The US-Israel-Iran war came as no surprise. Rather, it was a foreseeable development of scenarios set in motion earlier. Iran had already signalled the possibility of mobilising its proxies, foremost among them the Houthis, who possess advanced missile capabilities and can cause trouble for Israel.
The Houthis’ involvement in the war follows unprecedented losses sustained by Iran. It also reflects Houthi concerns over a potential weakening of Iran’s regional position, an outcome that could enable Israel and the US to neutralise the group and limit its influence in Yemen and the wider region.
The Houthis launched their first attacks against Israel on 28 March, with the arrival of additional US forces in the Middle East. The Yemeni group carried out a series of drone and missile strikes targeting Israel as well as commercial and military vessels in the region.
Iran ushered the Houthis into the war for a number of reasons. Iran seeks a number of strategic objectives, expanding the geographic scope of the conflict the better to be able to manage the war with the US and Israel. Tehran also wants to shift the theatre of war towards maritime corridors that are central to global energy security.
The Houthis’ ability to control the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait — a vital shipping artery of strategic importance to Israel and a significant share of global trade — provides Iran with a means to raise the economic costs for its adversaries. The strait accounts for approximately 10 to 12 per cent of global maritime trade. Its disruption or blockade may impede the global flow of oil and goods.
In this sense, the Houthis’ role extends beyond direct military engagement. Their strategy is primarily focused on converting security threats into economic costs by heightening risks in the Red Sea. This, in turn, drives up insurance and shipping costs, compels vessels to alter their routes, and sometimes forces them to adopt more expensive alternatives such as rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope.
At the same time, Iran is seeking to intensify pressure on Israel, which continues to receive unwavering support from the US. Iran is therefore betting on leveraging the Houthi card to increase international pressure on Washington to reconsider its alignment with Israel. Concurrently, it aims to disrupt Israel’s supply chains, given its vulnerability to any closure of Bab Al-Mandeb. Israel relies on maritime routes for nearly 95 per cent of its imports, making any disruption in the strait a direct threat.
Israel’s recognition of the independence of Somaliland last year, along with talks of establishing a military base there, can be seen as a preemptive step to secure Bab Al-Mandeb and prevent Houthi dominance. However, this scenario has yet to materialise on the ground due to persistent political and regional complexities.
The Houthis’ involvement in the war, expanding the geographic scope of the conflict, is meant to disperse the military capacities of the US and Israel, or at the very least compel regional actors to intensify pressure on the Trump administration over the repercussions of the war on Iran.
Tehran is also wagering on a strategy of attrition by opening distant military fronts that necessitate additional, more complex and costlier deployments – technically, financially, and operationally. This is meant to place a sustained strain on the budgets of Washington and Tel Aviv. At the same time, Iran seeks to broaden the scope of the conflict to encompass energy markets, gas supplies, and maritime navigation, to add direct pressure on global markets.
Perhaps most significantly, Tehran is attempting to transform the Houthi card — alongside that of Hizbullah in Southern Lebanon and allied Iraqi factions — into an additional bargaining chip in any prospective negotiations with Washington, should regional mediation efforts manage to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table.
The Houthis’ involvement in the war comes at a price, nevertheless. Tensions may escalate in the Red Sea, particularly as the US and Israel may conduct military operations on the pretext of securing maritime navigation. The US is also likely to renew pressure on Western allies to participate in safeguarding shipping routes in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, potentially through coordinated and targeted military operations against the Houthis.
Israel may also expand its use of precision strikes against Houthi targets to tear down the group’s military capabilities. Washington and Tel Aviv may seek to obstruct any political process concerning the Houthis’ future status in Yemen, including efforts to deny them formal political recognition domestically and internationally.
The US and Israel may, in addition, intensify pressure on the Houthis in an effort to neutralise their presence in Yemen and shift the balance of power on the ground in favour of the internationally recognised Yemeni government. Such pressure could extend to reductions in foreign aid or humanitarian assistance delivered to Yemeni civilians through non-governmental organisations.
It is true the Houthis’ involvement may produce a qualitative shift in the dynamics of the war against Iran, but it far from guarantees victory for Tehran. Rather, it serves primarily to increase the pressure weighing on US-Israeli military and strategic calculations targeting Iran.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 2 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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