In what Israel is framing as its most sweeping targeted operation since the killing of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the opening day of the US-Israeli war on Iran, it has claimed responsibility for the killing of Ali Larijani, secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, and Gholamreza Soleimani, commander of the Basij militia, along with several other senior Basij figures.
The strikes, presented as a calculated effort to excise the regime’s core leadership, are intended to weaken and ultimately unravel the structure of power in Tehran.
Iran has not confirmed the reports, but if they are verified Larijani’s death would mark the removal of arguably the most consequential figure in Iran’s post-Khamenei order. Larijani was reportedly targeted in a strike on an apartment in Tehran, where he was said to be with his son.
Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that Israel would “continue hunting down” Iran’s leadership, portraying the operation as part of a broader campaign to degrade Iran’s ability to coordinate internally and project power externally.
Israeli officials described the operation as “precise, intelligence-driven, and strategically necessary”. According to Israeli sources, the strikes are a continuation of a deliberate decapitation strategy aimed at dismantling Iran’s senior leadership network. The implication was clear: remove the brain, and the body falters.
That assumption, however, is precisely where the strategic logic of the strikes begins to fracture.
Larijani was not an ordinary official. A former speaker of parliament, ex-national security adviser, and longtime insider within Iran’s political elite, he occupied a unique position bridging ideological factions. He combined technocratic competence with deep institutional memory, having served across multiple administrations.
His influence extended beyond formal titles into the informal networks that shape Iranian policymaking. Following the killing of Khamenei, Larijani issued a defiant warning that Iran would make its enemies “regret” their actions. He played a central role in directing Iran’s military response from the outset of the war and emerged as one of the country’s principal political faces alongside Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
However, the premise that eliminating such individuals will produce systemic collapse misunderstands how the Iranian system has evolved, especially in recent years.
Iran has been here before. The repeated use of decapitation tactics against its leadership, most notably in the prior assassinations of senior military and nuclear figures, has forced a structural adaptation.
What has emerged is not a brittle hierarchy dependent on singular personalities, but a distributed model of governance designed explicitly to absorb shocks. Since at least late February, Iran’s leadership appears to have anticipated a scenario involving the intensified targeting of senior figures. The preparations reportedly included reinforcing chains of succession, clarifying operational doctrines, and decentralising decision-making authority across both political and security institutions.
This is not decentralisation in the sense of fragmentation. It is controlled dispersion.
The system operates on a shared strategic framework understood by senior officials and their deputies across the country from Tehran to peripheral provinces. Within that framework, individuals and institutions are empowered to act autonomously when necessary.
Decisions that would traditionally have required centralised approval can be executed locally, provided they align with the overarching national strategy. Communication with the centre becomes situational rather than constant. In effect, the system is designed to continue functioning even when key nodes are removed.
This is why the assumption, echoed in statements by US President Donald Trump who recently claimed there is “no one left to talk to in Tehran,” rings hollow. Leadership in Iran is not concentrated in a single individual or even a narrow circle. Even in the face of high-level targeted killings, governance will not simply evaporate. Instead, it is redistributed among a cadre of experienced figures who have long operated within the system’s upper tiers.
Among these figures are individuals such as the current Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) Ahmad Vahidi, who oversees the war effort against the United States and Israel; Mohsen Rezaei, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guard, recently appointed as a security adviser to new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei; Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guard commander who currently heads the Iranian parliament; Ali Akbar Velayati, a veteran politician who served for decades as an adviser to the Supreme Leader; and Hassan Rouhani, a former president and former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
These are influential figures with extensive experience in shaping Iran’s national defence strategy. They are deeply embedded in the system’s strategic core and are integral components of an already functioning network. This ecosystem is resilient precisely because it does not rely on any single individual.
The logic behind decapitation strategies assumes that leadership removal creates paralysis, confusion, and competition. That may hold in loosely organised or personality-driven systems. It is far less effective against structures that have institutionalised succession and distributed authority.
None of this is to suggest that the loss of figures like Larijani or Gholamreza Soleimani will be inconsequential. Their experience, networks, and institutional knowledge cannot be instantly replicated. There is always a transitional cost, but a cost is not a collapse.
Israel’s framing of the alleged assassinations as a decisive turning point reflects a broader strategic narrative and one that prioritises visible, high-impact actions and their immediate symbolic value. From a tactical perspective, such operations may achieve specific objectives: disrupting plans, removing key individuals, and demonstrating reach. But strategy operates on a different timeline. It is measured not in singular events, but in cumulative effects.
If the objective is to dismantle Iran’s centre of power and induce internal chaos, the evidence suggests that decapitation alone is insufficient. In that sense, the current moment may reveal less about the success of Israel’s operations and more about the limits of the strategy underpinning them.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 19 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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