A precarious precipice

Karam Said, Tuesday 21 Apr 2026

Turkey and Israel appear to have locked horns, stopping short of direct confrontation for now.

A precarious precipice

 

Turkish-Israeli tensions have been mounting dramatically since the outbreak of the US-Israel war on Iran despite US efforts to play the strain down. US Special Envoy Tom Barrack described the escalating friction on 18 April as mere “political rhetoric”; he stressed the need for a cooperative approach in the energy and security sectors to ensure regional stability.

However, the relationship continues to be beset by a range of challenges. Foremost among those is the Netanyahu government’s apparent insistence on recasting Turkey as an adversary that threatens Israeli national security, alongside Israel’s portrayal of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a main obstacle to de-escalation efforts in the region, particularly amid faltering US-Israel negotiations. This is compounded by Ankara’s accusations, voiced during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on 18 April, that Israel is exploiting the war in the Middle East as a pretext to occupy more territories. Turkey’s foreign minister said that Israel seeks to extend its control over lands in Syria, Lebanon, and the West Bank.

Last week during a meeting of the parliamentary bloc of the Justice and Development Party, Erdoğan launched an attack on Israel declaring that no power could threaten Turkey or its leadership. “If there is to be peace in our region”, he said, “it will be despite the Zionist regime”. In the same address, Erdoğan added, “I remind the baby killers who speak against me and our country of some facts: The Republic of Turkey is not an ordinary state.” This marked an escalation that goes beyond reciprocal rhetoric and a deepening state of hostility between the two sides.

Tensions further rose between Turkey and Israel following the announcement by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office on 11 April of an indictment against 35 Israeli officials, foremost among them Netanyahu himself. The charges come after the Israeli navy intercepted vessels that were part of a flotilla bound for the Gaza Strip in October 2025. The indictment calls for severe penalties, including life imprisonment, in addition to cumulative sentences ranging from 1,102 to 4,596 years, without specifying the punishment sought for each defendant individually, according to the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation.

In response, Netanyahu accused Erdoğan of supporting the Iranian regime and describing the Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz as a “paper tiger”. The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded by stating that “Netanyahu is the Hitler of our time.”

According to Turkish analyses, Ankara’s hardline approach to Israel reflects “a phase of redefining threats rather than adopting political positions, whereby considerations of regional security take precedence over traditional bilateral calculations. This explains the shift in Turkish discourse from political criticism to the language of early strategic warning in response to Israeli practices.”

As if these reasons were not enough for the rising tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv, Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip remains a major obstacle to their relationship, particularly following Ankara’s decision last year to sever trade relations with Israel and close Turkish airspace to Israeli aviation. Turkey supports efforts to hold Israeli leaders accountable before the International Criminal Court.

Ongoing Israeli military activity in Syria is another point of contention. Statements by senior Israeli officials indicate a continued willingness to pursue open-ended military options in southern Syria aimed at seizing further territory, while not ruling out a return to escalation at any moment. This was evident in the Israeli forces’ incursion into Syria’s southwest Quneitra Province on 17 April. The attack took place despite Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s stated commitment to reaching a security arrangement with Tel Aviv that would ensure stability in the region. Israel’s continued military build-up in Syria, ostensibly for purposes deterrence, has raised concerns in Ankara, which has warned against Israeli attempts to exploit the Druze issue in Suwayda in pursuit of its policies.

Turkey believes that Israel has plans for Syria, including spheres of influence, military operations, strikes or other measures. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Israel has deferred policies towards Syria, suggesting that Tel Aviv is not currently implementing these policies due to the war with Iran, but that this does not mean Tel Aviv has abandoned them. Tensions between Turkey and Israel may lead to an early return to a potential round of direct confrontations over the medium or longer term. Israel, for its part, appears to be advancing notions that the US may exit NATO – an idea that would weaken NATO and, in turn, limit Ankara’s ability to benefit from a key security and political ally. In parallel, in recent months Israel has sought to tarnish Turkey’s image in American circles, portraying it as a supporter of “Iranian terrorism”, while continuing to press Washington to prevent Turkey’s return to the F-35 fighter jet programme. At the same time, Israel has moved to boost its strategic ties with Cyprus and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As for Turkey, official statements continue to signal readiness for any potential confrontation, particularly amid what Ankara views as sustained Israeli incitement against it. Turkey is also preparing to counter Israeli policies through a new approach centred on expanding its regional security partnerships. This shows in Turkish efforts to establish a regional security platform comprising Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, aimed at coordinating positions and mechanisms of cooperation in addressing shared security challenges. Concurrently, Ankara is working to prevent Israel from imposing new faits accomplis in sensitive areas of influence, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa, as well as on the Syrian front, where Turkey is moving to intensify cooperation with Damascus in the fields of defence and energy.

Turkey is also seeking to bolster its direct deterrence capabilities by strengthening its defence arsenal and expanding the production of advanced military technologies, while attempting to manage the regional balance in preparation for scenarios that could involve an open confrontation with Israel. Nevertheless, despite the tensions, the likelihood of an immediate slide into direct confrontation appears limited. Washington, Turkey’s strategic ally, is unlikely to allow such an escalation, given that it would impose an additional burden on US interests in the region.

Tel Aviv knows too well that a military confrontation with Turkey could have significant economic and political costs, particularly as Ankara, a member of NATO, maintains extensive strategic relations with major regional and international powers, notably Russia and China, in addition to Israel’s lack of compelling justifications with which to persuade Washington of such a course of action.


* A version of this article appears in print in the 23 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.

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