Despite these vast volumes, these analyses—based on the author’s survey of both Arabic- and English-language sources—have largely overlooked the indicators and determinants that distinguish Oman’s position from those adopted by other Gulf states.
It is important to note that Oman served as a mediator between the United States and Iran across three rounds of negotiations in 2026—one held in Muscat and two in Geneva. The final Geneva round witnessed tangible progress on key issues, including limiting uranium enrichment, lifting sanctions, and establishing verification mechanisms, alongside plans to continue technical consultations in Vienna in early March.
However, the subsequent U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian targets triggered immediate escalation, as Tehran responded with ballistic missiles and drones targeting Israel, U.S. military bases in the region, and Gulf targets, including sites within Oman itself. Accordingly, Oman’s position reflects not only principled restraint but also direct, prior engagement with both Washington and Tehran.
Several indicators highlight the distinctiveness of Oman’s stance. First, Muscat has explicitly rejected the US–Israeli war on Iran. Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi stated publicly on 28 February that the war had undermined serious and effective negotiations and served neither U.S. interests nor global peace. He later described the war as “immoral and illegal” during an emergency Arab League ministerial meeting on 9 March, and Oman reiterated its rejection before the UN Human Rights Council on 25 March, characterizing the war as “illegitimate.”
Second, Oman has deliberately avoided identifying the party responsible for attacks in its official statements, even after Iranian drone strikes targeted areas such as Sohar and Salalah, causing limited material and human losses. This deliberate ambiguity reflects a broader diplomatic approach aligned with calls for restraint and the preservation of good-neighborly relations.
Official statements have instead condemned all violations of international law and emphasized the need to halt missile and drone attacks across the region, while consistently advocating dialogue as the only viable means to resolve disputes. In parallel, Albusaidi has described Iran’s retaliatory strikes against neighboring states as “deeply regrettable and unacceptable,” preserving a careful balance between criticism and de-escalation.
Third, diplomatic channels between Oman and Iran have remained open. In the immediate aftermath of the war’s outbreak, Albusaidi received a call from his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, on 1 March, during which he reaffirmed that diplomacy remains viable and that political efforts must continue despite escalating tensions. Muscat has consistently called for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations as the only sustainable path to resolving the conflict.
Fourth, Oman has emphasized the importance of coordinated Arab action to halt the war. In meetings with Arab ambassadors and international diplomatic representatives, Muscat has called for collective political and diplomatic pressure to contain the conflict and mitigate its consequences, stressing the need to safeguard regional stability and protect shared interests.
Fifth, Oman has characterized the war as a major strategic miscalculation by the administration of Donald Trump. In an article published in The Economist on 18 March, Albusaidi described the conflict as “the greatest miscalculation” of the administration, warning that it threatens both global economic stability and regional security. He further argued that the United States has effectively “lost control of its foreign policy,” and that neither side stands to gain from continued hostilities, with both U.S. and Iranian national interests lying in a swift cessation of the war.
Sixth, Oman has refused to provide any level of support for the war. Albusaidi affirmed in press statements on 12 March that the Sultanate would not offer any assistance that could contribute to the conflict, stressing that any military facilitation must be strictly defensive and grounded in explicit international legitimacy through the UN Security Council. This position is also consistent with Article (13) of Oman’s Basic Law, reflecting both legal and principled opposition to the war.
These positions are underpinned by deeper structural determinants. Foremost among them is Oman’s longstanding commitment to neutrality in regional crises. Muscat has consistently avoided adopting polarizing positions that favor one party at the expense of another, maintaining open lines of communication with all actors. This approach rejects policies that escalate conflicts—such as severing diplomatic ties, withdrawing ambassadors, mobilizing internal opposition, or arming non-state actors—and instead seeks to contain disputes regardless of their intensity. Oman thus positions itself as a meeting point and an open diplomatic channel for all parties, guided by the principle that geography makes permanent adversaries impractical.
Closely related is Oman’s relative independence from prevailing Gulf foreign policy alignments. Since the era of Sultan Qaboos and continuing under Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, Muscat has pursued a distinct path often described as one of “constructive distance” or calibrated mediation.
Muscat refused to sever relations with Egypt following the Camp David Accords; refrained from aligning fully with either side during the Iran–Iraq War; maintained ties with states labeled as “opposition” during the Gulf crises; preserved relations with Syria during its civil war; declined to participate in the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015; and refused to join the diplomatic boycott of Qatar in 2017.
These precedents underscore Oman’s consistent belief that rigid policy alignment among regional actors can sometimes weaken, rather than strengthen, collective stability.
Another key determinant lies in Muscat’s assessment that a diplomatic breakthrough had been within reach before the outbreak of war. Omani officials expressed optimism following the third round of Geneva negotiations, with Albusaidi noting in an interview with CBS’s Face the Nation that “peace was within reach.” He described the progress as “unprecedented,” citing preliminary understandings on limiting enrichment stockpiles and implementing comprehensive verification mechanisms. From this perspective, the war represents a rupture in an emerging diplomatic trajectory rather than an unavoidable outcome.
Oman also recognizes the central role played by Israel in shaping US decision-making toward war. As Albusaidi argued in The Economist, Israel appears to have convinced Washington that the conflict would be swift and easily won. Yet achieving Israel’s broader objectives, he warned, would likely require the deployment of US ground forces and risk entangling Washington in a prolonged and open-ended conflict—the very type of “forever war” that the Trump administration had pledged to avoid.
At the same time, Oman’s position reflects deep concern over the risks of prolonged regional instability. The Sultanate’s foreign policy prioritizes the preservation of regional security, stability, and peace, and it has consistently opposed escalation while supporting mediation efforts accepted by all parties. Ongoing conflicts threaten critical maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, and by extension the security of states bordering it, including Oman itself.
Economic considerations further reinforce Muscat’s stance. The war has increased shipping and maritime insurance costs, disrupted global supply chains, and introduced additional uncertainty into energy markets. The situation has been further complicated by the entry of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) into the conflict since 28 March under the logic of “unity of arenas,” adding pressure on maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb. Omani officials have repeatedly warned that the global economy will bear the cost through rising oil prices and supply chain instability.
Notably, Oman has suffered relatively limited direct damage compared to other Gulf states. Iranian strikes have disproportionately targeted countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, while Oman has experienced comparatively minor incidents.
According to available data, Iran launched 4,391 missiles and drones toward Gulf states as of 25 March, compared to 930 directed at Israel. Approximately 83 percent of these attacks targeted Gulf countries, with the United Arab Emirates alone accounting for 2,156 strikes, followed by Kuwait (791), Saudi Arabia (723), Bahrain (429), Qatar (270), and Oman (22). This disparity in targeting has inevitably shaped threat perceptions and policy responses across the region.
Finally, Oman’s strategic relationship with Iran remains a defining factor. Unlike some of its Gulf neighbors, Muscat does not frame Iran as an expansionist imperial threat but rather as a permanent regional actor whose behavior can be influenced through engagement rather than confrontation. This pragmatic outlook reflects a broader Omani strategic philosophy that prioritizes cooperation, dialogue, and sustained communication over isolation or hostility.
In sum, Oman represents a distinct voice in the region—one that diverges from prevailing US and Israeli approaches and instead prioritizes de-escalation, mediation, and the restoration of diplomacy.
For Muscat, the continuation of war serves neither its national interests nor those of the wider Gulf. Rather, it constitutes another episode in a dangerous pattern of violations that risks undermining the legal and security frameworks that have long sustained regional stability.
*The writer is the Head of the Arab and Regional Studies Unit, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
Short link: