Rather, the war—and the interactions among its political actors—has increasingly taken shape within a more complex regional and international context, in which the confrontation with Iran stands out as a defining pressure.

The military escalation against Tehran has not only reordered the priorities of major powers in the Middle East, but has also redrawn the map of conflict on the periphery—most notably in Sudan, which has shifted from a marginal arena into a point of intersection linking Red Sea security, networks of political Islam, and international containment strategies. In this light, understanding the dynamics of ending the Sudanese war is no longer possible without accounting for this new variable, which shapes not only settlement paths but also the nature of the actors themselves, their legitimacy, and the limits of their inclusion in any future political arrangements.

Historically, relations between Sudan and Iran have not been incidental. They were rooted in deep ideological and strategic convergence following the rise of Islamists to power in 1989. The Iranian Revolution served as what can be described as an “inspirational model” for Sudan’s Islamist elite, while international sanctions on Sudan opened the door to long-standing security and military cooperation that included training, capacity-building, and the development of military industries. With the outbreak of war in April 2023, Islamist currents found an opportunity to reposition themselves within the military establishment, benefiting from the collapse of the political transition and the growing need to mobilise manpower against the Rapid Support Forces. This helps explain the intersection between the Sudanese war and the war on Iran—not only at the level of ideological affinity, but also through overlapping networks of interest and cross-border ties.

With the outbreak of military confrontation with Iran in 2026, Sudan entered a new phase of strategic repositioning within the regional landscape. The war is no longer simply an internal conflict; it has become part of the active margins of a broader confrontation in which international powers seek to contain Iranian influence beyond its immediate sphere. This shift is reflected in increased international attention to Red Sea security, a reassessment of Sudan’s role as a link between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and rising concern over the possibility that it could become a rear platform for networks connected to Tehran. In this context, the Sudanese war is no longer viewed solely through the lens of the army’s conflict with the Rapid Support Forces, but through a broader perspective that redefines actors, examines their alignment with competing regional axes, and questions their ability to integrate into an international system increasingly wary of transnational political Islam.

The designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a terrorist organization marked a turning point. Its impact went beyond narrowing the group’s political space, extending instead to a broader reshaping of the rules of the game—both within the military institution and in international engagement with the Sudanese crisis. This designation reflects a shift in international perception of the conflict: from a struggle over power to a potential arena for the expansion of ideological networks linked to Iran. It therefore imposes strict limits on the possibility of integrating these forces into any future settlement. At the same time, it creates a dilemma. Excluding Islamists, despite its potential advantages, could prolong the conflict, given their deep entrenchment in state structures and society, and their ability to reconstitute themselves in new organisational and military forms.

In this context, the presence of Islamist actors in the Sudanese war is no longer marginal. It has become more visible as these forces seek to restore their political and military roles by taking advantage of the fluid conditions created by the war. Yet this presence is no longer viewed as purely domestic; for many international actors, it is linked to wider networks that may extend to Iran. This perception increases the sensitivity surrounding their role and places them within the core of regional security calculations, rather than within Sudan’s internal balance alone.

Some international assessments suggest that Sudan has become a testing ground for the repercussions of the war on Iran, where containment strategies intersect with the need for stability. There is growing recognition that leaving this conflict unmanaged could allow Iranian influence networks to re-emerge in the Red Sea region. As a result, any path toward ending the war is increasingly conditioned—implicitly or explicitly—on restructuring the actors and ensuring that forces designated as terrorist do not play a role in Sudan’s political future. Yet this approach also reflects a shift in international priorities, which tend to favour forms of functional stability, even at the expense of democratic transformation. This raises serious questions about the future of Sudan’s civilian forces and the nature of the political order that may emerge.

At the same time, concerns are growing about the increasing likelihood of the conflict becoming internationalized, potentially turning Sudan into a theatre for proxy confrontation between regional and global powers. In this regard, the war on Iran is not merely an external factor, but an accelerant of these dynamics, placing the African Union and neighbouring states before unprecedented challenges in containing the crisis without sliding into wider conflict.

Multiple Scenarios

In light of these dynamics, several scenarios emerge for ending the Sudanese war, all of them tied to developments in the war on Iran and to the management of regional and international competition. The first scenario involves a conditional settlement that excludes Islamist factions designated as terrorist organizations, but it faces risks to its sustainability in the presence of potential insurgency and renewed violence. The second points to a deepening of proxy warfare, with Sudan becoming an arena for indirect confrontation between an anti-Iran axis and networks linked to it, including Sudanese Islamists sympathetic to Tehran—an outcome that would prolong the war and complicate any settlement. The third relates to the possibility of a broader regional arrangement that reduces tensions with Iran and positively affects Sudan, though this remains dependent on developments that are difficult to foresee in the near term.

At the centre of these dynamics are important strategic implications for both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which face a dual challenge: preserving Sudan’s stability and preventing its collapse, while ensuring that it does not become a platform for the influence of other regional powers—particularly in light of the growing importance of the Red Sea in Arab national security calculations. Cairo and Riyadh are therefore required to adopt a multidimensional approach that combines support for the Sudanese state, containment of ideological actors, and the strengthening of regional frameworks for settlement, in order to reduce the likelihood of proxy wars on Sudanese territory and preserve regional balance.

In the end, the war on Iran reveals a broader reality: local conflicts can no longer be separated from their regional and international contexts, and pathways to peace are no longer shaped solely within state borders, but within wider balances that are redefining sovereignty itself. Sudan’s future will therefore depend not only on the ability of its actors to reach a settlement, but also on the capacity of regional and international powers to manage their contradictions and prevent the country from sliding into a conflict whose course it cannot control. The question is no longer simply how the war in Sudan might end, but how Sudan can be reintegrated into a regional order shaped by a conflict stretching from Iran to the Red Sea, redrawing the contours of power and legitimacy at the same time.

* The writer is an adviser at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and Expert in African Affairs.  

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