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran. But this stance does not reflect political alignment with Tehran.
On the contrary, Ankara would prefer an Iran that is weaker and more confined within its borders. By contrast, Azerbaijan has adopted a more hardline position on Tehran, particularly after it came under attack by four drones reportedly launched from Iran. The drones landed near Nakhchivan International Airport and a school, resulting in injuries among civilians.
As much as Azerbaijan adopts anti-Iran policies, it has strengthened its strategic relations with Israel, becoming Israel’s second closest partner after the US. Azerbaijan has also become a key partner in US regional ambitions, given its strong support for Israel. This has rendered Baku an influential player in the Middle East equation. On 6 March, Azerbaijan withdrew its diplomats from Iran, citing concerns for their safety, one day after Baku announced that Iranian drones had caused injuries in Nakhchivan. Nakhchivan Airport is the only air gateway to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and occupies a highly sensitive strategic location.
Meanwhile, Turkey has sought to maintain a neutral position regarding the war on Iran in order to preserve its current interests with Tehran while safeguarding its strategic alliance with the US. While the Turkish president condemned the attack on Tehran, describing it as serving Israel’s interests in its attempt to dominate the region and redraw the regional map in line with its own narrow agenda, Ankara has also voiced sharp criticism of Iran’s strategy towards the Gulf states.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned of the “risks of Iran directly targeting US bases in Arab countries,” arguing that such actions could escalate the situation into a broader regional security crisis. He also called for ensuring the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and safeguarding international navigation there in order to prevent volatility in global financial and energy markets. Fidan also criticised Iran’s strategy of attacking the Gulf states in retaliation for strikes against it, noting that such actions further destabilise the region. On 4 March, the Turkish Foreign Ministry summoned Iran’s ambassador in Ankara and delivered a formal protest after the launch of a ballistic missile from Iran towards Turkish territory.
Fears in Azerbaijan and Turkey are mounting over the repercussions of the war, particularly the escalation of tensions between Turkey and Israel. This was evident in remarks by former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett at the end of February, when he warned of a “new Turkish threat” to Israel. Bennett stated that Ankara was replacing Tehran as Israel’s principal danger and described President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “a sophisticated and dangerous adversary” who has emerged as a major strategic threat to Israel.
Both Turkey and Azerbaijan, which share borders with Iran, are also increasingly concerned about the prospect of large-scale Iranian migration should the war be prolonged. On the eve of the outbreak of the war in February, Turkey announced the temporary closure of three border crossings with Iran — Ağrı-Gürbulak, Van-Kapıköy, and Hakkari-Esendere — to daily passenger traffic, while imposing restrictions on the movement of goods.
Operations at these crossings later resumed in coordination with the Iranian administrative authorities. The land border between the two countries stretches for 500 km, and Ankara fears that if the war continues, it could prompt people in Iran to seek entry into Turkey, particularly through the eastern Turkish provinces bordering Iran. This would add more economic, security, and demographic challenges to Turkey, which is already grappling with the consequences of the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey and Azerbaijan also share concerns about the possible resurgence of terrorist organisations in the border regions. On 4 March, Turkey announced the arrest of dozens of members of the Islamic State (IS) group, which means that terrorist organisations continue to operate in Turkey and along its borders. This also means that IS could exploit the current regional insecurity to its advantage, by recruiting new members, particularly among those opposed to the war against Tehran and who view Israel and the US as enemies of Islam, among other ways.
In the meantime, Ankara and Baku are fishing for opportunities through the war. Both capitals view the weakening of the Iranian regime as a chance to strengthen and expand their regional presence at Iran’s expense. Their pursuit of neutrality, or carefully calibrated engagement, creates favourable conditions for further developing relations with the US. Notably, Turkey has intensified its contacts with the various parties to the crisis and has repeatedly affirmed its readiness to play a mediating role. Both countries are also seeking to enhance their diplomatic standing in the Middle East by supporting efforts aimed at de-escalation, particularly amid rising tensions between Hizbullah and Israel. Turkey is coordinating with regional and international players to contain military escalation and prevent the outbreak of a wider regional war.
Erdoğan called on all parties involved in the war to exercise restraint and return to the negotiating table, stressing Ankara’s potential role as a mediator. He also pledged to exert diplomatic pressure on all sides, in cooperation with the states of the region, the European Union, and the UN, to promote de-escalation in the Middle East. Along parallel lines, Baku and Ankara are betting on strengthening their strategic relations with the US while attempting to contain the intensity of their rivalry with Tehran. The success of efforts by Turkey and Azerbaijan to advance their objectives depends primarily on the response of the belligerents to Turkey’s mediation efforts, the ability of Turkey and Azerbaijan to mobilise international support for their de-escalation initiatives and, above all, Iran’s willingness to utilise Turkish mediation.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 19 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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