As the current war in the Middle East expands, reaching energy infrastructure, threatening maritime routes, and raising the prospect of a wider regional confrontation, the long-standing crisis of Arab national security is no longer a distant concern.
It has become immediate, visible, and increasingly costly. What was once manageable through containment or delay has now reached a point where the consequences of fragmentation are unfolding in real time.
The region is not facing a single conflict, but an accumulation of pressures: military escalation, economic disruption, and intensifying competition among regional and international powers. These pressures are interconnected, feeding into one another in ways that leave little room for hesitation. In such a context, the absence of coordinated Arab action is no longer a structural weakness alone; it is a strategic vulnerability.
For decades, Arab national security has been addressed through a reactive lens. Crises emerge and responses follow that are often late, fragmented, and rarely sustained. This pattern has produced a gap between potential and performance. The Arab world possesses considerable economic, military, and human capabilities, yet these assets seldom translate into collective influence. The issue has never been a lack of resources, but rather the absence of a unifying strategic direction capable of organising and deploying them effectively.
This gap is compounded by the limitations of existing Arab mechanisms. Over time, they have struggled to adapt to changing realities, often constrained by procedural rigidity and competing national priorities. Their record in managing major crises has exposed structural shortcomings that can no longer be overlooked. Addressing today’s challenges requires more than revisiting old frameworks; it calls for a shift in how coordination itself is conceived, moving from symbolic alignment to operational cooperation.
A practical starting point would be to bring together those directly responsible for security on the ground. Meetings among senior political and military leadership – chiefs of staff, as well as heads of intelligence, national security, and cybersecurity institutions – should be convened among the states most directly exposed to current risks. From there, participation can expand gradually to include other Arab countries willing to engage. Without this layered approach, broader initiatives risk remaining declaratory rather than actionable.
At the same time, the need for a comprehensive Arab national security strategy has become more pressing. Such a strategy must be grounded in a realistic assessment of both threats and capabilities. By most measures, Arab states collectively possess resources that exceed those of many surrounding regional actors. Yet without coordination, these advantages remain dispersed, unable to shape outcomes in a rapidly shifting environment. Strategy, in this sense, is not an abstract exercise; it is the means through which existing capabilities are translated into effective action.
Egypt is well placed to play a central role. Its diplomatic tradition, institutional depth, and regional relationships provide a foundation for initiating and sustaining such an effort. Egyptian diplomacy has historically relied on sustained engagement such as patient consultations, active mediation, and continuous communication, and these methods remain relevant in a moment defined by uncertainty and competing agendas.
One practical step would be the designation of an Egyptian envoy to serve as an Arab national security adviser supported by a high-level team drawn from relevant institutions. The objective would be to work closely with Arab partners to develop a shared strategic vision that addresses immediate risks while also anticipating future challenges. Without such forward planning, the region risks remaining trapped in a cycle of reaction, adjusting to developments shaped by others rather than shaping them directly.
At the political level, summit diplomacy is indispensable. Direct engagement among leaders through visits, consultations, and coordinated diplomatic tours can help build the political understanding necessary for deeper cooperation. These interactions are not merely ceremonial; they are often the only channels capable of overcoming entrenched divisions and aligning national positions around shared priorities.
The urgency of this effort is underscored by the emergence of a widening security vacuum across the region. History suggests that such vacuums do not remain unfilled. External powers are already moving to shape the regional order according to their own interests. In the absence of coordinated Arab action, the region risks becoming an arena defined by external priorities rather than internal consensus.
Egypt, by virtue of its geopolitical position and diplomatic reach, has the capacity to initiate a political process aimed at addressing this vacuum. This would begin with a series of high-level consultations and invitations, leading to successive meetings that build momentum towards a more substantive and outcome-oriented Arab summit. Such a process would not resolve all differences, but it could establish a framework within which those differences are managed rather than allowed to paralyse collective action.
At the same time, any emerging Arab security framework must remain anchored in international legitimacy. Preserving the role of the United Nations is essential, particularly at a time when multilateral institutions are under strain. The UN Charter provides a clear legal basis for collective action in defence of stability and for addressing threats to international peace and security. Rather than bypassing these frameworks, Arab states should make more effective use of them to reinforce their position.
What is at stake is not only influence, but the ability to make strategic choices. The region still possesses that ability, but it is narrowing under the weight of ongoing crises and external pressures. Recovering it will require more than recognition of the problem. It will require coordination, political will, and a readiness to move beyond familiar patterns that have ceased to deliver results.
The moment is not without precedent, but it is defined by a level of urgency that leaves little margin for delay. The question is no longer whether reform is needed, but whether it will come in time to allow the region to shape its own future or whether that future will be shaped for it by others.
The writer is a professor of international relations at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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