This distinguishes it from the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the US occupation of Iraq, and points to different effects on the countries of the region in general and the Gulf states in particular, especially by virtue of geographic proximity and their direct exposure to Iranian attacks by ballistic missiles and drones. For many years, the Gulf states sought to manage their place in regional conflicts through a combination of preventive diplomacy and avoidance of direct involvement in major confrontations that only deepen devastation in the Middle East, one of the regional systems most closely connected to the international order.
Recent developments, however, have shown that this approach faces clear limits in a highly charged strategic environment shaped by the ideological patterns of political leaders such as Trump, Netanyahu, and Khamenei. In Iranian military calculations, Gulf neutrality is not measured by political statements but by the operational environment.
The presence of American military bases and Western logistical infrastructure in the Gulf makes these states, from the perspective of the Revolutionary Guard in Tehran, part of the theater of operations, even if they officially declare that they are not participating in the war. In addition, the rules of engagement have shifted beyond traditional front lines and now extend into the logistical, economic, and technological spaces that support military operations. The threats facing the Gulf states have therefore become “hybrid” threats, because the Gulf is one of the world’s most important centers of energy, supply chains, and trade routes, and any threat to infrastructure or maritime corridors is reflected directly in global markets.
Within this context, this report addresses three main issues: the effects of the US–Israeli military war on Iran on the Gulf region, the policies that the Gulf states have already adopted to reduce the effects of the war, and the possible options they may pursue in the next phase.
First: The Effects of the US-Israeli Military War on Iran on the Gulf Region
The US-Israeli war on Iran has had multiple effects on the Gulf region. The region has moved from being merely “an environment affected by war” to becoming “an arena actively involved” in its dynamics, as follows:
1- Iran’s shift from a source of “potential threat” to a source of “confirmed threat” for the Gulf states: This war has exposed the scale of the threat that Tehran poses to all Gulf countries without exception. The attacks went beyond targeting fixed US military bases in Gulf states to include US embassies and consulates in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Dubai, as well as civilian airports, oil refineries, industrial zones, seaports, residential compounds, hotels, and data centers in Gulf capitals. Iranian attacks extended to every Gulf state, without exception, including Oman, which had served as a mediator in the negotiations between the United States and Iran, as well as the UAE, including Dubai, which is Tehran’s leading regional trading partner.
Iran also targeted other Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, despite the Beijing Agreement signed between them on March 10, 2023. The same was repeated with Kuwait, where some officers were killed while confronting Iranian threats. The Qatar News Agency also announced the arrest of two cells working in the interest of the Revolutionary Guard in Qatar. Coordinates and locations related to vital sites and military institutions were found in their possession. Seven members of the two cells were planning espionage missions and three were preparing sabotage operations, and they had received training in the use of drones, despite the role of Gulf states in preventing war, refusing the use of their territories, facilities, airspace, or airports, and trying over several months to halt escalation against Iran.
In this context, Dr. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the President of the United Arab Emirates, said in an interview with Sky News on February 28, 2026, that the escalation had been expected for months, “through following the course of the nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran alongside the broader regional developments.” The UAE, however, had hoped “that matters would not reach the point they have reached.”
He explained that Abu Dhabi, along with the Gulf states, had played an important role in sending multiple signals through its communication with the US administration, “in an attempt to avoid this confrontation if negotiations failed.” Gargash added that several Gulf states had played different roles in the de-escalation track, noting that “Qatar played a very important role in exchanging messages between Iran and the United States,” that the UAE also played a role in this regard, and that “Oman played an important and fundamental role as a facilitator in the negotiations,” in addition to “the constructive and positive role of Saudi Arabia and the other states in the region.”
Yet Tehran appears to hold a view that some Gulf states supported both Washington and Tel Aviv in carrying out strikes deep inside Iran’s strategic depth. Here it is worth recalling what Anwar Gargash wrote on his X account on March 1, 2026: “Iranian aggression against the Gulf states has missed the target and isolated Iran at its critical moment. Your war is not with your neighbors, and through this escalation you confirm the narrative of those who see Iran as the main source of danger in the region, and its missile program as a permanent title of instability.” In other words, Iranian behavior appears to be sending a message to different parties that if the Iranian ship sinks, it will not sink alone, but will take the whole region down with it.
2- Israel’s attempt to present itself as a possible ally rather than a source of threat to the Gulf states: One of the effects Israel is trying to exploit in the current war is the strengthening of strategic cooperation with it in confronting Iran, especially in light of Israel’s pursuit of hegemony over Middle Eastern dynamics and its attempt to shape a new Middle East consistent with its strategic interests in the post-October 7, 2023 phase.
This comes after the significant weakening of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon following the targeting of their cadres and leadership at various levels, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the delivery of qualitative strikes against some leaders of Ansar Allah, the Houthis, in Yemen, and the precise targeting of key figures in the Revolutionary Guard, the Iranian army, intelligence services, command centers, and security institutions. It has also sent deterrent messages to multiple actors in the region on the necessity of political and economic normalization with Israel in order to avoid the cost of antagonizing it. This reflects what Tel Aviv seeks: the launching of an Israeli phase in the Middle East, something against which some voices associated with official Gulf orientations have warned.
In this regard, former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani warned on March 1, 2026, against slipping into a direct confrontation between the Gulf states and Iran, saying it would amount to “a depletion of both sides’ resources.” Writing on his X account, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim said: “A direct clash between the GCC states and Iran, if it happens, will drain the resources of both sides and will provide many powers with the opportunity to control us under the pretext of helping us out of the crisis and halting the depletion. That is why it is important to avoid slipping into a direct confrontation with Iran, and that is my personal view.” He added: “There are powers that want the GCC states to engage directly with Iran, and they know that the current clash between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other will end. We must also realize that after this battle, which was meant to erupt before the end of the peace negotiations on which we had pinned great hopes to avoid conflict, there will be new powers in the region, and Israel will have sway over our region.”
3- The collapse of the notion of the “Gulfization” of the Middle East: The US-Israeli war on Iran has revealed the limited margin of maneuver available to Gulf states after their national sovereignty was repeatedly violated by Tehran. This points to the weakness of their air defense systems, despite the fact that some defenses intercepted more than 90 percent of the missile attacks, according to official Gulf statements. It also reflects the relative limits of the benefits drawn from the massive military deals on which the Gulf spends annually in support of national security. Despite repeated affirmations by these states that “the security situation is under control” and that there is “readiness to deal with any threat,” the images shown in the media of losses affecting aviation, oil, maritime transport, and the suspension of educational, recreational, and sports activities point to real crises facing the Gulf states.
Perhaps the main lesson of this war is the need to be as preoccupied with security as with development. That development trajectory had prompted some intellectuals to speak of a “Gulf moment,” in light of the Gulf states’ qualitative superiority in education, health, the economy, income levels, and other human development indicators. Yet the fires of the region have begun to affect its gardens, and the dangers are now close enough to be almost tangible. This was indirectly expressed by Dr. Anwar Gargash at the Emirati-Kuwaiti Media Forum on January 30, 2026, when he said: “A slide toward confrontation will come at a heavy cost to all parties, especially the Gulf states, which will bear part of the consequences of any escalation, whether at the level of security, the economy, or international reputation.” The problem, then, is not simply that the Gulf is in danger, but how to preserve stability amid a ring of fire.
4- The shaking of the familiar international image of the Gulf region, especially the UAE: One line of analysis suggests that one of the main consequences of the current war does not only affect the core of Gulf-Iranian relations, nor does it merely test the ability of Gulf Cooperation Council states to intercept missiles and drones. It also tests the position of the Gulf states in the global economic equation. Targeting energy, disrupting maritime corridors, delaying supply chains, and affecting capital all enter into one broader calculation: risk management in an escalatory environment. We live in a world where geopolitics and economics are increasingly intertwined. The task now is to prevent the region from being transformed from a “center of economic stability” into a “chronic risk zone,” and to prevent the consolidation in international market consciousness of an image of “supplies vulnerable to targeting,” especially now that the war has become a regional war with global consequences that disrupt oil markets, financial markets, supply chains, maritime trade, and air travel.
5- The intensification of the consequences of prolonged regional instability: Military escalation will not bring stability to the region. It instead pushes toward prolonged instability, while international and regional actors neglect issues that are more deserving of attention, such as the Palestinian cause, strengthening the nation-state, confronting armed militias, combating cross-border terrorism, and achieving negotiated settlements to the burning conflicts in Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. It also stirs tensions inside states where armed actors are tied to implementing Tehran’s regional agenda, whatever the catastrophic scenarios may be.
Added to this is the publicly declared Gulf fear of the collapse of the Iranian regime, allowing chaos to prevail in its place, which would represent the worst possible scenario. Israel’s broad military operation against Tehran appears aimed at preparing the conditions for bringing down the regime from within through killing political and military leaders and destroying the regime’s security pillars, while simultaneously attempting to eliminate its nuclear and missile capabilities. This leaves all scenarios open, particularly in the absence of a political force capable of representing an alternative to the regime and given the complexity of Iran’s demographic composition, which raises the possibility of civil war, as happened in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, where Kurds, Baloch, Azerbaijanis, and other minorities may seek to protect themselves amid a power vacuum.
6- Harm to maritime navigation and global trade: This is particularly true in light of Iran’s attempt to set the region ablaze, widen the circle of fire, threaten energy routes, and use booby-trapped boats and naval mines. This was reflected in the suspension of ship crossings and flights through the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the avoidance of transit through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important waterways. Some 20 million barrels pass through it daily, or roughly 30 percent of global oil trade, along with between 20 and 25 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade. This leads to higher insurance, air and maritime transport, and storage costs, as well as severe disruptions in supply chains. The stability of the Arab Gulf region is not merely a regional matter. It is a basic pillar of global economic stability and maritime navigation.
Second: Gulf State Policies to Reduce the Effects of the February 28 War
A set of policies has been adopted by the Gulf states to reduce the effects of the war on their interests, as follows:
1- Commitment to passive defense and avoidance of direct involvement in the war: The Gulf states, whether individually or collectively, have adhered to strategic patience in the face of Iranian attacks and assaults on their territories. In other words, they have continued to practice passive defense by relying on their own air defense systems to intercept Iranian missiles and drones. For example, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in its March 8, 2026 statement that the country was “in a state of defense in the face of the brutal and unjustified Iranian aggression, which included the launch of more than 1,400 ballistic missiles and drones targeting infrastructure and civilian sites, resulting in civilian deaths and injuries, constituting a grave breach of international law and the United Nations Charter, a violation of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a direct threat to its security and stability.” The statement added: “The United Arab Emirates stresses that it does not seek to be drawn into any conflicts or escalation, but affirms that it fully reserves its right to take all necessary measures to protect its sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and the safety and security of its citizens and residents, based on its right to self-defense in accordance with international law and the United Nations Charter.”
The same applies at the Gulf collective level. The GCC Ministerial Council, in its 50th extraordinary meeting held virtually on March 1 under the chairmanship of Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, did not adopt unconventional measures. It instead rejected and condemned the Iranian attacks and praised the efficiency and readiness of the armed forces and air defense systems in member states that confronted the missile and drone attacks, contributed to neutralizing the threat, reducing its effects, and protecting lives, installations, and vital capacities. This option allows the Gulf states to avoid Iranian retaliatory reactions should they choose to respond militarily, especially in light of the rise of the hardline current in Iran after the assassination of the Supreme Leader.
2- Continued diplomatic efforts to contain escalation and create possible opportunities to end the war: A number of Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have worked to open political and security communication channels with Iran in pursuit of de-escalation and a ceasefire. Oman has also remained an “open” communication channel between Iran and the United States. Many GCC states seem to operate on the understanding that Iran needs the Gulf states to contain and stop the course of the war. One of the governing perceptions in Gulf thinking is that Iran’s targeting of Gulf territories is linked to the pressures these states could exercise, once their sovereignty has been violated and their economies harmed, on the United States to stop a war that could become regional if the Gulf states, which represent oases of stability, are dragged into the fires of the region. In this context, Gargash said that Iran today is “in greater need of Gulf intervention to contain this war and prevent its spread. But Tehran, in truth, through these actions, and through targeting not only the bases, we have begun to see some of the randomness we are seeing today in Iran. There is short-sightedness and there is in reality the creation of enmities that will last for years to come, and a rebuilding of mistrust.”
Although Oman itself suffered damage from Iranian attacks on the Duqm area, damage described as purely economic, and despite drone attacks on Dhofar and Salalah, it has continued to play its conciliatory role between the United States and Iran in order to bring the war to an end. In a statement issued on March 1, 2026, the Omani Foreign Ministry said that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had informed his Omani counterpart Badr Al Busaidi in a phone call that Tehran was open to any serious efforts to calm the situation after the Israeli and American attacks. Oman also stressed, during the extraordinary session of the Council of the League of Arab States at the ministerial level held virtually on March 8, 2026, that the region stood at a dangerous turning point due to the escalation of military operations and the triumph of the logic of force over the language of dialogue and peace. This, it said, required intensified diplomatic and political efforts to find a peaceful solution to the root causes of the conflict in a manner that preserves the region’s security and stability and spares its peoples the scourge of war.
This was preceded by signs of de-escalation on the Iranian side, as reflected in the statement of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on March 6, 2026, that his country had received initiatives from several states to mediate regarding the war and that Tehran had informed the mediators of its commitment to the path of de-escalation, saying: “Our response to them is clear: we are committed to achieving lasting peace in the region.” Trump also told The Atlantic in an interview dated March 1, 2026 that he looked forward to dialogue with what he called the new Iranian administration, saying: “They want to talk, and I agreed to talk, so I will talk to them. They should have done that much earlier. They should have offered what was practical and easy to implement much earlier. They waited too long.”
3- Strengthening intra-Gulf relations in the face of regional threats: The US and Israeli war against Iran was one of the reasons behind the phone call received by UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after weeks of publicly declared tension following the clash between forces of the Presidential Council backed by Saudi Arabia and forces of the Southern Transitional Council backed by the UAE. The shared threats facing both Saudi Arabia and the UAE pushed their ruling elites to move beyond differences over some regional files, whether in Yemen or Sudan, in an era in which managing disputes with an ally has become more complex than managing disputes with an adversary.
The threat facing the Gulf states is not limited to the Iranian threat itself. It also extends to the Iraqi threat, or more precisely to the armed brigades supporting Iran inside the Iraqi arena, and it may extend to Yemen if Ansar Allah, the Houthis, become involved as part of the support front for the axis of resistance. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim praised, in his statement on March 1, 2026, “Saudi Arabia’s announcement that it will stand with Kuwait if Iraq attacks it, and this should be the position of all GCC states, and it should apply to every crisis threatening our countries through consultation and solid coordination, so that our countries are not singled out one after another and all of us subjected to extortion. A major danger is coming, one that we must realize and prepare to deal with.”
4- Sending a message from Arab states that Iran is regionally isolated: There is a policy being followed by five Gulf capitals, with the exception of Oman, which believes the war was imposed on Iran, based on the necessity of isolating Iran from its regional surroundings because of its interventionist policy in the internal affairs of Arab states and its use of ties with proxies in countries experiencing crises. This strengthens its agenda on the one hand and constrains regional stability on the other. The extraordinary meeting of the Council of the League of Arab States at the level of foreign ministers, chaired by the UAE on March 8, 2026, pointed to an Arab condemnation of Iranian attacks on Gulf states and a rejection of the Iranian narrative that such attacks formed part of a defensive strategy. It also stressed the need to secure the territories of Arab states exposed to Iranian attacks and to review Iranian policy toward neighboring states. The Arab message here is that Iran faces isolation from its regional neighborhood, with only limited exceptions.
5- Exploiting the rise in regional opposition to normalization with Israel: The war is likely to lead to a retreat in efforts by Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, to normalize relations with Israel. There is already a widespread belief that Israel has been waging military attacks across the region since October 7, 2023 without deterrence, whether near its borders or in distant areas such as Qatar, where it targeted Hamas leadership in Doha in September 2025.
Large segments of Arab public opinion also remain angry over the fifth Gaza war, Israeli threats to annex parts of the West Bank, and efforts to establish a buffer zone in southern Lebanon and displace its residents. The current Israeli campaign in Lebanon has also produced a new displacement crisis. US cooperation with Israel in waging this war will further damage the reputation of both countries, especially Tel Aviv. Gulf leaders may therefore make use of public opinion opposed to normalization in the Gulf region to absorb any American pressure in this direction.
6- Deepening the strategic partnership with major international powers: Bahrain has activated Article Two of the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) with the United States and Britain, which enshrines shared commitments aimed at enhancing security cooperation and collective deterrence in the face of external threats. This was reflected in the consultations held on March 6, 2026 by Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad, National Security Adviser and Secretary-General of the Supreme Defense Council in Bahrain, with Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, Chief of the Defence Staff of the United Kingdom.
Third: Future Options for the Gulf States Regarding the February 28 War
The options available to the Gulf states in responding to Iranian attacks on their sovereignty and territories are multiple, should the war continue for a longer period and should the scale, intensity, and scope of Iranian attacks expand, as follows:
1- A Gulf shift from passive defense to active defense against Iran: Although as of March 10, 2026 the Gulf states remain committed to a defensive strategy aimed at protecting their territories and populations by repelling Iranian attacks, this does not mean that they will indefinitely be satisfied with passive defense if Iranian attacks grow broader and more prolonged. They may resort to responding to Iranian aggression on their territories and shift toward active defense, as indicated in the statement issued after the extraordinary virtual meeting of the GCC Ministerial Council on March 1, 2026.
Under this path, the Gulf states could launch air raids against ballistic missile launch platforms and drone launching sites on Iranian territory. They may turn to such an option if the scope and intensity of Iranian strikes on Gulf states expand, requiring a firm response and the delivery of a deterrent message that the Gulf states will not tolerate violations of their sovereignty or attacks on their lands. This option is supported by the fact that Gulf states possess legal legitimacy under international law to respond to Iranian attacks and also enjoy public support for such a step. More importantly, some Gulf states, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, possess advanced air forces capable of carrying out such raids.
The United States might also be allowed to use bases and airspace on Gulf territory to strike Iran or to rely on the defensive capabilities of allied countries, especially European states such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Gulf states might ask these countries to deploy early warning and air defense systems on their territories to protect military assets, such as the French naval base in Abu Dhabi and British bases in Bahrain and Oman, as well as their citizens residing in Gulf states. These countries also have a core interest in the continued flow of Gulf oil and gas and in preventing a rise in prices that would negatively affect their economies. Yet no Gulf-wide consensus on such an option should be expected, and the option itself carries significant costs, especially as it could plunge the region into a sharply sectarian Sunni-Shiite conflict.
2- Further development of air defense systems in Gulf states: Air defense systems in the Gulf states have succeeded in intercepting the majority of the missiles and drones launched by Iran, reflecting notable progress in missile defense and early warning capabilities. Yet these systems still require further development to reduce material and human losses when projectiles do reach their intended targets. In addition, air defense contributes to protecting the international image of the Gulf states, since today’s Gulf economy does not rest only on energy exports but also on its role as a central node in global supply chains.
Ports, airports, and free zones form linking platforms between Asia, Europe, and Africa. In the context of a prolonged war or repeated escalation, global companies begin to redistribute risk. They may not withdraw immediately, but they may diversify storage centers, reduce dependence on particular routes, and increase reserve stocks. Economic security thus becomes an essential part of the national security equation. Protecting energy infrastructure, ports, and supply chains is no longer just an economic issue. It has become a central component of the region’s strategic stability and of preventing the region from being classified within the category of “high risk.”
3- Upgrading local defense industries in the Gulf states: There is likely to be broad discussion, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on strengthening a range of defense industries in highly specialized fields, in a way that provides a degree of readiness for any sudden regional shifts, or at the very least reduces the losses to which Gulf states may be exposed. This stems from the necessity of adapting to a risk environment in which threats may come from every direction.
4- Rethinking the move from Gulf cooperation to Gulf union: The current war is reviving debate over the future of collective security in the Gulf, something called for by a number of strategic experts in the region such as Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla and Dr. Ebtesam Al Ketbi. Despite the major development in the individual military capacities of GCC states, cross-border threats, especially missiles and drones, require a higher level of operational integration. This reality reinforces the need to build an integrated regional network for early warning and missile defense linking Gulf capabilities together and coordinating them with their international partners. Such a system would not only enhance defensive capacity but would also raise the level of deterrence by creating an operational environment that is difficult to penetrate. The current war may become a defining moment pushing toward the restructuring of the Gulf security architecture so that it moves from the traditional model of cooperation to a more integrated model based on the exchange of information and defensive capabilities in real time.
5- Contributing to the reshaping of the regional security order: This war represents a real test for the model of stability that the Gulf states sought to consolidate over past decades. While these states succeeded in building flexible economies and broad networks of international partnerships, the new strategic environment requires a shift from a policy of risk management to a policy of reshaping the regional security order itself, with a balance among different actors. The fundamental question raised by the current war is how to build a more stable regional security system in a region where wars have become less containable and more prone to spread across borders.
6- Thinking about the requirements of the “day after” the war: The strategic challenge for Gulf states lies in preparing for the post-war phase, or the day after the guns fall silent. Most notably, this means working urgently to restore production in key and vital sectors. That in turn requires dealing with the different consequences produced by the war. The recovery of damaged energy facilities, the suspension of flights, rising maritime insurance premiums, increased shipping costs, and the possibility of rerouting vessels do not merely represent additional financial burdens. They are also signals that the region may once again be classified as a high-risk zone.
Conclusion
The Gulf states will overcome the repercussions of this war, sooner or later, thanks to their vast financial reserves and sovereign wealth funds. Yet the core challenge they face will remain the restoration of global market confidence in the model offered by the Gulf states, because the security environment in the Gulf will not return to what it was before the war. That requires building a multidimensional deterrence system combining military power, economic resilience, and active diplomacy. The Iranian targeting of the Gulf states represents a comprehensive test of the Gulf economic model, which rests on four interconnected pillars: the stability of energy supplies, the security of maritime corridors, the centrality of supply chains, and the attractiveness of the investment environment. These are pillars not suited to slippage toward wider fronts.
* The writer is the head of Arab studies program at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
* The article was Published in the April 2026 issue of Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya magazine.
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