The evolution of the US rhetoric towards Iran under US President Donald Trump reveals a fundamental inconsistency in strategic objectives, reflecting a deeper crisis in policy coherence, writes Monica William Fawzy.
From the outset, the declared goals shifted significantly from regime change to behavioural modification, and later towards more operational and tactical aims such as reopening the Strait of Hormuz, seizing enriched uranium, and degrading Iran’s missile and defence capabilities.
This divergence in the “target bank” highlights not only a lack of strategic clarity but also raises serious questions about the feasibility and sustainability of US objectives in its war against Iran.
This rhetorical pattern aligns closely with what strategic literature defines as coercive diplomacy, a model that combines explicit military threats with limited windows for negotiation. The aim is not merely to compel concessions, but to reshape the adversary’s cost-benefit calculus under pressure of time and existential risk.
However, the effectiveness of such an approach depends heavily on message consistency, something notably absent in the timeline of the US statements below.
At the same time, a close reading of these statements suggests that Trump’s communication strategy also reflects elements of the “madman theory”, a well-established concept in American strategic thought.
By projecting unpredictability, volatility, and a willingness to escalate beyond conventional limits, this approach seeks to raise the stakes of negotiation and compel the adversary to concede under the assumption that the US leadership may act irrationally.
In this sense, contradiction is not merely a flaw, but at times a deliberate instrument designed to maximise psychological pressure and bargaining leverage.
The aim is not merely to compel concessions, but to reshape the adversary’s cost-benefit calculus under pressure of time and existential risk. However, the effectiveness of such an approach depends heavily on message consistency, something notably absent in Trump’s statements below:
3 March: “We won the war.”
7 March: “We defeated Iran.”
9 March: “We must attack Iran.” “The war is ending almost completely, and very beautifully.”
11 March: “You never like to say too early you won. We won. In the first hour it was over.”
12 March: “We did win, but we haven’t won completely yet.”
13 March: “We won the war.”
14 March: “Please help us” [addressed to NATO].
15 March: “If you don’t help us, I will certainly remember it.”
16 March: “Actually, we don’t need any help at all.” “I was just testing to see who’s listening to me.” “If NATO doesn’t help, they will suffer something very bad.”
17 March: “We neither need nor want NATO’s help.”
17 March: “I don’t need Congressional approval to withdraw from NATO.”
18 March: “Our allies must cooperate in reopening the Strait of Hormuz.”
19 March: “US allies need to get a grip - step up and help open the Strait of Hormuz.”
20 March: “NATO are cowards.”
21 March: “The Strait of Hormuz must be protected by the countries that use it. We don’t use it. We don’t need to open it.” Trump went on to say that he would “hit and obliterate” Iran’s power plants, “starting with the biggest ones first,” if Iran did not reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
22 March: “This is the last time. I will give Iran 48 hours. Open the strait.” “Iran is Dead”
23 March: “We had very good and productive talks with Iran.”
24 March: “We’re making progress.”
25 March: “They gave us a present and the present arrived today. And it was a very big present worth a tremendous amount of money. I’m not going to tell you what that present is, but it was a very significant prize.”
26 March: “Make a deal, or we’ll just keep blowing them away.”
27 March: Trump said he would postpone attacking Iran’s energy plants for 10 days, he claimed at Iran’s request, bringing the deadline to 6 April.
29 March: Trump claims the talks are progressing. He said that Iran had agreed to most of the 15-point demands put forward by the US. “They gave us most of the points. Why wouldn’t they?” He also said that Iran had shipped oil to the US as a show of good faith.
In an interview with the UK Financial Times, Trump said he wanted to “take the oil in Iran” and was considering seizing Kharg Island. “Maybe we take Kharg Island, maybe we don’t.”
30 March: The “US is in serious discussions with A NEW, AND MORE REASONABLE REGIME.”
On the same day: “Open the Strait of Hormuz immediately or face devastating consequences.”
31 March: Trump claims a deal is “very close” and that Iran would “do the right thing”.
1 April: “[Iran’s] new regime president, much less radicalised and far more intelligent than his predecessors, has just asked the United States of America for a CEASEFIRE!”
2 April: Repeats that a deal was likely, while warning of continued US strikes if not.
3 April: “Something big is going to happen.”
4 April: Iran must comply “immediately” or face further consequences.
5 April: “Open the f****n’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell - JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah.”
6 April: “I agree to suspend the bombing and attack of Iran for a period of two weeks. This will be a double sided CEASEFIRE!”
At the level of conflict management, Trump’s approach, rooted in the logic of the “art of the deal”, has not yielded the expected results in the Iranian case. This approach was premised on the assumption that maximum pressure, whether military or economic, could force Tehran into submission or compel it to accept US negotiating terms.
However, developments on the ground, after five weeks of sustained conflict, suggest otherwise. Neither US nor Israeli military operations have succeeded in achieving their central objective of forcing Iran into compliance.
Indeed, Trump’s own rhetoric reflects this contradiction: while repeatedly declaring the extensive destruction of Iranian capabilities, he has simultaneously threatened further escalation, including targeting critical infrastructure such as electricity networks. This duality underscores the absence of decisive strategic closure and reveals a gap between declared achievements and operational realities.
The US administration appears increasingly constrained between three primary options: escalation, withdrawal, or negotiated settlement. Despite a clear inclination towards imposing a settlement from a position of strength, the effectiveness of coercive instruments appears to be diminishing, raising doubts about the sustainability of the current strategy.
Within this broader framework, Trump’s proposed 2027 budget, which means cutting non-defence spending by 10 per cent (approximately $73 billion) while raising defence spending to $1.5 trillion, illustrates a clear “war economy” logic.
Resources are being redirected from social programmes and green energy towards sustaining military operations, replenishing munitions, and upgrading capabilities in a prolonged confrontation with Iran.
Ultimately, the interplay between contradiction, coercion, and strategic signalling, whether deliberate or reactive, reveals not a coherent grand strategy, but a fluid and pressure-driven approach shaped by uncertainty, domestic constraints, and shifting geopolitical realities.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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