US President Donald Trump suddenly declared a ten-day ceasefire in Lebanon on 16 April, with the announcement coming only days after contention over whether the US-Iran ceasefire included Lebanon, with Trump taking the Israeli position that it did not.
During the interval, Israel unleashed the most intensive wave of aerial bombardment in the history of its aggressions against Lebanon. “Black Wednesday”, as the massacre was called, left 357 civilians killed and 1,223 wounded.
The separate ceasefire in Lebanon, which reportedly followed direct pressure from Trump on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has not resolved the debate over the extent of the linkage between the US-Iran and Israel-Lebanon tracks.
A month earlier on 9 March, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun launched an initiative inviting direct negotiations with Israel. The move epitomised the shift in regional power balances since the fall of the Al-Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, which, for decades before the outbreak of Civil War in the country, had been a factor in preventing Lebanese moves to conclude a peace with Israel.
However, Aoun’s announcement also triggered concerns that Beirut in its haste to conclude a deal would make poorly calculated concessions under the pressures of unrestrained Israeli military force and Trump’s eagerness to score an achievement to bolster his image as a “peacemaker”.
Iran’s willingness to engage in a second round of negotiations with the US, despite the collapse of the first Pakistani-mediated round, has opened the door to a second round of US-sponsored Lebanese-Israeli talks. The two tracks thus appear to be unified in principle, even if they retain a degree of independence in practice.
The Lebanese-Israeli negotiations are expected to continue as long as the US-Iran talks do as a result, with the latter reinforcing the former. However, if the US-Iran negotiations collapse again, the same might occur with the Lebanese-Israeli track, especially if Hizbullah acts to obstruct any progress not aligned with Iranian interests.
As the Lebanese government entered direct negotiations with Israel despite Hizbullah’s opposition, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, backed by Saudi Arabia, began to campaign to win broader domestic support behind the move, so that it does not appear too detached from public opinion.
A large segment of Lebanese opinion was expressed tangibly by the return of tens of thousands of displaced Lebanese to their ruined villages in Southern Lebanon on the day after the ceasefire announcement. Their action, despite the ever-looming threat of Israeli violations, reflected a grassroots Lebanese “red line” in response to Israeli attempts to impose a “yellow line” aimed at annexing Southern Lebanon.
Soon after Washington announced the ceasefire, Hizbullah described it as the fruit of the renewed US-Iran negotiations, which rectified the previous lack of clarity and confirmed Lebanon’s inclusion in the agreement.
The Lebanese government characterised it differently, describing it as a “goodwill initiative” made possible by the US’ response to Lebanon’s request for a cessation of hostilities to give direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations a chance.
On 14 April, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio opened the preparatory meeting for direct talks between the Lebanese and Israeli ambassadors at the State Department in Washington. The ceasefire announcement came two days later, creating the impression of a first outcome of the US-sponsored talks. They are expected to move onto a second round, with delegations flying to Washington from Beirut and Tel Aviv on 23 April.
The terms of the new ceasefire are as ambiguous as that announced on 27 November 2024, which was observed by one side only, and Israeli violations persisted on a near daily basis on the pretext it was striking Hizbullah targets.
Israel has signalled that it will follow the same pattern of behaviour this time around. It has reserved the freedom to act in “self-defence” in Southern Lebanon, while its defence minister, Israel Katz, has clarified that the Israeli army’s presence there will be open-ended.
On 16 April, just hours after the ceasefire was announced, Israel claimed it had assassinated a senior commander in Hizbullah’s Radwan Force.
Over the next two days, Israeli troops were caught in ambushes in South Lebanon, killing two soldiers. Similar incidents occurred elsewhere, one resulting in the loss of four tanks out of an advancing column of Merkavas.
The ambushes were laid to prevent Israeli forces from exploiting the ceasefire to seize more territory in Lebanon, and the incidents show that in practice the ceasefire does not necessarily mean a complete halt in the fighting, but rather a reduction of hostilities to a minimum.
According to a Hizbullah military source, the group will adhere to the ceasefire, but unlike during the previous one, it will respond to Israeli violations. Israel has made it clear that it will continue its military operations south of its “yellow line” in Lebanon.
This defines a “security belt” extending from six to 10 km from Israel into Southern Lebanon, in which “all homes in Lebanese villages near the border will be destroyed – in accordance with the Rafah and Beit Hanoun model in Gaza,” Katz said in a meeting with senior Israeli military officials.
The residents of approximately 55 Lebanese villages – around 600,000 civilians according to Katz’s estimate – will be barred from returning to their homes in the area south of the Litani River.
According to maps appearing in Israeli news reports, the “yellow line” extends to the maritime zone where a boundary was demarcated under a 2022 agreement between Israel and Lebanon. This has raised questions as to whether Israel intends to extend its military operations through a naval blockade or whether it plans to appropriate Lebanon’s offshore gas south of a new de facto maritime border drawn by the “yellow line”.
Since the ceasefire announcement, Israeli forces have continued low-grade operations, demolishing residential buildings and bulldozing roads in several towns in Southern Lebanon such as Mays Al-Jabal, Naqoura, Shamaa, and Bayyada.
Israel claims it is targeting Hizbullah’s military infrastructure; however, the true nature of the operations has been exposed by a video, which has gone viral, showing an Israeli soldier smashing a statue of Jesus in the southern town of Debel.
Regardless of the Israeli army’s pledge to investigate the incident, it is widely believed that the image reflects the Israeli intention to permanently eliminate all Lebanese civilian presence in a swath of territory two to three times the size of Gaza.
In the forthcoming second round of negotiations, the Lebanese delegation will be headed by Simon Karam and will include another civilian and a representative of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Other members might be added to match the size and composition of the Israeli delegation.
The agenda of the talks remains uncertain, but Lebanon is expected to press for a full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory, the deployment of LAF forces up to the border, the return of southern residents to their homes, and the launch of reconstruction efforts.
It will also address 13 disputed points along the land border and seek the release of Lebanese POWs captured in the conflict from 2024 to the present.
Israel still insists on the complete disarmament of Hizbullah and on remaining within its declared buffer zone, on the grounds of a need to destroy Hizbullah’s military infrastructure. Despite sustaining a low-cost, low-intensity offensive, Tel Aviv has stated that it hopes the negotiations will lead to a comprehensive peace agreement with Lebanon and a trilateral meeting between Trump, Netanyahu, and Aoun.
For his part, Aoun reportedly refused to include Netanyahu in a phone call with Trump during which the ceasefire was announced. Observers expect he will continue to refuse to meet Netanyahu personally even if the negotiations become more serious. Lebanese Ambassador in Washington Nada Hammadeh also refused to shake hands with her Israeli counterpart during the direct talks.
The Lebanese government’s decision to engage in direct negotiations with Israel continues to stir heated controversy. Both Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam face widespread accusations of betrayal.
Intensive Saudi diplomatic efforts have been instrumental in containing a domestic campaign against Aoun and Salam, said to have been launched by supporters of Hizbullah and the Amal Movement, which have been accused of trying to overthrow the government.
A visit to Riyadh by an aide to Berri is believed to have helped alleviate the domestic pressure on the government while simultaneously accelerating the US pressure on Israel to halt the war on Lebanon.
The Saudi diplomatic input during the past week reflects the development of a broader front of mediators keen to support Lebanon as it prepares for the negotiations. Earlier Egyptian efforts to support Lebanon’s resilience during the war helped bolster the Lebanese government’s adherence to its decision regarding the state’s monopoly on arms and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
French support following the “Black Wednesday” massacre also helped secure the ceasefire.
The Saudi efforts remain focus on two objectives: preventing internal Lebanese strife over the controversial negotiations with Israel and prolonging the ceasefire to enable a longer negotiating process. Such steps are consistent with the Arab Peace Initiative launched under Saudi sponsorship at the 2002 Arab League Summit in Beirut.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 23 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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