The Israeli offensive in Lebanon, now in its fourth week, continues to escalate. While Hizbullah forces continue to engage the Israeli ground incursion in the south of the country, Israel is wreaking widespread destruction to infrastructure linking the area south of the Litani River to the north.
On 22 March, Israel bombed the Qasmiyeh Bridge along the coastal highway linking southern cities like Tyre and Sidon to Beirut.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has decried the collective punishment being carried out by Israel’s deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, thereby obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid, and he has also accused Israel of creating a buffer zone as part of a plan to consolidate the seizure of Lebanese territory south of the Litani River.
Since 13 March, Israel has destroyed other bridges spanning the Litani River. Observers believe that it is accelerating a strategy of isolating the area south of the river to secure its ground invasion and to cut off Hizbullah’s supply lines, a tactic it also used in its previous invasions of Lebanon in 1978, 1982, and 2006.
Israel claims that it is targeting these structures because Hizbullah has used them to transport military equipment. However, it has also struck roads and bridges further south in a manner designed to isolate eastern, central, and western areas from each other, thereby facilitating their encirclement and eventual invasion and occupation.
Israeli Chief-of-Staff Eyal Zamir has stated that the Israeli ground operation in Lebanon is still in its early stages, that it will expand, and that it will be long-term. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich stated on Sunday that the Litani River should demarcate the international border between Lebanon and Israel.
Hizbullah has quickly regained its ability to attack northern and central Israel with rockets and drones. It has even been able to reach as far south as Israeli settlements near the Gaza Strip. Overcast weather during the past week has given the group sufficient cloud cover to infiltrate front-line villages. From there, it has fired salvoes of rockets and drones that have penetrated Israeli air defences, causing significant casualties and damage in Misgav Am and Kiryat Shmona.
The Israeli government has so far refused to evacuate Israel’s northern settlements, in contrast to during its previous engagement with Hizbullah. It argues that its forward ground offensive inside Lebanon will neutralise the threat to these settlements.
Hizbullah also appears to have recovered much of its ability to keep the invading forces locked in intensive close-quarters combat in Southern Lebanese towns and villages, thereby hampering their advancement. The “limited” ground operation announced by the Israeli army on 14 March has become bogged down by fierce clashes on the outskirts of the town of Khiam, which is around five km from the Israeli border.
Israeli forces have pushed northwards into Lebanon from three directions: towards Khiam, Adaisseh, Markaba, and Taybeh in the east; towards Maroun Al‑Ras, Yaroun, and Aita Al‑Shaab in the central sector; and towards Naqoura, Alma Al‑Shaab, and Labouneh in the west.
Initially it was thought the aim was to probe for weaknesses in Hizbullah’s defences; however, it later became clear that the objective was to disperse its forces and obstruct coordination between them.
By stalling the enemy’s advance, Hizbullah has gained more time to breach Israeli air defences, target settlements in northern Israel, and inflict attrition on invading ground forces. The Israeli government’s decision not to evacuate the northern settlements has increased the strains on its domestic front.
However, Israel appears not only to welcome these pressures but also to want to augment them by declassifying the extent of the damage inflicted on civilian infrastructure. The aim is to channel public anger at domestic losses into support for a longer and broader offensive on Lebanon, with a higher tolerance for casualties among the targeted civilian populations in Lebanon as well as for higher losses among Israeli soldiers.
Within Lebanon itself, Hizbullah remains at loggerheads with the Lebanese government. In a notable escalation, deputy head of the group’s Political Council Mahmoud Qomati lashed out at what he described as Lebanon’s “Vichy Government,” an allusion to the regime that collaborated with the Nazi occupation of France during World War II.
He warned that when Hizbullah prevails, it will bring the government to account, forcing it either to apologise and reverse its decision to criminalise the group’s military activity or face an outpouring of public anger that will bring it down.
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam described Qomati’s statement as “blackmail” and an attempt to deflect attention from Hizbullah’s responsibility for the unilateral decision that dragged Lebanon into a war that does not serve its interests.
He said that the government would not slacken in its resolve to establish state authority over decisions of war and peace and to secure a monopoly on arms. The consequences of delaying these steps are evident, he said, claiming that every rocket launched by Hizbullah has led to the displacement of tens of thousands of Lebanese and burdening the government with providing relief to over one million displaced people without restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty.
Since the launch of its latest offensive against Lebanon, Israel has killed more than 1,000 people, including nearly 120 children, 80 women, and 40 medical personnel, according to Lebanon’s Health Ministry.
Most of the displaced civilians in Lebanon have been housed in public facilities, especially schools. This has caused some disruption to education, as instruction in many areas has had to shift to remote learning. The government also plans to adapt to a prolonged war by opening permanent shelters, such as at Sports City near Dahiyeh in southern Beirut and in Karantina near the port north of the city.
The announcement of the latter project has triggered strong opposition from local residents and their MPs, who have cautioned against altering the demographic balance in the area. They have also warned of the risk to the port operations should unrest break out due to grievances among the residents.
As most of the internally displaced persons are from the south, where Hizbullah has its greatest influence, the fear is that the group could incite discontent, causing potential disruptions of the port and other key facilities.
Some have argued that Hizbullah is to blame for the situation by failing to rebuild the internal front in a way that would enable it to sustain a long war without incurring anger and raising the risk of conflict.
In contrast to the previous war, when Hizbullah expressed its gratitude to Lebanese civil society for hosting displaced people, it has since adopted a more confrontational tone towards those who criticise its military choices. This has created obstacles to building cross-sectarian support for its war effort, despite the widespread hostility towards Israel.
Salam has denied rumours that he intends to dismiss Hizbullah ministers or reshuffle the Lebanese government. He said that such steps would be inappropriate during the Israeli aggression and that the priority should be to mobilise efforts to meet the needs of displaced people.
The government is providing comprehensive food, medical, and health services in cooperation with the Red Cross and other civil-society organisations.
As both Hizbullah and Israel dig in for a protracted conflict, US President Donald Trump surprised observers on 23 March by announcing that “constructive” talks had been held with Iran and that he had postponed plans to strike Iranian energy infrastructure and other civilian facilities.
A possible de-escalation on the Iranian front could have a positive impact on Lebanon. It might give Hizbullah’s forces more time to wear down Israeli ground forces, increase pressure on the Israeli domestic front, and obstruct Israel’s plans to seize control of Lebanese territory south of the Litani River on the pretext of creating a buffer zone.
At the same time, however, Hizbullah still faces growing public discontent within Lebanon, raising the risks of mounting internal tensions and perhaps even open conflict if the war continues.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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