However, it raises many questions about the "day after" war for all parties involved, including the United States and Israel, and especially for Iran, as well as neighbouring countries, particularly the Gulf states.
At the same time, everyone is watching Russia and China's stance on the war, the settlement, and the day after the conflict, which has reached its peak.
The Iranian leadership appears to be in a difficult position. Amidst existential threats to both the regime and the state, it must find complex answers to questions of destiny, the most important of which are: When can a ceasefire be considered to be in its best interest, preventing it from being subjected to successive rounds of war until it collapses? Has a "list of conditions" begun to take shape for a sustainable cessation of hostilities? Could this include a package of compromises, such as lifting sanctions and allowing access to frozen assets? Does the basket include its allies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon, to prevent it from being singled out? Is it even capable of achieving its demands in the first place?.
The dilemma facing Tehran's leaders doesn't end there; it extends to neighbours and allies. Among the most pressing questions are: Can the widening rift with the Gulf states be bridged in the "day after"? Do Russia or China have the capacity to mediate and reach satisfactory solutions? And with which of these players is the most likely to be involved?.
Adding to the complexity of the situation is the fact that shifts in international positions regarding the war, particularly from China and Russia, seem largely contingent on Iran's ability to withstand the raging storm.
Tehran appears to believe that the higher the cost of the war, both regionally and internationally, the more likely it is to secure a more sustainable ceasefire that better addresses its demands. Moreover, it believes that this high cost will ultimately secure its very existence, which has been and remains under threat. Anything less, it sees as a slow suicide, one that offered no prospect of survival in the first place.
As for the neighbouring countries, they are in a difficult and no less perplexed position. The war was imposed on them, they failed to prevent it, and they are paying a heavy price for it. They are looking for answers to important questions such as: How can the war be stopped, and under what conditions? And what are the scenarios for the day after the war stops in Iran?
Marc Lynch, director of POMEPS, a major Middle East research project, believes that Gulf leaders have “good reason to believe that the United States and Israel have launched a war not only against their interests but against their very survival.” They are “deeply concerned about Israel’s strategy of regime change in Iran, which involves destroying Iranian state institutions, because they realise they are not immune to its catastrophic consequences.” Lynch adds that the Iranian regime, whether it survives or is replaced by a similar one, “will remember well the power it gained by attacking the Gulf and the movement of oil tankers.” If it falls and the state collapses, the Gulf states will be exposed to refugee flows, maritime disruptions, extremism, and the fallout from armed violence, and will no longer trust “the United States to defend them.”
Iran is aware of all this and understands that its options were extremely limited, if not outright surrender. It has acted accordingly, albeit somewhat haphazardly. Perhaps this randomness—or some of it—was intentional, intended to demonstrate that Iran's capacity to play a destabilising role in the region has not yet reached its peak, and that this peak would be precisely its collapse.
Iran's ability to defy expectations and its resilience have confounded the calculations of the Trump administration and Israel. The anticipated image of a swift and decisive victory, followed by the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior figures in his regime, has not materialised.
About a week before the war, a classified report was issued by the National Intelligence Council, which provides periodic assessments to the 18 US intelligence agencies. The report, later leaked, concluded that a large-scale US attack on Iran would likely not topple its military and religious establishments, and it did not address the possibility of deploying US ground troops.
The report's authors predicted that the Iranian regime would respond to the assassination of the Supreme Leader by following protocols designed to maintain its grip on power, and they ruled out the possibility of the fragmented Iranian opposition replacing the regime. The report appears to have accurately predicted the course of events so far, although nothing yet confirms that things will unfold contrary to the wishes of Washington and Tel Aviv.
On the other hand, John Mearsheimer, the renowned international relations theorist, says that “the Americans and Israelis will be frustrated by the lack of a clear strategy.” In a recently broadcast interview, he compares the current military campaign to the one that targeted the Ansar Allah group in Yemen, which ended with an American retreat. However, he adds that the issue with Iran is different, as the escalation is still unfolding and the nature of the war is more fateful for the parties involved.
At some point, very soon, every additional day of war will work in Tehran's favour because America under Trump, and Israel under any administration and any prime minister, are ill-prepared for a protracted campaign. It will be difficult for Israeli society, and indeed American society, to endure.
While markets are suffering from "the biggest supply shortage in history, greater than the Arab oil embargo, the Iranian revolution, and the invasion of Kuwait combined," as Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi put it, US President Donald Trump has threatened Iran with "unprecedented" military consequences if it lays naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz, which would escalate the conflict to a more dangerous level.
Meanwhile, US envoy Steve Witkopf confirmed that Trump remains open to dialogue with Iran, but stressed that the fundamental question remains whether Tehran truly desires a diplomatic solution, noting that the indications so far do not suggest this.
I believe we are approaching a point of "difficult exhaustion" due to the cost of war and the risk of it spiralling out of control. This is a favourable moment for a deal, despite the escalation by both sides, because each party to the crisis can portray it as a victory. Iran can present the regime's survival as a victory, while Trump will portray his assassination of Khamenei and the resulting destruction as a victory. The Arab world and the rest of the world will breathe a sigh of relief at the extinguishing of the greatest fire threatening the region and the world.
I believe that this deal is possible if the Arab and Islamic countries, especially Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Iraq, move to present a "balanced deal" and convince the parties to the crisis that the time has come to stop the fighting and sign a deal with international guarantees.
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