I present three expected directions of transformation in the Middle East after the current war: the future of the region's relationship with the international system, its relationship with rising powers, and intra-regional relations. These three levels of the war’s impact on the region largely reflected an academic perspective.
However, now that the two main parties to the war—the United States and Iran—have entered into a complex negotiation process aimed at ending this war, with each side presenting a list of demands toward the other, a careful reading of the substance of these demands indicates that the parties to the war are seeking to reformulate some of the foundations of the region, or to build new regional balances, or to change the nature of the relationship between the region and the United States.
In this context, it is necessary to emphasize some fundamental principles that should govern any direction related to formulating new rules in the region, if the parties are indeed serious about building sustainable peace—whether at the level of their direct relations or at the level of the region—based on the assumption that the shape of the region does not belong to a single party, nor to the parties of the war alone.
The first principle is to ensure that no single state dominates the region. This means that specific parties should not, to the exclusion of others, monopolize the shaping of the region or the main frameworks governing policies and key interactions within it, whether political, security, or otherwise. Some parties may argue that the current war, and the wars that preceded it over the past three years, have revealed new balances in the region or are leading toward them. However, this is an incorrect conclusion, because real balances are not necessarily revealed by actual wars, but rather by the distribution of military, political, and diplomatic capabilities, as well as geopolitical factors. Therefore, any new formulation of the region’s structure and its political and security frameworks must involve all regional powers, as this is a fundamental condition for building sustainable peace and stability.
The second principle, which is linked to the previous one, concerns ensuring that no single state dominates maritime navigation and strategic straits. If the current war has demonstrated the importance of freedom of navigation in general, and the danger of the closure of one of the key maritime straits, it has also confirmed the risks of a single state controlling navigation in a way that threatens the freedom of international trade.
It also highlights the importance of adhering to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other rules of international law governing freedom of navigation during wartime. This means there is a danger that negotiations between the parties to the war could lead to the consolidation of an exceptional status in the Strait of Hormuz, which could establish new rules for managing maritime straits that may undermine the principle of freedom of navigation as a fundamental guarantee of international trade.
The third principle relates to the necessity of building a normal and healthy relationship between the region and the international system. The current war has revealed a relationship between the region and the dominant power in the international system that generates crises, and the emergence of rising powers within the international system has not led to a noticeable change in this characteristic.
Many regions have succeeded in formulating a healthy relationship with the international system, preserving functional boundaries between the region (or regional system) and the international system, which ultimately contributed to regulating the limits of international intervention in regional policies and intra-regional relations. This relationship has been regulated either through balances of power or through structured relations between existing regional arrangements and the international system or major powers. An example of this is the formulas developed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in its relations with the United States and China.
The fourth principle concerns the necessity of building normal relations between the region and neighboring states, particularly between Arab powers and non-Arab regional neighbors. The issue of relations between Arab powers and neighboring regional states is not new and is not a product of this war, but it has become more dangerous in light of the adoption by neighboring powers of policies and projects at the expense of regional security and the national security of several Arab states, as well as the transformation of some of these states into arenas of conflict—either among regional powers themselves or between those powers and Arab states. The current war has represented a clear manifestation of the risks inherent in the existing pattern of relations between the Arab bloc and regional neighbors.
One of the entry points and conditions for correcting this relationship is the construction of an effective Arab regional system, based on a clear definition of the concept of Arab national security and the patterns of threats facing it as an integrated whole, without denying the variation in the relative importance of threat sources from one Arab sub-region to another. The importance of the Iranian threat to the security of Gulf states does not negate the importance of the Israeli threat to other states. There is a significant responsibility on Arab powers to fulfill this requirement at this particular moment more than ever before.
The second entry point is the development of a framework governing relations between Arab states and neighboring countries, drawing on other regional experiences. No party in the region can eliminate the existence of another, nor can geopolitical realities be abolished, nor can any party ignore the security concerns of others. Any framework for relations with neighboring states must also be based on a number of principles, foremost among them non-interference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, and respect for the nation-state as the primary unit upon which the region and its interactions are based, and consequently respect for borders and geopolitical realities.
It is not easy for the parties to the war, or for other states in the region, to accept these principles. However, they represent a real test for all in order to avoid new waves of violence and wars that serve no one’s interests.
The current war has revealed that the relationship between the region and the dominant power in the international system is one that generates crises, and the emergence of rising powers has not significantly altered this characteristic. By contrast, many regions have succeeded in establishing a healthy relationship with the international system, preserving functional boundaries between the regional system and the international system, which, in the final analysis, has contributed to regulating the limits of international intervention in regional policies and intra-regional relations.
*The writer is Chairman of the Board of the Al-Ahram Foundation and an expert in international relations.
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