The emergence of the disagreement into the open, its transformation into a media-driven debate rather than one conducted through discreet diplomatic channels, and the escalation in the tone and vocabulary used by its parties, between the US and its allies in NATO, particularly its European allies, over the allies’ failure to respond to Washington’s call to join a military effort aimed at ensuring that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to international navigation in the face of Iranian efforts to close it to countries Tehran considers hostile, did not come as a surprise to those who had closely followed developments in the interaction between Washington and major European and Western capitals since the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran on February 28, 2026.
From the beginning of the ongoing war, it was clear that the American side limited its coordination to Israel alone months before launching the war. This was unlike previous wars, including the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Washington had sought to build the broadest possible international coalition, particularly among its NATO allies and especially its European partners. European allies’ reactions, although expressing a general desire to see an end to Iran’s nuclear program, and even with some European officials, particularly as the war escalated, stating they would like to see the current regime in Tehran replaced with a Western-style democratic system, did not include any support or endorsement of the US-Israeli war on Iran. Spain went so far as to explicitly and strongly condemn the war, while some other European leaders and the Canadian Prime Minister considered it a violation of international law.
The dominant tone of European leaders’ statements suggested they had not favoured launching the war against Iran in the first place and had been looking toward a peaceful diplomatic settlement to the US-Iranian dispute in its various aspects, one that would address concerns related to Iran’s nuclear program and possibly its ballistic missile program as well. However, what further ignited the disagreement and brought it into the open were public statements at an early stage of the war by the US President criticizing a number of allies across the Atlantic, specifically singling out the British Prime Minister and accusing him of refusing to allow the use of British military bases for launching US attacks on Iran.
These criticisms directed at London were notable for several reasons. First, the strategic nature of the Anglo-Saxon alliance between Washington and London over many decades, which had not been negatively affected by changes in US administrations or British governments. Second, the fact that the British Prime Minister had, early in the war, agreed to allow the US military to use British bases, yet still faced sharp criticism from the US President. Third, Washington had not consulted London in making its decision but had expected compliance with its requests without prior discussion.
The US President’s criticisms did not stop at the British Prime Minister but extended, albeit less directly, to other heads of state or government in NATO or Europe, reminding them that the US is fighting Iran on behalf of all of them and for the sake of global stability, peace, and security, as the US President put it. He also repeatedly warned that without the US-Israeli war on Iran, or even if it had been delayed, a nuclear war would have broken out, initiated by Iran, which, in his view, would have led to World War III.
Although European leaders, including the British Prime Minister, chose to ignore or refrain from commenting on these statements, keen to preserve the transatlantic partnership with Washington on which they depend, the US President, unlike in other areas where he revised his positions over time since the war began, continued to criticize NATO allies, especially Europeans. When Britain, France, and other European countries announced the dispatch of forces, even if symbolic, near the theatre of operations, the US President declared that Washington did not need other NATO countries, that the US would win alone, or even that the US had already won. These statements were certainly not welcomed by European leaders, though they again exercised restraint in their responses to avoid harming relations with Washington.
However, after Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz to countries hostile to Iran, and despite the US President previously stating that US forces could ensure the strait remained open by force and promising that US warships would escort tankers passing through it, statements from within his administration suggested that achieving this would take some time. The President then surprised the world, especially NATO allies, by requesting that they join a “coalition of the willing” to carry out collective military action to guarantee the strait’s openness to international navigation and neutralize any Iranian control over it, including the possible use of force against Iran.
The US President was surprised by the reactions of his NATO allies, especially in Europe, which this time were explicit and unequivocal at the highest levels in rejecting being drawn into a war about which they had not been consulted in advance. They declared that this was not their war, that it must end, and that any change of regime in Iran must come from within. Some also pointed to the failure of previous attempts to impose pro-Western governments through military intervention, as in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and the unfavourable outcomes for the West in both cases. These Western and European leaders also stressed that the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz should be resolved through peaceful and diplomatic means, not through force, and that they would not send their armies or navies to use force to counter Iranian restrictions on navigation in the strait.
At this point, the US President launched a new wave of accusations and criticisms against European leaders, harsher than before. Having previously said that the current British Prime Minister was no Winston Churchill, he went on to say that the French President would not remain long in office, while reminding allies that the US had provided them protection and defence for decades, including its support for Ukraine against Russia. He expressed disappointment with NATO and European and Western leaders’ positions, stressing that he would not forget these stances and hinting that the US would review its policies toward those countries. Notably, at the beginning of the war, he had specifically mentioned that Washington would cut trade relations with Madrid due to the Spanish government’s early and clear condemnation of the US-Israeli war on Iran.
In conclusion, each side has its own valid arguments. Washington reminds its NATO allies, especially in Europe, that it has provided them with a military security umbrella since its major role in defeating the Axis powers in World War II, then defending them during the Cold War between the Western and Eastern blocs, and again during the Russia-Ukraine war. It argues that gratitude should have translated into a prompt and positive response to its requests. On the other hand, Europeans and other Western leaders argue that they were not consulted in advance before the war, that the US administration initially underestimated their weight and role, and that their democratic systems hold them accountable to their peoples if they do not pursue policies aligned with their national interests. They also maintain that the current conflict should be resolved through peaceful and diplomatic channels.
It is difficult to expect either side, Washington on one hand or its European and Western allies on the other, to change their positions in the short term regarding the issues under dispute in the ongoing war, unless developments on the battlefield occur that either strengthen the US case or reinforce the warnings and concerns expressed by Western and European actors outside the US.
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