Nearly 40 days have passed since the outbreak of one of the largest wars since the Second Gulf War and perhaps the widest in scope since World War II in the Middle East.
Unlike previous confrontations limited to exchanges between Iran and Israel, this conflict has spilled into the Gulf states without clear justification, engulfed Iraq, and even reached Cyprus and Turkey, thereby extending directly into Europe. All of this unfolds against the backdrop of Russian threats in Eastern Europe.
With negotiations uncertain and diplomacy in tatters, the struggle has become a war of attrition. The only path to resolution now lies in a decisive military shift on the battlefield, something that could compel one side to halt. That could mean a knockout blow, akin to boxing, delivered to one of the pa ties, or the depletion of the other’s ammunition, leaving them unable to continue.
On 5 April, “Easter Night,” US President Donald J Trump wrote on his Truth Social account that “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open the Strait, or you’ll be living in Hell – JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah.”
What exactly does the American president mean by “hell”?
US Central Command (CENTCOM) publishes weekly lists detailing the weapons deployed in the current campaign. What stands out is that Washington has spared no munitions from its arsenal, whether for the air force or the navy. Every combat aircraft and bomber in service has been committed, including strategic bombers such as the B‑2 and stealth fighters like the F‑22 and F‑35.
The full fleet of reconnaissance and intelligence‑gathering aircraft has also been mobilised, from Cold War‑era U‑2s to modern RC‑135s, alongside transport aircraft of all sizes and roles. Systems never before used in Middle Eastern wars have appeared as well, such as the E‑11 communications platform, the EA‑37B electronic warfare aircraft, and, most strikingly, the ultra‑secret RQ‑180 “White Bat” stealth drone, reportedly landing in Greece earlier this week according to multiple sources.
On the munitions front, nearly the entire American inventory has been tapped from 45‑kg Hellfire missiles to the 14‑ton GBU‑57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator. Stealth and non‑stealth cruise missiles have been employed, including radar‑evading Tomahawks, the extended‑range AGM‑158 JASSM and AARGM anti‑radar weapons.
Analysts estimate that as much as 90 per cent of the conventional arsenal variants has already been committed, leaving only near‑service projects such as the hypersonic AGM‑183, the new SIAW anti‑radar missile, and the LRASM anti‑ship weapon. The nuclear stockpile, however, remains untouched.
It is evident that the Iranians are fully aware of this reality. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that “over 14 million proud Iranians have, up to this moment, declared their readiness to sacrifice their lives in defence of Iran. I too have been, am, and will be a sacrificer for Iran.”
The time has certainly passed when a tactical nuclear strike against Iran could be considered, akin to the US attacks on Japan in World War II. The Iranian threat is not comparable to that posed by Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany. And herein lies the dilemma: the decisive variable that could alter the course of the war will not be the munitions themselves.
The same holds true for Iran, which has already deployed the full spectrum of its missile arsenal, from the Emad to the Sejjil‑2 and through the “Kheibar Shekan”, the hypersonic “Fattah”, and a wide array of drones.
For Iran, there is little incentive to embark on risky offensives or seize the initiative. Tehran possesses a sufficient stockpile of missiles and maintains a daily launch rate that unsettles its Gulf neighbours and Israel. The leadership is psychologically prepared for a protracted struggle, recognising that managing this war requires endurance.
Above all, Iran’s full control of the Strait of Hormuz, even under sustained strikes, provides enormous leverage in any negotiations. Aware that Washington will not finance reconstruction, Tehran views imposing transit fees on shipping through the strait, estimated at $2 million, as its most valuable bargaining chip.
On the American side, its commanders face an adversary that has adapted to the ongoing campaign. Two options remain. The first is intensifying strikes on critical infrastructure such as power plants, bridges, and above all water desalination facilities. In a country where water scarcity is more acute than oil abundance, such attacks would inflict severe hardship on civilians, likely prompting retaliatory strikes on the Gulf states’ energy and water systems.
The second, far more dangerous but potentially decisive, is depriving Iran of its core strengths: control of the Strait of Hormuz and its remaining stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. The question now is how experts assess these scenarios.
An Australian military strategist exploring the possibility of American land operations inside Iran said that “my central argument is simple and sobering: ground forces can be decisive, but only when employed at scale, against the right mission, with clear political objectives. None of those conditions are obviously present at the moment.”
“Iran is a large, mountainous country with a substantial army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Strait of Hormuz’s 200-km Iranian shoreline means the Americans must protect every inch while the Iranians need only threaten any one of them. Russia is already sharing intelligence with Tehran and would relish the opportunity to help kill American soldiers.”
Regarding the second option of seizing the uranium, former CENTCOM commander Joseph Votel said in an interview with the US Warzone site that “going after the fissile material I think is a bigger operation. Within our Special Operations community, we have people that are trained to do this and have the right relationships and connections and other things to allow us to get in and do that. So, you’d have to be able to project that force onto the ground.”
“This would be going to a place like Natanz or Isfahan – probably one of those locations. Those are well inland – several hundred miles into Iran, a country of the same size as the state of Alaska. So, it’s big, and it’s diverse. It’s largely in an open plain, so you don’t have a lot of natural terrain protection there. That would have to be taken into consideration.”
“In addition to the kind of operators you put on the ground, you’d also have to bring in a security force, but probably a sizable security force – a brigade size or 1,000 to 3,000 or 4,000 troops to just secure while they did that work. You’d have to do that. You’d have to make sure you have dedicated air power. You’d have to put CAPs [combat air patrols] up over, you’d have to have ISR [information, surveillance and reconnaissance] in place.”
“And then you have the added challenge of handling nuclear material. So about 450-some kg. That’s roughly 1,000 pounds of 60 per cent highly enriched uranium. And that’s a lethal material. So ideally, that would be packaged already, but we’d have to make sure we packaged that and moved it and had someplace to actually take it back to.”
By comparison, the United States required more than a hundred soldiers and over a hundred aircraft of various types to extract a single downed pilot from Iran earlier this month. What, then, would it take for American commanders to protect, secure, and provide logistical support for at least a thousand troops?
The scenario appears highly improbable, given the massive air power required for transport and aerial coverage. Such an operation would go far beyond a limited mission, inevitably resulting in heavy losses and an even greater attrition on the full spectrum of US munitions.
The prevailing assessment suggests that pressure on Iranian society will continue through a manufactured humanitarian crisis marked by persistent power outages and water shortages. This, in turn, will generate reciprocal pressure on the Gulf states until diplomacy inevitably returns to the table.
Ideally, such a shift should occur sooner rather than later, as the damage is ongoing and affects not only the Middle East but the wider world. Amid the fog of war, whether through attrition or escalation, its end will not be quiet. It will be consequential, instructive, and costly.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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