The US approach to Iran under President Donald Trump involves a fundamental dilemma. Is Washington genuinely pursuing negotiations as a pathway to de-escalation, or merely using diplomacy as a tactical instrument to buy time while consolidating pressure? The available evidence suggests that the United States is not operating within a binary framework of war versus peace, but rather within a hybrid model where negotiation and escalation proceed simultaneously.
At the surface level, diplomatic engagement is active. US envoys are dispatched for last-minute talks, public statements emphasise the possibility of a “reasonable deal”, and signals of progress intermittently emerge from both sides. However, beneath this diplomatic layer, a different reality unfolds characterised by the continuation and even expansion of coercive measures. This dual-track behaviour indicates that, rather than replacing pressure, negotiations are embedded in a broader architecture of strategic coercion.
One of the clearest indicators of this approach is the continuation of what can be described as a “comprehensive containment strategy”. The seizure of the Iranian-linked vessel Touska, following direct US military action in the Gulf of Oman, demonstrates that the ceasefire has not led to a trust-building phase. Instead, it remains a fragile pause, during which Washington continues to enforce maritime restrictions.
From the American perspective, halting or relaxing such measures prematurely would weaken its negotiating leverage; from the Iranian perspective, however, these actions undermine the very basis of negotiations, reinforcing deep-seated mistrust.
There are clear indicators of lack of credibility and strategic clarity in the US position, reflected, for example, in the absence of JD Vance from the negotiations. This absence raises important questions about how seriously these talks are regarded within the US administration, as the level of representation often signals the priority and political weight assigned to a given round.
The implications of this strategy go beyond the maritime domain. The arrest of an Iranian-American woman in Los Angeles on charges of arms smuggling reportedly involving drones, munitions and millions of rounds of ammunition destined for African networks highlights a parallel dimension of US pressure. This case, reportedly investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, sees the confrontation expanding into the security sphere. It signals Washington’s intent to dismantle what are often referred to as “gray networks”, informal logistical and financial channels used by Iran to circumvent sanctions.
Crucially, this incident cannot be viewed in isolation. When analysed alongside maritime interdictions and financial restrictions, it becomes evident that the United States is pursuing a multi-layered strategy: externally through naval enforcement, and internally through legal and intelligence mechanisms.
This convergence suggests that Washington is not merely reacting to Iranian activities but proactively attempting to degrade Iran’s capacity to operate simultaneously across multiple domains. In this sense, negotiations may function less as a conflict-resolution tool and more as a mechanism to manage escalation while these pressure layers intensify.
At the same time, domestic dynamics in the United States impose significant constraints on policy choices. Trump’s declining approval ratings are driven by rising inflation, energy prices and war fatigue and create a strong incentive to seek a political exit. Public opinion data indicates a growing reluctance among Americans to support further military engagement, while divisions within both Republican and Democratic circles limit the administration’s room for manoeuvre. Such domestic pressure introduces an additional layer of complexity: the need to balance external coercion with internal legitimacy.
This is where the contradiction becomes most visible. On the one hand, Trump escalates rhetorically, threatening severe military consequences if negotiations fail. On the other hand, he continues to authorise diplomatic outreach. This pattern aligns with a classic “carrot and stick” strategy, but in this context, it is also indicative of a deeper political necessity: the need to present any potential agreement as a position of strength rather than compromise. Therefore, negotiation is not only directed at Iran, it is equally directed at domestic audiences.
Meanwhile, Iran’s behaviour suggests a clear awareness of this American dilemma. By fluctuating its posture on the Strait of Hormuz which is alternating between closure and partial opening, Tehran is not displaying inconsistency but rather engaging in calibrated signalling. This strategy aims to amplify the global economic uncertainty, thereby increasing the cost of continued US pressure. In effect, Iran is attempting to counterbalance American coercion by redistributing its consequences onto the international system.
The broader strategic picture thus reveals a mutual reliance on pressure as a negotiating tool. Both sides appear to believe that time, under the right conditions, can improve their bargaining position. For US administration, continued economic and security pressure may eventually force Iranian concessions. For Tehran, sustained instability particularly in global energy markets may compel the United States to soften its demands.
However, this dynamic carries inherent risks. The absence of genuine trust-building measures increases the probability of miscalculation, especially in a context where military actions continue under the shadow of diplomacy. Incidents such as vessel seizures or retaliatory threats could easily escalate beyond controlled limits, particularly as the ceasefire approaches its expiration without a clear framework for extension.
When all is said and done, the US approach cannot be understood as a straightforward pursuit of peace, nor as a simple delay tactic. Rather, it reflects a crisis management strategy complex and layered, in which negotiation serves both as a tool for de-escalation and a way to continue exerting pressure.
The central question is not whether Washington seeks an agreement, but whether it seeks one now or under more favourable conditions shaped by continued coercion. Until this question is resolved, the current trajectory is likely to produce a provisional arrangement at best, one that manages the conflict without fundamentally resolving it.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 23 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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