Just as expected, the first round of direct talks between Iran and the US in Pakistan proved a failure. The whole region finds itself back again in a highly volatile mood for another fortnight. With both parties playing hardball, it is now left to US President Donald Trump to decide whether to restart the war or give negotiations another chance.
Israel will say to the Americans, “we told you so, you can’t negotiate with Iran’s regime,” pressuring for further strikes. But it’s not alone in this. Some Gulf parties share the same position. Though almost all bordering Arab states acknowledge that they have to find effective ways to function with their neighbouring states, their trust in the current regime in Tehran is gone now that Iran responded to Israeli and American attacks by targeting all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members along with Iraq and Jordan.
There is no unified GCC voice on the crisis, whether the US reaches a deal with Iran or war resumes till the complete destruction of the Iranian state. Saudi Arabia holds a balanced position, since it has been part of the efforts led by Egypt to bring the warring parties to negotiating table in Islamabad. Qatar and Oman prefer political settlement to war. But the rest of the GCC wants to see the Iranian regime destroyed.
Whatever happens, no war can go on forever, and many analysts are already contemplating how the Gulf will shape up after the war. Regardless of the outcome, there seems to be some indications of a change in policies and alliances. The first direct message about this came from Emirati Presidential Adviser Anwar Gargash, who posted on X: “The UAE will reassess its regional and international relationships with clarity and precision, identifying trusted partners, while pursuing economic and financial recalibration to reinforce the resilience of its model.”
Other messages by UAE-based figures clearly indicated a move towards closer relations with Israel rather than other regional parties who were much less supportive during the war. But the popular mood in the Gulf and the whole region is different. Dubai businessman Khalaf Al- Habtoor gave voice to a large segment of public opinion when he criticised Trump’s decision to start the war, and then rebuked Lindsey Graham for calling out the Gulf countries for not joining the US-Israeli strikes on Iran. Though he later deleted that post, it was a reflection of the public mood in the UAE and the rest of the Gulf.
Commentary in the Israeli media indicates that changes in the region may not have played out as Israel wished. The daily Yedioth Ahronoth concluded this week, “security ties with UAE strengthened, but normalisation hit as Gulf States may tilt towards Iran and Turkey.” According to the paper, one Israeli official said, “the outcome is less favourable for now. It will reduce the chances of normalisation and alliances. They [the Gulf countries] will want to move closer to Iran and align with Turkey. In the Gulf, we come out weaker – except with the UAE.”
Since the war on Gaza, public opinion in the Gulf has not differed much from that of the rest of the region. Jonathan Fulton, a professor at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, noted this popular stance on his blog, citing discussions with people there. But he added that “at the official level, however, the decision to partner so deeply with the US on defence has been justified. After all, Iran is the enemy... The Islamic Republic is a threat that can’t be met with diplomacy, and the fortune spent on US bases and defence systems was money well-spent. And of course other partners have stepped up – Korea, France, the UK, and Ukraine – but I suspect the lesson this month has been that there is no substitute for the defence cooperation agreements with the US. I imagine there is deep frustration if not anger with the flippant approach the US has taken in starting this war.”
This is not the case with other Gulf states, many of which have begun to see US military bases there as a liability rather than protection. GCC countries are not confident that the US will “finish the job” in Iran, but some of them are also wary and averse to supporting Israel in reaching that goal. According to a report in the British daily, The Guardian, the post-war Gulf will be in a dilemma. “The Gulf will have to live with a continuing threat from the regime in Iran and its remaining missile arsenal. American bases on their soil turned them into targets for Iran.”
Almost all analysis and commentary excludes the idea of the Gulf dropping military dependence on the US after the war, even if they diversify their alliances. In another blog, Fulton, who also works for the Atlantic Council, wrote: “In 2017 the big idea was the Middle East Security Alliance, or MESA, a group consisting of the GCC states along with Jordan and Egypt... I suspect we’ll be hearing more about collective security in the aftermath of this war. I have no idea what form that would take, other than the same GCC+2 along with the US and Israel would likely be the members.”
This would not be an easy undertaking, as countries like Oman will be reluctant to join any security arrangements including Israel. Emirati finances won’t be enough to establish the Gulf system it desires either as this requires political will. Until Saudi Arabia joins the train of normalisation, such a post-war Gulf arrangement won’t be feasible. A recent example of the limits of money was evident last week when the UAE – not pleased with Pakistan pushing for Iranian-American negotiations – it sought repayment of a $3.5 billion deposit from Islamabad’s Central Bank. Though the withdrawal was brushed off by Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry as a “routine financial transaction”, the sum equated to roughly 21 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange reserves. Some observers saw the move as an Emirati signal of displeasure with Pakistan’s stance on Iran and a signal for other indebted partners.
There is a growing feeling in the Gulf that an American deal with Iran might not address their concerns regarding security and stability. Hours after Trump announced a truce for talks, the Emirati Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement about “seeking further clarification on the agreement’s provisions to ensure Iran’s full commitment to an immediate cessation of all hostilities in the region and the complete and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.”
Whether or not a deal is made, the situation escalates into wider conflict or the Iranian regime collapses, the most likely outcome is a paradigm shift in the GCC. This will not necessarily abolish all previous policies and alliances but will definitely recalibrate them to the outcome of the current war. As a Gulf-based analyst told Al-Ahram Weekly, this war is different from the war on Iraq at the start of the century: “At that time, some warned of the consequences for the GCC countries if Iraq collapsed into chaos. Those fears proved to be baseless. Now, the Gulf is emboldened that even if Iran goes into the abyss, no drastic consequences are very likely.”
* A version of this article appears in print in the 16 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
Short link: