Arab Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, like Qatar and Oman, are in favour of a de-escalation plan. While other states appear to be in favour of Trump “finishing the job” with a huge strike to cripple Iran once and for all.
Initially, the American media spoke of a two-phase plan of immediate ceasefire in the Middle East for 45 days, which can be extended during negotiations to reach the final stage of a deal. Later, according to sources cited by Reuters, Pakistan handed the plan to both parties, and it included an “end of all hostilities” for 15-20 days and reopening the Strait of Hormuz immediately. The second phase, with possible in-person talks in Islamabad, will involve a final deal concerning nuclear controls, sanctions relief, unfreezing of assets and a permanent end to the war.
Egypt and Turkey played an essential part in reaching what the media dubbed the “Islamabad Accord”. It is said that China and other concerned parties also back the plan. This would be an eleventh-hour attempt to avert a major Israeli-American military campaign against Iran.
In a last-ditch effort to avoid the escalation, the Omanis held talks with the Iranians to come out with an agreement about safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, which is situated between the two countries. Media reports also imply that Tehran agreed to hand over its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, but that has not been confirmed by any party. The hours before Trump’s ultimatum to Iran to reach a deal or “face hell” witnessed a fury of contacts in the Gulf in anticipation of escalation. Egypt and Turkey resumed their efforts to narrow down the difference in the hope of reaching a compromise that would prevent escalation, which probably led to the plan presented by Pakistan.
A couple of days before the end of Trump’s deadline, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Qatar resisted a mediating role in the conflict. As Pakistani mediation reached a dead end, there was talk of having the Iranians and the Americans meet in the Qatari capital Doha or Istanbul in Turkey. But as the WSJ reported, “the Gulf state told US officials last week that it wasn’t keen on playing a key role in the mediation or leading the efforts.” It was not clear if Qatar is wary of the Iranians, who continue targeting it with missiles and drones. Like the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar adopts a conciliatory position on the conflict even though the Iranian strike halted nearly a fifth of its LNG production in Ras Laffan.
Some pundits both in the West and the region see the Qatari move as an indication of growing Gulf frustration with the way Trump is handling the war. The Western media is full of reports and analyses concerning anger in the Gulf with the US handling of the war on Iran. Bernard Haykel, a professor of near-eastern studies at Princeton University, told the Financial Times, “given how it has proceeded and the Iranians’ capabilities, [the Gulf States] have had to rethink [American relations]… They are acutely vulnerable and they can’t protect their huge territory, and if their desalination plants and energy go up in smoke, you are talking about going back to the Stone Age. It is an untenable situation.”
For decades, the main line of Gulf policy was reliance on American military protection in return for guaranteeing US interest in Gulf energy and reinvesting petrodollars in America. In 2019 that alliance was tested when a missile and drone strike on Saudi oil facilities stopped half its production. Though Iran-backed Yemeni Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack, Riyadh and many others accused Iran. Trump, who was in office during the first term, did nothing. Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, de-facto leader of the country, was not satisfied. But with Trump returning to the White House last year, it became clear that he only sees the whole region “through Israeli eyes”, as one Gulf commentator told Al-Ahram Weekly.
Riyadh was not ready to join the UAE and Bahraini normalisation drive with Israel under the so-called Abraham accords. Despite many reports in American and Israeli media that Gulf countries pressured Trump to attack Iran, the perception in the Gulf is that it was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who needed this war and pulled America into it. In fact, Saudi Arabia was progressing in improving relations with Tehran. Now, as former Jordanian diplomat and politician Marwan Muasher wrote for the American think-tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, almost all Gulf states are wary of both Iran and the US. He wrote that the war on Iran managed to “forge a collective Gulf anger directed towards Iran and the Unites States and, at least at the popular level, against Israel as well”.
Anger is rising with the possibility of further escalation in this war, especially if Trump proceeded with his threat to destroy power plants and all Iranian infrastructure. The worst scenario would be sending ground troops into Iran as this would most likely close any window for negotiating an end to the war. Iranian retaliation may target energy and water desalination stations in Gulf countries. The US can’t protect such strategically sensitive assets. The Gulf capital is more convinced that what matters to Trump is Israeli security, not Gulf safety and stability. The Gulf countries are already rethinking their relations with the US, not in the sense of breaking the long-held alliance but re-calibrating it. A simple example: if both Israel and the Gulf countries are running low on ammunition, especially missile interceptors, the US will prioritise replenishing the Israeli arsenal.
Chief global affairs correspondent at CNN, Matthew Chance, told a British newspaper that the Gulf States are scrutinising their close military relations with the US, and asking themselves whether that is the right structure for the future. Yet he stresses that “no one is going to walk away from an alliance with America, but they might diversify their agreements as insurance.” In fact, the Gulf countries began diversifying their alliances reaching out to China, Russia and others. This trend is expected to accelerate once the war is over. Meanwhile, there are other developments that could become more prominent. Hundreds of billions of dollars promised by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to be invested in the US may well no longer materialise. Trump bragged about money on his visit to the region last year, some of it already poured into American AI ventures and other projects. But as the war is straining Gulf countries financially, the promised “trillions” may not happen.
Many analysts note that the Gulf countries’ anxiety about the war is reaching a critical point. As a veteran Western diplomat puts it, they are reluctant to join an Israeli-American war and in the meantime fear the consequences of Trump abruptly ending it. “Nobody in the Gulf, except the UAE and to some extent Bahrain, is enthusiastic about an American ground invasion of Iran. That will drag them further into a conflict they didn’t choose, as Tehran will consider some countries on the western flank of the Gulf camps for invading American troops,” he told the Weekly. In any case, whether the war escalates or not, the Gulf states are more and more sceptical of American policy. Destruction of Iran will leave them with a chaotic situation close to home, and a deal that ends the war without taking Gulf concerns into account is even worse. A Gulf commentator drew an analogy to the war on Gaza: “Some Gulf countries expected Netanyahu to ‘finish the job’ quickly but it took years, turning public opinion in the Gulf more against Israel contrary to the official position of Abraham signatories and pushing Saudis away from joining the normalisation train.”
The analogy of the war on Gaza and the war on Iran might not be the most plausible in this case. Ultimately, Gaza was not as much of a threat to the Gulf as Iran. But the Trump’s “erratic policies” and how he is handling the war is leaving Gulf leaders with more uncertainty. Those countries will no doubt have to rethink their alliance with Washington, especially if Trump’s Republican Party loses the mid-term elections in November to the Democrats.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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