On 7 March, as the joint US-Israeli air campaign relentlessly pounded Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) positions around the clock, a trend swept across social media.
It featured a group of young girls signalling with their hands three simple gestures: the first for calm, the second for the start of operations, and the third for the launch of a missile above their heads. Despite the apparent simplicity of these signs, they vividly encapsulated Iran’s military strategy, which unfolds in three stages: absorbing enemy strikes, adapting combat tactics in response to operational developments, and, finally, striking back with force.
In his fourth update, released by US Central Command on 21 March, US Admiral Brad Cooper confirmed that American and Israeli forces had destroyed more than 8,000 Iranian targets overall. These have included major missile facilities and production sites, effectively crippling Iran’s ability to threaten the region with ballistic missiles on a large scale.
As a result, Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks have dropped significantly, a point repeatedly emphasised in several earlier US CENTCOM updates.
On the very same day, Israel’s air defences failed to intercept two warheads fired at the country from Iran. The first struck the city of Arad, causing numerous injuries and several fatalities according to local sources. The second landed just 12 km from Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. This attack was a direct response to the strike on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility.
In its update on daily rocket fire, Israel’s Alma Research and Education Centre reported that on 19 March Iran carried out 19 waves of missile attacks against Israel following the assassination of Ali Larijani, head of Iran’s National Security Council.
The number of strikes exceeded those launched on 2 March prior to the intensified US-Israeli air campaign aimed at weakening Iran’s missile capabilities. For the remaining days, the rate of attacks stabilised at between seven and 12 missiles fired per day, a near-constant pace deliberately maintained by IRGC commanders to sustain battlefield pressure.
In his fourth update, Cooper confirmed that the United States had largely neutralised Iran’s maritime threat. He noted that American forces had destroyed Iran’s largest underground anti-ship missile headquarters using bunker-busting bombs. Operations, he added, remain ongoing to eliminate any residual naval capabilities, with a strong emphasis on safeguarding freedom of navigation and commerce across the region.
Despite these efforts, 24 attacks on commercial vessels have been confirmed, 12 of which sustained severe damage.
From the preceding developments, it becomes clear how Iran has built its strategy by sustaining the missile threat while simultaneously exploiting the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz in an approach designed to secure a measure of military parity on the battlefield.
Crucially, this has not been achieved through Iran’s Air Force or naval frigates, but rather through unconventional weapons systems and tactics increasingly deployed to serve strategic objectives. This doctrine is widely recognised as being an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy.
The United States developed the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept to confront this type of unconventional warfare, focusing on disrupting enemy command-and-control capabilities in a tactic already employed by the Israeli Air Force through the targeted assassinations of Iranian commanders.
Yet these efforts have proved insufficient, as even after the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iranian military operations continued.
As a result, US plans evolved into a second phase involving the deployment of more than 4,000 marines following the call-up of the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer. Their mission is to secure the Strait of Hormuz by seizing key islands overlooking the waterway or even capture Kharg Island to pressure Iran into reopening the strait.
The plan also envisions special forces operating deep inside Iran, integrating ground units into the expanded ASB framework known as the Joint Concept for Access and Manoeuvre in the Global Commons (JAM-GC).
This approach combines land forces with air and naval power to deliver full combat support and firepower, raising critical questions about the effectiveness of deploying ground troops on Iranian soil.
According to former CENTCOM commander Joseph Votel in an interview with the US site The Warzone, “we would be vulnerable. When you start putting troops on the ground – I know there’s some mishmash and words on that – but that’s troops on the ground right there. It also implies that you are going to have to take care of them, you’re going to have to resupply them, you’re going to medevac them, you have to do all the things that keep them in place for whatever period of time.”
“That requires that you have a logistical tail, and at some point that tail has to be protected as well. So, these are not insignificant considerations and they’re often bigger operations.”
Commenting on Iran’s ability to continue launching missiles and drones, Votel said “don’t pay attention to the numbers. The fact of the matter is they’re going to have a remnant portion of capabilities, and that’s a portion we’re focused on right now.”
“Iran’s strategy has been to broaden the conflict by hitting a lot of different places, 12 or 13 different countries, and then to extend it by continuing to present this threat to us over a long period of time. They don’t have to shoot large volleys of missiles and drones. They just have to get some across. They just have to launch some every day. And that’s going to keep our focus, and it’s going to keep us occupied doing that.”
Expanding the scope of the conflict has become one of the pillars of Iran’s strategy compared to the 12-Day War last year. This not only involves unjustified attacks on the Gulf states or the launch of missiles at the island of Diego Garcia, at ranges exceeding 4,000 km and far beyond what was previously known about Iran’s missile arsenal, but also extends to leveraging the issue of strategic straits to intensify global pressure.
By signalling the possibility of closing both the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, Iran seeks to amplify the economic repercussions of the war and sway international public opinion.
In a study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) titled “Sailing in Troubled Waters,” particular attention has been given to the consequences of closing more than one strait simultaneously.
“Global trade possesses a remarkable capacity for adaptation so long as geographic alternatives remain accessible. The closure of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait represents a ‘distance penalty’ that can be mitigated via the Cape of Good Hope, which increases costs but does not sever supply,” it said.
“A true systemic collapse would only occur in the event of a dual choke-point closure, specifically when the Strait of Hormuz is obstructed concurrently with Bab Al-Mandeb. Such a scenario would deprive the global economy of both energy alternatives and goods simultaneously.”
US President Donald Trump told MS Now on 20 March that regime change in Iran is not the primary objective of the US-Israeli war. He said the top priority of the US military operations is preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and dismantling its missile capabilities, not necessarily overthrowing the government.
Meanwhile, what we are now witnessing is a cycle of attrition, draining the military capabilities of both sides over an extended period. Iran had prepared for this from the outset by rationing its munitions and employing militias to prolong its endurance.
US Pentagon officials have stressed that degrading Iran’s capabilities is more effective than relying on leadership decapitation. Analysts note that the IRGC’s parallel structure is designed to function in a decentralised manner, ensuring missile and drone operations continue under field commanders even if senior figures are removed.
The death of a top leader creates political shock, but it does not halt Iran’s military apparatus.
The American strategy of dealing with the Iranian regime by weakening it has so far proven successful. However, it will require a long time to eliminate Iran’s military power and will need a vast amount of high-cost munitions, while increasing the likelihood of further losses among combat units and military personnel.
This creates additional pressure on the US administration and pushes towards diplomacy in ending the war, which remains indispensable to avoid further negative economic repercussions. The story is not over yet, as we will be in the process of learning in the coming days.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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