Twenty-three years after the 2003 invasion of Iraq led by the United States, the country cannot be captured by a single narrative. It is no longer the state that existed before that date, yet it has not transformed into a fully stable post-conflict model either.
Over these years, multiple layers of reality have accumulated: a functioning state burdened with complex political balances, and a young society with vast aspirations, confronting a governance structure whose contours remain unsettled.
On 13 July 2003, the Iraq Interim Governing Council was announced under the supervision of the US Civil Administrator L Paul Bremer as the first political framework after the fall of the previous regime. The council was designed to represent Iraq’s diverse components as a transitional mechanism to involve all groups in power and prevent exclusion.
Initially intended as a temporary measure to build trust, this muasasa or “power-sharing” formula gradually became a permanent feature in the management of the state, shaping the structure of successive governments and influencing decision-making.
With the ratification of the 2005 constitution, Iraq officially entered the stage of political pluralism. Yet practical experience showed that this pluralism did not translate into strong institutions; instead, it produced a system based on the distribution of influence. Authority was no longer centralised, but it was not managed institutionally either. Instead, it depended on delicate balances between political forces, each holding its share and leverage.
In this context, corruption became more structural than merely administrative. Power-sharing intended to ensure inclusivity turned into a mechanism for distributing resources and positions.
The World Bank noted in a 2022 report that “the power-sharing system based on quotas weakened the effectiveness of public institutions, directing resources according to political considerations rather than developmental priorities.” The International Crisis Group in a 2021 report added that “partisan quota networks created an environment conducive to corruption, where state institutions are used as tools for distributing political gains.”
As a result, corruption became intertwined with the system itself.
Iraq has endured severe phases relating to security, especially with the rise of the Islamic State (IS) group in 2014, which went on to control large parts of Iraq. The government’s declaration of victory in December 2017, following key battles including the Battle of Mosul, marked a significant turning point. But stability nevertheless has remained fragile. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) noted in a 2023 briefing that “security stability is real but reversible without deep reforms.”
Economically, a paradox persists. Iraq possesses significant oil wealth but suffers from a lack of economic diversification. The World Bank’s 2022 report emphasised that “Iraq’s economy remains heavily reliant on oil, while other sectors are incapable of creating sufficient job opportunities.” This is evident in the country’s high youth unemployment.
The generation born after 2003 expressed itself clearly during the October (Tishreen) 2019 protests in the country, which marked a pivotal moment. The international NGO Human Rights Watch reported in 2020 that the protests were “a broad expression of frustration with corruption and mismanagement, demanding radical reform”.
However, despite their political impact, they did not alter the fundamental structure of the system.
Iraq now faces a scene reflecting the accumulation of these paths. Since the recent elections, political deadlock has persisted, with repeated failures to elect a president or form a fully empowered government, amid widespread accusations of political money influencing the electoral process, as UNAMI warned in its 2022 report about “the impact of money and influence on equal opportunity”.
In this vacuum, the government led by Prime Minister Mohamed Shia Al-Sudani functions today as a caretaker administration, limiting its capacity for strategic decisions.
In this situation, domestic statements reflect rising concern about the path the country is taking, including a declaration issued by the Iraqioun Initiative, a group of academics, cultural figures, and political personalities, in the last week of March. The declaration launched a campaign to collect one million signatures demanding the dissolution of parliament and the holding of early elections.
It noted that the country stands “amid regional war and military tensions that threaten Iraq’s stability and fragile cohesion, alongside rapidly deteriorating security and an ongoing economic crisis,” emphasising that the political process “remains stagnant, recording failure after failure without achieving the most basic constitutional milestones.”
It added that “this deliberate deadlock constitutes a blatant violation of the constitution, an abdication of responsibility by the ruling political forces, and a deepening of the political impasse that has mortgaged the interests of Iraqis to quotas and partisan gains.”
It warned that the continued adherence to this approach “is a crime against the nation and its citizens”. It called for dissolving parliament under Article 64 of the constitution, holding new elections within six months, reforming the Independent High Electoral Commission, and activating laws governing party funding and putting all weapons under state control.
The declaration, whether politically adopted or not, reflects an unprecedented loss of trust, not only in individual Iraqi governments but also in the mechanisms of governance itself. It aligns with the warnings of the International Crisis Group in its 2023 report that “Iraq remains vulnerable to being drawn into regional conflicts, given the fragility of its internal situation.”
Such concerns are intensifying with the ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran, raising the possibility of Iraq’s becoming a theatre for proxy confrontations, with consequences for both its security and the economy, especially in a country heavily dependent on international oil markets.
More than two decades after the US-led invasion, Iraq remains trapped in a phase of change that began in 2003 but has not yet reached its end. The challenge is no longer about the fall of a regime or building formal institutions, but redefining the relationship between the state and society, and between authority and responsibility.
While the crises in the country continue in various forms, the question remains whether Iraq can break out of this cycle or whether it will continue to revolve helplessly within it.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 2 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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