Even if we acknowledge that, up to the present moment, there is no evidence that reliance on peaceful means for dispute settlement is the sole or primary option for the parties to the war, at least for some of them, it is nevertheless clear that since before the outbreak of the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 and up to today, some peaceful dispute-settlement methods have been attempted at different times and stages.
However, none of these efforts has so far yielded final positive or fruitful results or led to a resolution of the issues in dispute between the American and Iranian sides in a way that would ultimately provide comprehensive and definitive solutions to this conflict.
If we refer back to the Charter of the United Nations, we find that it emphasizes in more than one article and paragraph the importance of preventing disputes and resolving their causes through peaceful means, or settling them peacefully after they arise. This is stated in Article 2(3), which obliges states to resolve their disputes peacefully, as well as in Article 33, which lists examples of peaceful means for dispute settlement such as mediation and negotiation.
It is noteworthy that both mediation and negotiation have been used multiple times since before the June 2025 war up to the present, but without final success in resolving the issues at stake between the United States of America and Iran.
In both the June 2025 war and the February 2026 war, the same scenario was repeated: hostilities broke out while negotiations were ongoing between the American and Iranian sides. In both cases, these negotiations were conducted through active and effective mediation by the Sultanate of Oman, a country that maintains distinguished relations with both parties to the conflict.
In each instance, war erupted shortly, perhaps even within a few hours, after the Omani side, through its Foreign Minister Dr. Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, announced tangible progress in the peaceful negotiation process, affirming the value of the negotiation track while maintaining realistic and credible assessments by avoiding claims that all disputed issues had been resolved.
During the June 2025 war, the progress of negotiations appeared to have been aborted when Israel launched its attack on Iran, thereby undermining the negotiation option at a time when a follow-up meeting between the United States of America and Iran at the foreign ministers’ level was scheduled to take place in Rome.
This meeting did not occur due to the war, and interpretations varied: some argued that Israel initiated the war to prevent a peaceful settlement of the American-Iranian dispute through negotiations and Omani mediation, favouring a military option instead. Another view suggested that Israel’s attack, coming just hours after the Omani mediator announced progress, was fully coordinated with the United States of America, a perspective that acquired more credibility following the outbreak of the second war in February 2026, jointly by the US and Israel.
In the case of the February 2026 war, the derailment of the negotiation option between Tehran and Washington was more explicit on the part of one of the parties, the US, which directly and clearly participated alongside Israel in launching the war on Iran. This, again, occurred just hours after statements by the Omani Foreign Minister about progress in negotiations, intensifying feelings of bitterness and regret on the part of the Omani mediator, which did not conceal its surprise in either case at the sudden abandonment of peaceful settlement in favor of military action.
In both instances, June 2025 and February 2026, the outbreak of war indicated, in practical terms and contrary to the UN Charter and prevailing jurisprudence in public international law, that peaceful means for dispute settlement had not been exhausted in the American-Iranian conflict. Some analysts and observers have gone further, raising the question of whether the US was genuinely committed in either case to opting for negotiations with Iran via a third-party mediator (Oman), or whether the entire process was merely a maneuver or deception intended to distract Iran and divert its attention away from the possibility of a military strike.
In reality, in both cases, the Omani side fulfilled all the requirements expected of a mediator. As mentioned earlier, Oman maintained strong relations with both Iran and the United States. Notably, both Iran, under the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and the US provided significant support that helped the Omani army, with Iranian participation at the time, suppress the Dhofar rebellion by the mid-1970s.
After the Iranian Revolution of February 1979 and the establishment of a political system based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of “Guardianship of the Jurist,” Oman succeeded in maintaining strong relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, while also preserving its close ties with the USA. This enabled Oman to gain the trust of both sides and act as a mediator before both the June 2025 and February 2026 wars.
This was not the first time Oman played such a role of mediation between the USA and Iran after the 1979 revolution. During the hostage crisis that began in November 1979, when a group calling itself the “Students Following the Line of the Imam” seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and detained American hostages, Oman entered as a mediator and successfully contributed to a final agreement that led to the hostages’ release in January 1981, shortly before President Ronald Reagan took office. Thus, Oman had ample experience qualifying it for mediation between the USA and Iran before the wars of 2025 and 2026.
During the June 2025 war, Russia offered mediation to end the conflict. More recently, during the current war, President Putin reportedly offered mediation to the US President and proposed that Russia could retain Iran’s enriched uranium as part of a solution to that aspect of the dispute.
In both cases, however, the US neither explicitly accepted nor rejected the offer, although discussions of this proposal have resurfaced in recent days. Qatar also played a mediating role in the final stages leading to the ceasefire in the June 2025 war. Additionally, many UN Security Council members, as well as countries from the European Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, have called for following the peaceful settlement of the dispute in both conflicts.
After nearly six weeks of the 28 February 2026 war, and following joint initiatives and consultations among several key Islamic countries, particularly Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, Pakistani mediation emerged, linked to the announcement of a temporary ceasefire. Pakistan was also well-positioned for this role due to its close relations with both the US and Iran. Islamabad hosted an initial round of negotiations following separate meetings between the Pakistani Prime Minister and his senior officials with each side.
However, for a third time, despite announcements of progress on some disputed issues, the talks quickly stalled. Recently, a second round was expected to be held on Tuesday, 21 April, in Islamabad, but Iran declared that lifting the US naval blockade imposed after the collapse of the first round was a precondition for resuming negotiations, rejecting talks “under threat or pressure” and asserting that the blockade violates international law, a position echoed by several global leaders and officials in some relevant international and regional organizations.
The coming days will determine whether the resumption of peaceful negotiations through Pakistani mediation is feasible and serious, or whether the temporary ceasefire will collapse, leading to a renewed escalation of military operations with all its associated risks, not only for the parties involved but for the entire world at strategic, economic, and security levels.
Alternatively, the ceasefire extension may provide an opportunity to overcome obstacles and soften positions, eventually paving the way for a return to peaceful means aimed at achieving a final resolution of the disputed issues.
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