A considerable body of American scholarship presents Generation Z as the most progressive generation, the most open to diversity, and the least trusting of traditional institutions. Yet, important as this characterization may be, it is not sufficient to explain this generation’s place within the American political system.
The accumulated evidence of recent years makes clear that Generation Z is not a homogeneous political bloc that can simply be described as “liberal” or “progressive.” Rather, it contains visible internal divisions shaped by gender, educational attainment, social position, media environment, and differing understandings of politics itself, as well as varying degrees of trust in parties and formal institutions.
The importance of studying this generation lies not only in the fact that it is the youngest cohort within the American electorate, but also in the fact that its political consciousness was formed in a context fundamentally different from those that shaped earlier generations. Its political maturation took place amid sharp political and social polarization, mounting economic pressures, declining trust in institutions, and the growing salience of climate, rights, and identity issues, in addition to the central role of the digital sphere in shaping political knowledge, mobilization, and collective action. The significance of Generation Z, therefore, lies not only in its voting tendencies, but also in the way it is redefining the relationship between politics and identity, between participation and representation, and between partisan engagement and issue-based mobilization.
This issue carries added importance for the Arab reader because the impact of this generation is not confined to American domestic politics. Recent surveys and studies have shown that younger Americans, especially on the left wing of the Democratic Party, hold more critical views of Israel and more sympathetic attitudes toward Palestinians than older age groups. This gap does not appear to be a passing divergence in public opinion, but rather reflects deeper changes in the ordering of priorities, in conceptions of justice, and in the way young Americans connect foreign issues to domestic narratives about rights and inequality.
Accordingly, this study is guided by a central question: how is Generation Z reshaping American politics through its partisan orientations, political priorities, modes of political participation, and positions on selected foreign policy issues? It proceeds from the hypothesis that the political importance of this generation lies not only in its relative inclination toward the Democratic Party compared with older generations, but also in the fact that it is internally divided, that it is redistributing political and social cleavages within both parties, that it gives priority to a combination of material and rights-based issues, and that it often prefers forms of participation that go beyond traditional partisan channels. The study further suggests that generational shifts in attitudes toward Israel/Palestine and the war on Gaza may, over the medium term, become one of the most important lines of tension in American politics.
First: From the Image of the “Progressive Generation” to the Reality of a Divided Generation
A significant portion of early American scholarship on Generation Z began from the assumption that this generation represented a relative break with some of the political and cultural traits associated with older cohorts. Reports by the Pew Research Center emphasized that Generation Z is the most racially and ethnically diverse among recent American generations, and that, on average, it tends to hold more open attitudes toward diversity and difference, to be more accepting of a role for the state in addressing a number of public problems, and to be less attached to traditional conceptions of national identity and social hierarchy (Pew Research Center 2019; Pew Research Center 2020). On this basis, a broad image took hold in much journalistic and scholarly writing: that Generation Z is, in essence, the new “progressive generation” in American politics.
Yet this image appeared, from the outset, vulnerable to oversimplification. It captured some of the generation’s broad characteristics, but it paid greater attention to the gap between Generation Z and older generations than to the divisions and inequalities within Generation Z itself. For this reason, more recent scholarship has moved to revise this perception, stressing that any political understanding of Generation Z requires viewing it not as a single ideological bloc, but as a generation shaped by intersecting divisions related to gender, educational attainment, identity affiliations, and varying degrees of integration into the public sphere (Deckman 2024).
The importance of Melissa Deckman’s The Politics of Gen Z lies precisely in its exploration of these divisions. Instead of merely asking whether Generation Z is more progressive than other generations, Deckman asks a more precise question: which groups within this generation are driving political action, on which issues, and through what discourse? Through this lens, she shows that Generation Z is not a politically homogeneous unit, but a generation marked by significant variation in the levels and forms of political engagement, especially along lines of gender and issues related to rights and justice (Deckman 2024).The internal divisions of Generation Z are especially visible across gender, education, class position, and racial and ethnic background. Young women and segments of youth engaged in rights and justice issues are more present in mobilization spaces linked to reproductive rights, racial justice, gun violence, and climate. The common image of the “progressive youth” often reflects particular segments of the generation, but does not capture the experiences of other groups, especially those less integrated into university or organizational spaces, or those more burdened by the pressures of work, housing, and everyday survival. The racial and ethnic diversity within this generation also means that its experiences with the state, discrimination, representation, and justice are not uniform, which in turn shapes how public issues are understood and how young people position themselves within the two major parties. Generation Z should therefore not be treated as a unified generation, but rather as a space in which gender, education, class, and racial and ethnic background intersect to produce multiple patterns of political awareness, engagement, and positioning (Pew Research Center 2020; CIRCLE 2025; Harvard Youth Poll 2025a; Deckman 2024).
Second: The Priorities of Generation Z Compared with Older Generations
If Generation Z cannot be reduced to a homogeneous political bloc, this does not negate the existence of broad traits that distinguish it from older generations. Perhaps the most important of these concerns the ordering of political priorities. Generations differ not only in their positions on issues, but also in the kinds of issues they prioritize and in the way they connect those issues within a broader understanding of politics and society. From this perspective, Generation Z appears more inclined than older generations to combine immediate material pressures with rights-based and future-oriented concerns within a single agenda, rather than treating them as separate or competing domains (CIRCLE 2025; Harvard Youth Poll 2025a; Harvard Youth Poll 2025b).
Recent youth surveys indicate that everyday economic concerns occupy a central place in this generation’s consciousness. The cost of living, housing prices, unstable employment, and the accumulation of debt are no longer secondary matters, deferred until after the “major” political issues. For wide segments of this generation, they have become the primary entry point for understanding politics itself. This is hardly surprising if one considers that many members of Generation Z entered public life amid successive crises: the aftermath of the pandemic, sharp increases in prices, the housing crisis, and a growing sense of economic fragility. Their concern with the economy therefore does not usually take the form of traditional language about growth or tax cuts, but rather appears as a direct anxiety about the possibility of living independently, achieving stability, and building a secure life (CIRCLE 2025; Harvard Youth Poll 2025a).
At the same time, the centrality of material issues does not mean that rights-based or “values” issues have receded. Recent surveys and studies suggest that wide segments of this generation do not see a contradiction between caring about housing, work, and debt on the one hand, and caring about climate, reproductive rights, gun violence, racial justice, and immigration on the other. On the contrary, these issues appear interconnected in the minds of many young people within a broader conception of justice, security, and dignity. This helps explain why issues such as climate change and reproductive rights continue to rank among the top concerns of youth even in the midst of mounting economic pressures (Pew Research Center 2021; Harvard Youth Poll 2025a).
From this angle, generational difference lies not only in the kinds of issues prioritized, but also in the mental framework through which those issues are understood. When many young people focus on the economy, they do not do so in the traditional conservative sense that prioritizes markets or tax cuts, but rather from the standpoint of access to housing, access to care, job security, debt relief, and the expansion of the conditions for a dignified life. Trust in institutions has also become part of the structure of priorities itself, since the importance of any issue is inseparable from a parallel question: do existing institutions possess the capacity or the will to address it? The priorities of this generation, therefore, cannot be understood solely through a list of the issues it cares about, but also through the recognition that part of its political consciousness is shaped by a crisis in the effectiveness of the political system itself (Pinedo, Diemer, and Frisby 2024; Harvard Youth Poll 2025a; Harvard Youth Poll 2025b).
Accordingly, it can be said that the priorities of Generation Z differ from those of older generations on two interconnected levels: first, in the substance of the issues to which it gives priority, above all housing, the cost of living, climate, reproductive rights, gun violence, and social justice; and second, in the way these issues are understood, as younger generations tend to connect the economic with the rights-based, the everyday with the structural, and the personal with the future-oriented within a single narrative.
Third: Generation Z and the Democrats: Convergence on Issues, Distance from the Party Establishment
Electoral data and opinion polls indicate that Generation Z, on the whole, leans more toward the Democratic Party than older generations. But this inclination does not mean stable partisan integration or deep organizational loyalty. Rather, it reflects convergence on issues without full satisfaction with the party establishment or its leadership. For broad segments of this generation, the Democratic Party remains the political framework closest to their priorities on climate, reproductive rights, racial justice, healthcare, gun regulation, and the role of the state in reducing inequality (Pew Research Center 2024a).
This inclination toward the Democratic Party is more pronounced among some segments of Generation Z than others. Available scholarship suggests that young women, segments of nonwhite youth, and college students or those more integrated into educational and organizational environments are relatively closer to Democratic discourse, especially on issues such as reproductive rights, racial justice, climate, gun regulation, and the role of the state in addressing inequality. This is due not only to the positions the party takes on these issues, but also to the fact that, despite all its limitations, the Democratic Party appears to these groups as the partisan framework most prepared to acknowledge such demands and incorporate them into mainstream political language (Pew Research Center 2020; Deckman 2024; Pew Research Center 2024a).
This closeness is also tied to the degree of integration into the spaces that produce political and activist consciousness within this generation. Young people with greater exposure to universities, student organizing networks, and discourses centered on rights and social justice are more likely to gravitate toward the Democratic Party or its left wing. For this reason, important segments of youth who lean Democratic do not see the party as their full or complete representative, but rather as the best available option compared with the Republican Party (Deckman 2024; CIRCLE 2025; Harvard Youth Poll 2025a).
This tension is clearly reflected in the kinds of political figures who enjoy appeal among the younger base. Their attraction lies not simply in their place within the party, but in their political style: greater clarity on questions of justice, a more direct connection between economic issues and rights, a more skillful use of the digital sphere, and a clearer distance from the more cautious and conventional language of the Democratic establishment. From this perspective, one can understand the appeal of figures such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Maxwell Frost, and also figures on the party’s margins such as Zohran Mamdani, because their discourse connects livelihood issues, justice, and representation more directly than traditional party rhetoric does (Deckman 2024).
The tension between Generation Z and the Democratic establishment therefore concerns not only specific policies, but also the speed of response, political language, and the party’s ability to reflect the moral urgency young people attach to issues such as climate, justice, the cost of living, and Gaza. The position of Generation Z within the Democratic Party is thus governed by a dual equation: clear political proximity, but without full institutional integration. In this sense, young Democrats appear at once to be an important electoral base and a growing source of pressure on the party (Deckman 2024; CIRCLE 2025).
Fourth: Generation Z and the Republicans: Conservatism in a New Language
If Generation Z, on the whole, leans more toward the Democratic Party than the Republican Party, this does not make its presence within the Republican camp marginal. Conservative youth also occupy an important place in understanding the transformations underway within the American right. Their importance lies not in the fact that they are simply a younger نسخة of older Republicans, but in the fact that they express a somewhat different form of conservatism: one that shares with older generations a defense of free markets and skepticism toward the state, but differs from them in priorities and political language (Pew Research Center 2020; Kidder 2015; Binder and Wood 2013).
Older Republicans have tended to anchor their partisan identity more strongly in themes such as public religiosity, conservative family values, and conventional partisan loyalty. Among some segments of the young right, however, the center of gravity seems to be shifting away from this formula and toward a language that places greater emphasis on individual independence, free markets, resistance to dominant cultural liberalism, and opposition to the perceived dominance of media and academic elites. This does not mean that social conservatism has disappeared among young Republicans. It means only that it is no longer always the primary point of entry for defining conservative identity, as it was for many older Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020; Kidder 2015).
Jeffrey Kidder’s study makes this point especially clear. It shows that conservative discourse among some Republican students is not based primarily on detailed defenses of specific policies, but on the assertion of a conservative identity articulated through terms such as the free market, self-reliance, and resistance to what is perceived as liberal dominance within the university and the public sphere. The book Becoming Right reinforces this point by showing how the university environment generates in some young conservatives a sense of marginalization or misrepresentation, making conservatism, in part, a reaction to a cultural position that its adherents feel is under threat, as much as it is a stance toward the state or the market (Kidder 2015; Binder and Wood 2013).
The inclination toward the Republican Party also appears more clearly among certain segments of Generation Z than others. Available evidence suggests that young men, some white youth, and those less integrated into university environments or into dominant progressive discourses are relatively more likely to gravitate toward Republican rhetoric or some of the newer forms of the right. This closeness is tied not only to attitudes toward taxes or the size of government, but also to a greater responsiveness to discourses that emphasize individual autonomy, self-reliance, skepticism toward cultural and media institutions, and resistance to what is seen as the dominance of cultural liberalism in the public sphere (Pew Research Center 2020; Kidder 2015; Binder and Wood 2013).
This tendency is also visible in the kinds of figures and networks that address young Republicans in a language that goes beyond the traditional Republican lexicon. Figures such as Charlie Kirk matter here not because they represent all young conservatives, but because they embody a political style that resonates with some of them: direct and confrontational rhetoric, a focus on universities, culture wars, and free speech, and an intensive use of the digital sphere as a field of mobilization and confrontation. The position of Generation Z within the Republican Party, therefore, cannot be understood as merely that of a small young minority inside an older base, but rather as one of the arenas through which conservatism itself is being reordered in a more identity-driven and cultural language.
Fifth: Modes of Political Participation among Generation Z: New Mobilization and Limited Trust in Institutions
Generation Z differs from older generations not only in its priorities and partisan alignments, but also in the way it participates politically. Recent evidence, along with the academic literature, suggests that this generation is not necessarily less politicized, but it is less attached to traditional forms of participation, such as stable party loyalty or long-term organizational membership, and more inclined toward selective and flexible channels that combine voting, protest, digital mobilization, and activism centered on specific issues (Fisher 2012; Pinedo, Diemer, and Frisby 2024; CIRCLE 2025).
Dana Fisher’s work is especially useful in clarifying this point, because it shows that the conventional distinction between “electoral participation” and “protest activism” is no longer sufficient to explain youth engagement. For many members of Generation Z, there is no sharp boundary between the two spheres: involvement may begin through a digital campaign, a protest, or a petition, and then extend to voting, pressuring elected representatives, or supporting local candidates. This suggests that the generation does not reject institutional politics in principle, but it does not grant it exclusive status as the sole legitimate or sufficient form of political action (Fisher 2012).
The literature on “critical consciousness” also helps explain why some young people are drawn to this kind of participation. Youth do not become politically engaged simply because a specific issue matters to them, but because they perceive a connection between their everyday experiences or immediate problems and broader structures of injustice and inequality in society. Once that connection is made, political participation becomes both a form of moral expression and an attempt to influence reality at the same time. This helps explain the appeal of involvement in issues such as climate, reproductive rights, gun violence, racial justice, and Gaza. Their attraction lies not only in the importance of these issues in themselves, but also in the fact that they give young people the sense that they can translate their moral position into direct collective action (Pinedo, Diemer, and Frisby 2024).
This also explains the centrality of the digital sphere in Generation Z’s political participation. For many young people, digital platforms are not simply technical tools, but primary spaces for opinion formation, network building, the development of political language, the organization of campaigns, and the exercise of public pressure on institutions and elites. Yet they do not replace political action on the ground; rather, they often overlap with it. Participation may begin with a post or a campaign, and then extend to a protest, a petition, a donation, a vote, or a boycott. Digitization, therefore, does not displace politics, but reshapes its instruments, its rhythm, and its channels (Fisher 2012; Pew Research Center 2025).
At the same time, this transformation is also tied to weak trust in traditional institutions. Recent youth surveys indicate that a significant share of Generation Z does not regard the two major parties, Congress, or some formal institutions as effective or trustworthy channels. Weak partisan attachment, therefore, does not necessarily mean disengagement from politics. More often, it reflects doubt about the ability of these institutions to represent their priorities or respond to their crises. The more accurate reading of Generation Z’s relationship to political participation is not that it is “apathetic,” but that it is selective in its engagement and more inclined toward the forms of action it sees as more direct and more consistent with its priorities (Harvard Youth Poll 2025a; Harvard Youth Poll 2025b; CIRCLE 2025).
Sixth: Generation Z and Foreign Policy: Israel/Palestine, Gaza, and the Changing View of America’s Role
Generational difference in the United States is not confined to domestic issues. It also extends to foreign policy, especially with regard to Israel/Palestine and the war on Gaza. This issue is particularly important because American foreign policy has historically been less directly affected by generational change than domestic politics. Yet available evidence today suggests that influential segments of Generation Z have come to view some Middle Eastern issues in a language that differs clearly from that of older generations, especially on the left wing of the Democratic Party (Royden and Hersh 2021; Pew Research Center 2024b).
The study by Laura Royden and Eitan Hersh helps explain this shift. Based on a 2020 survey of 3,500 American adults, with an expanded sample of those aged 18 to 30, the study argues that the young American left differs markedly from older Americans and from more conservative groups in its view of Israel. It shows that this young left tends to evaluate Israel in a manner closer to how it views American adversaries such as Russia and Iran, rather than traditional allies. The study also indicates that this position cannot be explained simply by the greater importance of the Israel/Palestine issue among youth, nor is it limited to criticism of the Israeli government alone. Rather, it reflects a broader shift in attitudes toward Israel itself within parts of the young left (Royden and Hersh 2021).
The significance of this generational gap has grown further with the war on Gaza since late 2023. Pew Research Center showed in 2024 that Americans under thirty were more likely to sympathize with Palestinians, more negative in their views of Israel, and less convinced than older age groups that Israel had justified reasons for the war or that its conduct of the war was acceptable. This means that the difference concerns not only degrees of sympathy, but also how the legitimacy of violence and the limits of force are understood within the conflict itself (Pew Research Center 2024b).
The generational distinction here, therefore, does not appear to be a passing divergence in public opinion, but rather reflects a broader shift in the moral and political lens through which some young Americans view foreign policy. For segments of Generation Z, issues such as Gaza are not read simply through the language of alliances and strategy, but through the vocabulary of justice, human rights, and inequality. This makes them, for some young people, an extension of familiar domestic debates about power, discrimination, and structural violence, rather than merely distant foreign questions (Royden and Hersh 2021; CIRCLE 2024).
This does not mean that foreign policy has become a higher priority than the economy, housing, or climate for Generation Z. These domestic concerns remain more central in the minds of large segments of youth. What is striking, however, is that some foreign policy issues, when framed in the language of rights and justice, become more capable of generating political mobilization and pressure, especially within the Democratic camp. Gaza, for some youth, has therefore appeared not merely as a Middle Eastern issue, but as a test of the consistency of American discourse on rights, justice, and the limits of unconditional military support.
Accordingly, it can be said that Generation Z does not make foreign policy the center of its political identity, but it is reopening some of its files from a different angle. When it engages with issues such as Israel/Palestine and Gaza, it does so in a moral and political language that differs from the one that prevailed among older generations. That language may not quickly alter the constants of American foreign policy, but it does reveal growing fractures within public opinion and within both parties, especially within the Democratic Party.
Conclusion
This study shows that the political significance of Generation Z in the United States lies not only in the fact that it is the youngest cohort within the electorate, nor only in its relative inclination toward the Democratic Party compared with older generations, but in the fact that it is participating in the reshaping of American politics on several levels at once. It is not a politically homogeneous bloc that can be reduced to a general label such as “the progressive generation,” but rather a generation internally divided along lines of gender, identity, social position, and institutional experience. It also carries a set of priorities that links immediate material pressures to rights-based and future-oriented concerns, and it is redefining the meaning of political participation itself through a more fluid combination of voting, protest, digital mobilization, and issue-based activism, all in the context of deep doubt toward traditional institutions without a full withdrawal from political life (Deckman 2024; Fisher 2012; Pinedo, Diemer, and Frisby 2024).
From this perspective, Generation Z should not be treated merely as a “new generation” that will gradually enter the existing political system without altering its internal logic. Rather, it should be understood as one of the principal actors through which deeper transformations in American politics are being revealed. The relationship between this generation and the Democratic Party shows that electoral proximity does not necessarily amount to institutional integration, and that young people may at once be an important electoral base and a growing source of pressure on the party. Likewise, this generation’s place within the Republican Party shows that the young right is not simply an automatic extension of traditional conservatism, but also bears distinct features of its own, in which economic conservatism, cultural grievance, and the construction of conservative identity as a social and political position all intersect in response to what is perceived as liberal dominance over the public sphere (Kidder 2015; Binder and Wood 2013; Pew Research Center 2024a).
The importance of this generation is especially visible in foreign policy issues, above all Israel/Palestine and the war on Gaza. Here the generational gap appears in ways that are difficult to ignore: not only in degrees of sympathy, but in the way the conflict itself is interpreted and in the limits of acceptance for traditional American rhetoric about allies and the use of force. It is true that these changes have not yet produced a comprehensive reversal in the constants of American foreign policy, but they do reveal the widening space of tension within both parties, especially within the Democratic Party, and a relative decline in the ability of some older assumptions to command the same level of acceptance among younger generations (Royden and Hersh 2021; Pew Research Center 2024b; CIRCLE 2024).
In sum, Generation Z does not yet appear to be a fully consolidated or cohesive political force so much as an early indicator of broader trends in American society and politics: declining trust, shifting generational priorities, the rise of issue-based politics, the growing importance of identity and values in political action, and the reopening of questions that once seemed settled in American politics, both at home and abroad. The importance of this generation, therefore, lies not only in what it thinks now, but also in what it reveals about the paths American politics may take in the years ahead.
Reference:
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https://www.eitanhersh.com/uploads/7/9/7/5/7975685/hersh_royden_israel_paper_060921.pdf
* The writer is an expert at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
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