Amid the breakdown of longstanding rules of deterrence as a result of the war, the US-Israeli axis started a campaign against Iran. Will the current conflict drag on, or will a new security order be imposed by force?
Regional security is indeed precarious, what with all the sides dealing with the regional security order in a manner that suits their own interest, with no regard for the welfare of others.
This problem must be addressed if a genuine security framework is to be put in place.
The first step, in my view, is for all the parties to work together to formulate a binding regional security system that takes into account the interests of all the stakeholders without exception. This approach will help prevent the recurrence of devastating wars that harm the stability and development of some states while sparing others.
The recent developments surrounding the war on Iran, which will end sooner or later, suggest that the US and Israel aim to impose a security order tailored to their interests, taking advantage of their military and technological capabilities. However, it is too soon to tell whether they will succeed. This will only become clear when the war ends, at which point we will be able to discern the new equations emerging at the regional and international levels.
How has Cairo handled the current crisis in your view, with all its complexities?
Egypt will continue to serve as a stabilising and de-escalating force in this highly turbulent region, given the excellent relations it has with all the concerned parties and others. Cairo’s recent actions, whether taken independently or in coordination with other actors such as Pakistan and Turkey, demonstrate the dynamism of the Egyptian role. That it is welcomed by all sides is one of the keys to its success. This role extends well beyond mediation, and Egypt has become a principal partner in efforts to end the current war and others.
Egypt is not immune to the repercussions of the conflict, however. The longer the war continues, the greater the detrimental impacts it will have on Egypt and many other countries. This will certainly be the case if the Houthis in Yemen escalate their involvement, which will affect navigation through the Bab Al-Mandab and the Suez Canal.
How prepared is Cairo for post-war geopolitical developments?
Egypt’s political leadership fully understands the complexities of the current situation and the implications of the war for both Egypt and the region. Egypt possesses the means and options to respond to whatever scenarios arise in the next phase, which could be even more complex. At present, Egypt is focused on several crucial steps, such as strengthening the domestic front by taking economic and social measures to contain the detrimental impacts of the war as much as possible. It is also continuing to modernise the state across all sectors, especially in the light of the qualitative technological advances we have seen during the war. At the same time, it is recalibrating its external engagements to ensure that domestic and foreign policy efforts converge into a comprehensive programme for grappling with the challenges that come its way in the next phase.
We are seeing unprecedented attempts to sideline Gaza to clear the way for broader regional arrangements. Is this tactic meant to make it possible for US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace to impose an international diplomatic solution on the Palestinian cause, or are we seeing only a temporary de-escalation?
The current war on Iran has shifted attention away from the Gaza crisis, which is only natural. The war will harden the Israeli position on implementing the 20-point plan proposed by Trump and approved by all the concerned parties.
As for the role of the Board of Peace, it could very well play a part in the “day after” in Gaza as this would be consistent with the global role envisioned for it within the framework announced by Trump. Disarming Hamas and the other Palestinian factions in Gaza will be the top priority on returning to the second phase of the Gaza agreement. If Washington and Tel Aviv fail to achieve this diplomatically, they will attempt to do so militarily, towards which end Israel will probably resume its full-scale war on Gaza with US support.
Is a “Sykes-Picot” arrangement being imposed through air superiority?
A major lesson of the current war relates to the role of military technology and air superiority. It has been decisive in achieving major objectives, especially the destruction of critical military, security, nuclear, and economic targets in Iran, as well as the assassination of key Iranian religious, military, political, and scientific figures.
What are the prospects for Pakistani mediation evolving into a comprehensive regional agreement that ends the confrontation?
Pakistan relies on its good relations with the parties to the conflict and its membership in the Board of Peace. These efforts are part of a collective framework involving Egypt and Turkey, which culminated in a quadrilateral meeting in the Pakistani capital to coordinate de-escalation and explore ways to open US-Iranian diplomatic channels, end the war, and prevent its recurrence. The success of these efforts would mark a major turning point in the conflict. Even if the desired results are not achieved, it would generate momentum in the search for political solutions.
Israel is attempting to impose a new reality on the ground in Southern Lebanon. Could it succeed in creating a buffer zone inside the country — which would amount to the de facto annexation of more Lebanese territory?
Lebanon is a chief victim of the war. Not only is Israel conducting strikes and assassinations targeting Hizbullah leaders, institutions, and bases across Lebanon, including in Beirut, it is also establishing buffer zones in the south of the country. These zones will persist for a long time and may even become permanent unless Hizbullah is disarmed. But disarming Hizbullah is a delicate matter that cannot be resolved as easily as some might imagine.
The security of the Gulf relies in part on international protection and in part on autonomous deterrence. Can the Gulf’s domestic militaries replace the dependency on the US umbrella?
The Gulf states will be conducting in-depth assessments to determine how best to protect their national security. Most likely, they will contemplate new tools and methods very different from those employed up to now. Never before have they experienced Iranian attacks on this scale that target all the states indiscriminately. They now perceive an existential threat, and their future policies will reflect this reality, leading to a comprehensive overhaul of their security systems.
Is the geopolitical map of the Middle East being reconfigured in a pragmatic way based on energy corridors, digital connectivity, and transnational military bases?
Given Iran’s actions in the Strait of Hormuz — asserting control over it, restricting the passage of some ships, and targeting some others — maritime security will be high on the agenda in the post-war phase. About 20 per cent of the global oil trade passes through this strait daily. The disruptions have already caused havoc in the global energy markets in a situation that will worsen if the war continues. The US will most likely prioritise securing the international waterways, perhaps through attempts to assert a measure of direct control, economically or militarily, and not necessarily with the consent of regional actors. Such steps might violate these countries’ national sovereignty, sparking new tensions.
How do you see the future of regional alliances?
The nature of future alliances will ultimately be determined by the outcome of the war. Military, economic, and technological bonds are likely to be stronger, more effective, and more diverse. But numerous questions remain. Will these alliances be collective or regional? Will they be Arab-only, or will they include non-Arab parties? If there are new defence agreements, will they be regional or broader? What role will Israel play? Will China and Russia be involved, or will the US remain dominant? In what condition will Iran emerge from the war? I believe that the answers to these questions will determine both the nature and the efficacy of any future alliances.
How do you envision Israel’s political and military future after the direct confrontation with Iran?
Israel continues to pursue its “Greater Israel” project, which its officials have openly acknowledged. It does not aim for integration into the region but for dominance. The US strongly supports this project and will likely push for its implementation throughout 2026. The main obstacle is the evolving Arab stance, which has come to understand the nature of this project. Will the Arabs allow the Israeli hegemony, or will they be able to check Israel’s ambitions? If so, would this be within a framework whereby Israel is a normal state like other states in the region, one bound by certain commitments such as the establishment of a Palestinian state and withdrawing from the Occupied Territories in Lebanon and Syria?
A major challenge that we should begin to prepare for now is that the next Israeli government is likely once again to be far-right, whether led by the present Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or another figure. It will also continue to enjoy the US’s pro-Israel bias, which must change if Washington truly seeks regional stability.
What is the most likely scenario for the region when the war is over?
The US and Israel seem to be operating on the premise that military power brings peace, as seen in Gaza, Venezuela, and to some extent in Iran. This approach does not bring stability. Instead, it leaves the region vulnerable to sudden explosions. It is an approach that is informed by a great deal of arrogance coupled with an inability to grasp the profundity of the problems of this region. Continuing in this mode would be a huge mistake.
A diplomatic approach is essential, especially regarding the Palestinian cause. The West Bank could be headed towards a third Intifada due to the absence of political horizons and Israel’s extremist behaviour, which the US must try to change.
Continuing to rely exclusively on force will only produce further instability and more economic and security crises. These will affect all the parties without exception, both regionally and globally. My message to the US and Israel is that they will not be immune to these negative repercussions as long as their approach to the region is driven by arrogance and the thirst for power and hegemony.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 2 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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