When the US-Israeli war on Iran broke out on 28 February 2026, and for a short time afterward, some believed there was complete harmony and full alignment between Washington and Tel Aviv regarding the objectives of launching this war and the goals intended to be achieved through it. This perception was reinforced by repeated public statements from both countries, delivered on more than one occasion by senior officials, including the US President and the Israeli Prime Minister, early in the war, declaring that it would not end until the political regime in Tehran was overthrown and entirely replaced by a new political system.
However, as the war evolved, escalated, and grew more complex and widespread, and while days and events unfolded without a clear vision of how, when, or under what conditions it might end, two matters became evident. First, there were differences between the US and Israel regarding the war’s objectives. Second, even within each side, there were ongoing shifts, adjustments, and changes in objectives since the outbreak of the war. This situation can be compared to the movement of a “pendulum,” making it difficult to predict which objectives would remain constant and which would change, as well as the timing, direction, scale, and depth of such changes.
Despite acknowledging these differences, one should avoid exaggerating them or assuming they could lead to the collapse of the US-Israeli alliance in the war against Iran. Ultimately, these differences fall within what political science describes as “secondary contradictions,” rather than “primary or fundamental contradictions.” The common ground between the two sides remains, at least under the current US administration and Israeli government, significantly broader and deeper than the areas of disagreement.
American objectives have fluctuated considerably. At times, officials spoke of overthrowing the ruling regime in Tehran and selecting an alternative, preferably from within Iran or from options envisioned by the US President. At other times, they emphasized giving the Iranian people the opportunity to choose their leadership and political system. Other stated goals included weakening Iran by destroying its nuclear programme and missile capabilities, targeting its air defence systems, adding its naval forces to the list of targets, expanding operations to include infrastructure destruction, and even discussing a potential airborne operation to seize the strategic Iranian island of Kharg and end Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.
There has also been talk of targeting Iran’s oil facilities, along with general statements about taking whatever military actions were necessary to render Iran incapable of threatening its neighbours, Israel, the US, and Western interests. Later, attention returned to eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities and cutting the lines of supplies through which Tehran provides military, logistical, and financial support to its allied groups in the region.
On the Israeli side, although shifts in positions were less rapid and less pronounced than those of the US, they were still present. Objectives ranged from completely overthrowing the Iranian regime and “liberating” the Iranian people, as stated by the Israeli Prime Minister, to ensuring the destruction of Iran’s military capabilities, especially nuclear, ballistic, and air power.
Another key goal was dismantling the close alliances between Iran and its regional partners, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and other Islamist-oriented Palestinian armed groups.
Observers of these shifts can easily link them to several factors. These include addressing domestic public opinion in both the US and Israel, as well as appealing to governments and publics in the West, the Middle East, and the Gulf. Another factor is the need to convey messages to countries that compete with, or even oppose, the US's interests and objectives, such as China and Russia. Additionally, the evolution of objectives reflects changes on the ground in military operations, which have experienced ups and downs over the weeks since the war began. Finally, these shifting goals are also part of efforts to exert pressure on Iran and signal threats in an attempt to force it to accept certain demands from Washington and Tel Aviv.
This brings us to the growing divergence between American and Israeli war objectives.
It appears that the US President, due to personal factors such as his leadership style, his strong focus on media and social media, and his concern for his image both domestically and internationally, as well as his desire to always appear victorious, alongside objective considerations, including avoiding responsibility for potential Republican losses in the November 2026 midterm elections, is increasingly cautious. He also seeks to avoid being compared to past US presidents who were blamed for entangling the country in unnecessary foreign wars, such as Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in Vietnam and George W. Bush in both Afghanistan and Iraq—wars whose outcomes were ultimately disastrous for the United States.
Furthermore, the American president does not want the war to drag on to the point where he would need congressional authorization to continue it beyond the first sixty days. Nor does he want to bear responsibility for financing the war through increased budget deficit amid an already massive national debt.
As a result, current assessments, after one month of the war, suggest that the goal of overthrowing or changing the regime in Tehran has significantly declined, with some even arguing it has disappeared altogether. Instead, the US's objectives now revolve around securing guarantees that Iran will not produce nuclear weapons, possibly pushing toward limiting, or even dismantling, its nuclear programme. The objectives could also include seeking concessions regarding Iran's ballistic missile programme, particularly by restricting its range. Additionally, the US probably aims to obtain Iranian commitments to halt support, at least in terms of provision of weapons, logistics, and training, for allied groups in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis, Islamist movements in Palestine, and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces.
On the Israeli side, the picture differs somewhat. The Israeli government may, under pressure from the current US administration, accept the American demands outlined above. However, Israel is unlikely to consider the war over or any ceasefire final. This is because Israeli officials have repeatedly stated throughout the war that the very existence of the current regime in Tehran, given its declared hostility toward Israel, constitutes an existential threat to the state, not just a threat to its security or territorial integrity.
Some, however, question the sincerity of this claim, arguing that Israel’s current leadership is more concerned with preventing the emergence of any competing regional power in its attempt to dominate the region as the sole hegemonic force. Historically, Iran had played a similar role under the Shah until 1979. The difference, however, is that Israel seeks to play this role independently, not on behalf of any global power, even the United States. It seeks first and foremost to serve its own interests.
Moreover, according to statements by its Prime Minister, Israel aspires to evolve from the sole Middle Eastern power to a major global power.
Finally, the current war against Iran serves the current Israeli PM's personal aims since prolonging the war may extend his tenure as prime minister and help him consolidate his power and avoid legal accountability or potential prosecution over allegations of domestic corruption.
Looking ahead, it remains to be seen whether the gap between American and Israeli objectives will widen or narrow. In either case, it is important to reiterate that, from a strategic perspective, and under the current US administration and Israeli government, any differences between the two countries remain secondary rather than fundamental.
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