In less than a week, President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi and his top diplomat, Badr Abdelatty, have conducted intense meetings and consultations with partners in the Arab Gulf region. The objective, according to informed diplomatic sources, is to find an exit from the current regional crisis that began with the US-Israeli war on Iran and expanded with Iranian attacks against US and other targets in neighbouring Arab Gulf countries.
On 15 March, Abdelatty visited Doha, Muscat, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi. On Thursday, President Sisi visited Abu Dhabi and Doha. On Saturday, he visited Riyadh and Manama. Also on Saturday, while in Riyadh with President Sisi, Abdel-Atty met with Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani counterparts.
According to the diplomatic sources, discussing the basis for a new comprehensive security regime, one that could serve as a first step towards ending the current war, is at the core of the consultations Egyptian officials have been conducting with Gulf leaders, as well as in parallel with the leadership in Iran and several world capitals.
“Clearly, the Arab Gulf countries have been genuinely upset by the Iranian strikes against targets in their countries,” said one diplomat. He added that an end to the war could only be made sustainable if future engagement is grounded in a framework of diplomacy and non-aggression.
That said, diplomats agreed that while it is important to work towards a coherent Arab/Islamic understanding of what is needed for regional stability, ending the war is ultimately a decision that will be taken in Washington.
On Thursday, US President Trump said he was looking into “winding down the war”. However, his statement came as the US faced criticism from allies in Europe and the Arab world for having initiated a war that was not well thought through, with no clear objectives or timeline.
It also came against the backdrop of a growing global energy crisis, exacerbated by Iran’s partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for about a quarter of global oil and LNG transit, along with Israeli strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure and subsequent Iranian strikes on oil and gas installations in the Gulf.
According to a Washington-based Arab diplomat, the situation remains far from clear. He added that it is difficult to predict the trajectory of events, with the US set to deploy additional marine forces in the region and speculation mounting over a plan to take control of the strategically crucial Kharg Island to force Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
“Needless to say, such an on-the-ground operation is far from being welcomed in decision-making circles in Washington,” the diplomat said. He noted that with 13 US military personnel killed since the start of the war on 28 February, and 230 wounded, “this war is getting more and more unpopular, especially in the US Congress”.
A US president cannot conduct a war for more than 60 days without congressional approval. According to the diplomat, it appears unlikely that Trump would be able—if he wished—to secure approval for a longer war.
Although Republicans hold a majority in Congress, the war is not particularly popular among them, the diplomat added.
However, according to a recent paper published by the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, both the decision to start the war and the decision to end it are shaped by a complex web of relationships in Washington that extends beyond legislators or the administration.
Titled “A decision-making for war within the Trump quarter”, the 17-page paper—authored by Ezzat Ibrahim, head of the American Studies programme at the ECSS—argues that the decision to launch the war was made amid both pressure and pushback from multiple actors, including US-based lobbies and external players, particularly Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
“This war is not just another episode of a long conflict between Washington and Tehran,” the paper noted.
On 4 November 1979, only eight months after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, a group of revolutionaries stormed the US embassy in Tehran. They held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days in response to Washington’s decision to allow the deposed Shah to receive medical treatment in the US.
While the crisis ended on 20 January 1981, tensions between the two countries continued, including US involvement in what was effectively an Israeli war on Iran last summer under the pretext of “obliterating Iran’s nuclear capacity”.
However, according to the ECSS paper, this war “is different not only because of the scope and volume of the military operations but also because of the complex environment that allowed for the decision of war to be taken”.
The paper argues that it is difficult to claim the war was launched based on a clear and direct threat to US interests. Instead, it points to a combination of factors, including regional power balances, concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme, external pressure from allies—particularly Israel—and internal economic and political dynamics within the US.
Setting aside the debate over Washington’s motives, the paper focuses on how the decision for war was made. Understanding these dynamics, it suggests, is key to understanding how the war might end.
“This is a war that was taken by a highly central president along with some conflicting quarters of bureaucracy and many foreign influences,” the paper noted. It added that the differing motives among these actors make it difficult to foresee an end to the war before most believe their objectives have been achieved.
The paper also noted that the diversity of actors and objectives has led to an expansive set of goals, making it harder to conclude the war and claim victory, as some have suggested.
Published on 16 March, the paper noted that internal debate within Trump’s inner circle remains unresolved.
“Some are proposing that this war needs to all but fully eliminate Iran’s military capacity [not just its nuclear programme and ballistic missiles capacity] while some are proposing the need to find a quick political exit from the war that could well turn into a quagmire,” it said.
On Saturday, both Trump and some of his military chiefs spoke of significant success in achieving their stated objectives, namely, containing Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities.
The paper noted that “already some pro-diplomacy advocates inside the White House” are working to revive a diplomatic track that had continued until the final hours before the war, with Omani mediation.
It argued that this camp aligns with others, including parts of the MAGA movement that oppose prolonged foreign entanglements, as well as those concerned about the economic fallout of a prolonged war, particularly rising fuel prices.
“A considerable hike in the prices of oil is firmly a very sensitive matter for the American public opinion too,” the paper noted.
However, it added that Netanyahu, along with the Israeli lobby in the US, continues to push for the war to continue. It cited several US think tanks suggesting that the decision for war may have been taken during a Netanyahu-Trump meeting in Washington just two weeks before the conflict, outside formal intelligence assessments.
“Obviously, there are considerable differences behind the US objectives and those of Israel behind this war—even if they might have some common aspects, they are not identical,” the paper noted.
“Netanyahu, as he said repeatedly, is aiming to change the face of the Middle East—something that falls on the right side of the hawkish camp in Washington,” it added. This is not necessarily Trump’s position, who may be more inclined to settle for degrading Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities.
“Clearly, Netanyahu would always try to raise the bar but he is not finally the one who can influence the decision to end the war… with direct help from the US Lobby in the US that is working to make the traditionally difficult decisions possible to embrace—through close coordination with those inside the US Administration who share their vision,” the paper noted.
According to another paper published by World Politics Review, regional powers must now step in, set aside differences, and attempt to create a pathway out of the war with an eye on future stability.
Published on 10 March, “War and disorder are mobilizing the Middle East’s middle powers”, co-authored by Dalia Ghanem and Ahmed Morsy of the Doha-based Middle East Council on Global Affairs, suggests that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Algeria have been coordinating mediation efforts, having previously attempted to prevent the war and contain other regional crises.
“The logic of this realignment is anchored in a shared political identity. Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are fundamentally statist powers that view governing systems in which centralized authority, often with the military as its backbone, as the sole guarantor of social order,” the paper noted.
It added that the current war “poses a new and unique challenge” because while Israel’s targeting strategy may appear to serve some Gulf interests, “the emergence of Israel as an unchallenged hegemon… is an outcome that most middle powers would like to avoid”.
According to diplomats who spoke to Ahram Online, it may take only days for clearer indications to emerge as to whether the war will end, continue, or evolve into a protracted low-intensity conflict.
On Saturday, as the war entered its fourth week, Iranians marked both Eid Al-Fitr and Nowruz, the Persian New Year.
In a message posted on X, Iran’s President Massoud Pezeshkian sent a conciliatory signal to Arab neighbours, saying Iran does not seek conflict with neighbouring or Muslim countries.
Addressing his own people, Pezeshkian wrote, “This year, more than ever, we need Nowruz… that showcases unity, cohesion and national harmony in our culture. Let us join hands to guide our Iran through the storms it has fallen into, emerging proud and triumphant.”
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