The Gulf’s critical position within global energy markets has long reinforced the assumption that its security is a matter of shared international economic interest. This helped embed a model of indirect deterrence, premised on the understanding that any major disruption in the region would impose significant costs on the global economy.
The recent conflict with Iran, however, has exposed the limits of this model. Guarantees once considered robust no longer offer the same degree of strategic reassurance, while the nature of contemporary threats facing Gulf states has grown increasingly complex, outstripping the capacity of conventional deterrence frameworks.
Missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf states have provided a real-time stress test of their ability to secure strategic airspace in a rapidly evolving operational environment. While advanced air defence systems intercepted the majority of these attacks, the episode underscores a critical lesson: deterrence can no longer rely solely on technological superiority. It now requires adaptability to shifting threat vectors and the development of resilient, multi-layered defence architectures capable of countering low-cost, high-impact platforms.
These lessons are likely to drive substantial enhancements in Gulf defence postures—not simply through increased military spending, but through integrated air and missile defence systems capable of addressing a wide spectrum of threats, from ballistic missiles and drones to cyber operations. This shift may also catalyse deeper forms of regional military coordination, despite persistent political and institutional barriers to full defence integration.
At the same time, these developments are expected to accelerate efforts to diversify energy export routes, reducing reliance on the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. Existing pipelines that bypass the strait have demonstrated their value, but also their limitations. Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline (Petroline), for example, carries around seven million barrels per day from the Eastern Province to Yanbu, while the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline (ADCOP) has a capacity of roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, fully circumventing the strait. While these alternatives improve resilience, they do not eliminate the need for robust regional and international security arrangements to ensure freedom of navigation and protect key maritime corridors, particularly for states such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, which lack viable alternatives.
The conflict has also reaffirmed the close link between Gulf security and global economic stability. Despite major shifts in the global energy landscape—from the US shale revolution to the expansion of renewables—Gulf states remain central to balancing global markets. The crisis demonstrated how even localised disruptions can quickly ripple through oil and gas prices, inflation, and growth trajectories in major economies.
More broadly, Gulf security can no longer be treated as a purely regional issue. It is increasingly embedded in a wider international matrix shaped by great-power competition. China’s expanding economic footprint, the sustained US military presence, and Russia’s strategic manoeuvring together position the Gulf as a theatre of complex geopolitical balancing. As a result, the region’s stability will depend not only on the capabilities of Gulf states but also on how major powers manage their overlapping interests in one of the world’s most economically sensitive arenas.
Despite this growing complexity, the United States is likely to remain the cornerstone of Gulf security for the foreseeable future, given its military preeminence, technological advantage, and extensive network of bases and logistical infrastructure. That said, the relationship is likely to evolve, defined by continued interdependence on one hand, and a gradual pursuit of strategic autonomy by some Gulf states on the other.
Ultimately, the recent war marks the Gulf’s entry into a new strategic phase. The post–First Gulf War security architecture remains in place, but no longer operates with the same effectiveness. The key question for policymakers is not whether the security equation will change, but how far, and whether this transformation will lead to a more stable regional order or usher in a new era of open strategic competition.
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