Before the war on Gaza began in October 2023, the US had reasons to anticipate Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic normalisation with Israel, and a Gulf region solidified against Iran within the framework of the so-called “Abraham Accords” seemed to be imminent.
This dynamic changed when Israel pursued its long and genocidal campaign in Gaza, sending shock waves across the region. Its expanding multi-front attacks on Lebanon and Syria, and even Qatar, a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state, with US approval or at least inability to contain Israel’s increasing militarism, set the scene for strategic revisions.
In June 2025, Israel attacked Iran just as it was progressing on talks with the US in a 12-day war that brought the conflict to the oil-rich Gulf region for the first time.
On 17 September 2025, Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan, the only Islamic country possessing nuclear weapons and also having an army of 600,000 soldiers. The agreement was Riyadh’s answer to Israel’s ambitions, the regional implications of Iran’s retaliation, and its declining faith in US protection despite billions of dollars’ worth of Saudi investment pledges to the US economy.
Less than a year later, with both the US and Israel launching an unprovoked war on Iran leading to the unravelling of regional stability feared by the Gulf and Arab states, Pakistan is firmly in the spotlight as an effective interlocuter between Tehran, Washington, and the Arab capitals in its efforts to end the war between the US and Israel against Iran.
The Pakistani media now speculate that the recent talks in Doha between Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Qatari leaders including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence Affairs Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani are leading to a strategic partnership between the two countries.
The new accord could lay the groundwork for a broader regional security framework involving key players like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, according to the Times of Islamabad. Such a framework could foster coordinated responses to shared threats, joint defence industry projects, and enhanced interoperability among participating forces, the paper said.
The Gulf’s ties with Islamabad are not new. They are deeply rooted in security cooperation, economic dependence, and labour migration. Around six million Pakistani expatriates in the Gulf send vital remittances home, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have long provided financial lifelines to Pakistan through aid, loans, and deferred oil payments.
Winning the favour of US President Donald Trump is a new development that raised Pakistan’s global standing when it mediated the two-week ceasefire agreement earlier this month between Iran and the US before the war escalated to apocalyptic levels.
Pakistan then hosted historic talks in Islamabad that brought high-level US and Iranian officials to speak directly together for the first time in 47 years.
Though the talks produced no agreement, Pakistan has, after years of marginalisation, come to occupy an unforeseen role in Middle East politics as a trusted ally of Washington, although it does not recognise Israel.
By hosting and facilitating the talks, Islamabad has positioned itself as a rare intermediary that can maintain working relationships with both Washington and Tehran. This access gives Pakistan an opening to rebuild trust with the United States while preserving its ties with Iran and Gulf partners.
The effort reflects a broader shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy towards pragmatism and multi-alignment. Rather than relying heavily on any single partner, Islamabad is trying to balance relations across competing powers, including the US, China, and regional actors. Acting as a mediator helps to reinforce this strategy by demonstrating its utility to all sides.
Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir, who flew to Tehran this week for three days of talks with the Iranian leadership, before heading to Riyadh, was previously praised by Trump as a “great fighter” and a “favourite field marshal” who knows Iran “more than most”.
As preparations intensify for a second round of talks, Islamabad is once again under the spotlight. A follow-up round means this channel has not collapsed. For Pakistan, that is critical, since if the talks continue in Islamabad, they effectively lock Pakistan in as the default venue and gatekeeper of communication.
That gives it leverage and influence over timing, sequencing, and backchannel messaging.
But Pakistan is also hoping to stabilise its immediate neighbourhood since de-escalation would reduce risks along its border with Iran and help secure vital energy supplies from the Gulf, on which it heavily depends and is affected by the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Pakistan is highly exposed to Gulf energy routes, so even small diplomatic progress like extending a ceasefire or clarifying red lines has real economic value for Islamabad.
It is unclear how the fate of the new round of talks will impact Pakistan. If they fail, Islamabad might take a reputational hit, but not a fatal one. If Iran is seen as walking away, Pakistan will look like a reasonable facilitator caught in the middle. If the process collapses due to poor coordination or unrealistic expectations, Pakistan could look ineffective.
A no-show by Iran would expose Pakistan’s limited leverage over Tehran, and it would show that Islamabad can host but that it cannot compel. More than just another meeting, the second round of talks are a stress test for Pakistan. Can it convert access into actual diplomatic traction, or is it just providing a venue for talks while others call the shots?
* A version of this article appears in print in the 23 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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