Iran’s repeated attacks on the Gulf states, within the context of its ongoing conflict with the United States and Israel, reveal a complex pattern of political and strategic behaviour that cannot be reduced to mere circumstantial or tactical reactions.
The Islamic republic clearly seeks to raise the cost of war for its adversaries by expanding the theatre of operations to include its Arab Gulf neighbours, thereby creating additional pressure on Washington and Tel Aviv and forcing them to reconsider their calculations.
However, this dimension, important as it is, is insufficient to understand the nature of these attacks. It is intertwined with a deeper and more entrenched tendency in the behaviour of the Iranian state since 1979: a tendency to exploit its regional neighbourhood to serve its strategic interests, with no real regard for the national sovereignty or national security of other states.
In the logic of conflict management, Tehran understands that transferring the confrontation to the Gulf achieves several simultaneous objectives. First, it expands the scope of the threat beyond its geographical borders, making the stability of global energy markets and maritime routes hostage to the developments of the war. Second, it presents the Gulf states with a difficult dilemma, as they become directly affected by the continuation of military operations, which may push them to pressure the United States to contain the escalation.
It also gives Iran an additional bargaining chip, as its ability to destabilise the regional environment becomes a bargaining chip in any ceasefire arrangements or conflict management.
However, interpreting these attacks solely within a tactical framework overlooks the structural dimension of Iranian behaviour. Since the establishment of the Islamic republic, a particular vision of relations with its Arab neighbours has been formed, based on the idea of influence and power, not on the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty.
This vision rests on a combination of ideological and security considerations, whereby Tehran views its regional environment as a vital sphere that must be managed in a way that serves its vision and interests, even at the expense of the stability of other countries. In this context, the direct attacks on the Gulf states become a natural extension of older and more entrenched policies, not merely a circumstantial deviation imposed by the war.
Direct attacks targeting infrastructure or vital facilities in the Gulf are not fundamentally different from Iran’s decades-long policy of employing regional proxies. In Iraq, Tehran supported armed and political groups that consolidated their influence within and outside state institutions, weakening the Iraqi state’s ability to monopolise legitimate violence and plunging the country into recurring cycles of instability.
In Yemen, its support for the Houthis prolonged the war and complicated the path to a settlement, resulting in a heavy human and political cost. In Lebanon, its support for Hizbullah created a dual power structure, where the state coexists with an armed force that sometimes surpasses it, undermining national sovereignty and limiting the potential for reform and stability.
What these cases have in common is that Iran has not treated these countries as fully sovereign and independent entities, but rather as arenas to be exploited to serve its regional strategy. This exploitation has not been limited to the military dimension, but has also included political, economic, and media influence, creating complex networks of influence that are difficult to dismantle. In all cases, the price paid by the Arab peoples in these countries has been heavy, whether in terms of security, development, or social stability.
Therefore, the shift to direct attacks on the Gulf states during wartime does not represent a break with this approach, but rather an evolution in its tools. When Iran is subjected to direct military pressure, it resorts to expanding the scope of conflict using all available means, whether through proxies or direct strikes. In both cases, the objective remains the same: to protect the regime and maximise its influence, even at the expense of the stability of its neighbours.
This behaviour raises a profound question concerning the future of regional relations in the Middle East. The Gulf states, which in recent years have tended to pursue more pragmatic and open policies, now find themselves facing a deteriorating security reality that compels them to reorder their priorities.
With the recurrence of the attacks, confidence in the possibility of building stable relations with Tehran erodes, and the inclination to adopt more stringent deterrent policies increases, whether through strengthening defence capabilities or deepening security partnerships with external powers.
The attacks also have profound societal repercussions, exacerbating feelings of anxiety and uncertainty among citizens and fuelling a more hardline political and media discourse towards Iran. In this climate, maintaining spaces for dialogue or advancing cooperative regional arrangements becomes increasingly difficult. Indeed, the general trend may be towards greater polarisation, with new alignments emerging that perpetuate the logic of conflict rather than transcend it.
It cannot be overlooked that this Iranian approach also weakens the prospects for long-term stability within the countries where its proxies are present. When national interests become intertwined with external agendas, state-building becomes more complex, and the ability of institutions to respond to citizens’ aspirations diminishes. This, in turn, creates fragile environments that can erupt at any moment, adding another layer of instability to the regional landscape.
Ultimately, the Iranian attacks on the Gulf states reflect an interplay between immediate war calculations and a deeper pattern of political behaviour that exploits neighbouring countries without sufficient respect for their sovereignty.
If Tehran seeks to improve its negotiating position and raise the cost of confrontation for its adversaries through these attacks, it is simultaneously reproducing policies that have proven in the past to lead to further instability and tension in the region. While these policies may achieve short-term gains, their long-term cost, both for Iran and for the region, will be significant.
Given this reality, it is essential to consider new regional approaches based on restoring the principles of sovereignty and non-interference and on building collective mechanisms for managing regional security, moving away from the logic of hegemony or exploitation.
However, achieving this remains contingent on profound changes in the behaviour of key actors, foremost among them Iran, which will need to fundamentally revise its approach if it wants to be part of a more stable and balanced regional order. Until that happens, the region will remain vulnerable to recurring cycles of escalation, for which its people will pay a heavy price.
The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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