When the provisional ceasefire in the American-Israeli war against Iran took effect on 8 April just prior to the first round of the American-Iranian negotiations in Islamabad, the world was confronted with two sets of demands from Tehran and Washington regarding their expected outcome.
These positions appeared largely irreconcilable, if not outright contradictory. While the US presented a list of 15 items, Iran put forward 10. As is typical before negotiations begin, each party advanced a maximalist set of demands to strengthen its position at the negotiating table, on the understanding that the process would involve concessions aimed at reaching mutually acceptable compromises towards its end.
One notable demand among Iran’s 10 points was its call for war reparations to compensate for the severe material and human losses it has suffered as a result of the American-Israeli military attacks. Iran considers that there is a legal liability under international law for the “aggressor states” to pay war reparations to it, particularly in order to support reconstruction following the extensive destruction caused by the war and to compensate the families of those killed or injured.
However, Iran did not elaborate on this demand. It did not specify the framework or mechanisms through which such reparations would be assessed or delivered, possibly through bilateral, multilateral, regional, or international channels, including the United Nations or other plurilateral arrangements. Historically, there have been relatively few instances in modern times where war reparations have been formally determined and implemented by the international community.
However, the cases that have existed have had far-reaching and even destabilising consequences. For example, the reparations imposed by the victorious Allied Powers on the defeated Central Powers, notably Germany, following World War I, through the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the London Schedule of Payments (1921), were intended to compensate for civilian damages caused by military operations during the war.
But these reparations are widely regarded as having contributed, at least indirectly, to the rise in the popularity of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party in Germany and its assumption of political power, thereby helping to set the stage for World War II.
Other efforts to implement war reparations have also been short-lived, incomplete, or ultimately unsuccessful. They include, to mention a couple of examples, attempts to do so following the wars in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the Dayton Agreement of 14 December 1995.
There were also initiatives in the mid-1990s by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to pursue compensation for Palestinian refugees under UN General Assembly Resolution 194 adopted on 11 December 1948. These were originally planned to be presented as part of the multilateral track on the question of refugees in the framework of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in November 1991. They aimed to implement the provisions included in the above-mentioned resolution related to the compensation of Palestinian refugees for loss or damage to property, regardless of whether they chose to exercise their right of return to Palestine or not.
The most comprehensive and successful multilateral war reparations process within a UN framework followed the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991 after Iraq’s invasion on 2 August 1990. UN Security Council Resolution 687, adopted on 3 April 1991, established Iraq’s “liability under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”
The same resolution established the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) as a subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council in order to administer this process, which concluded on 31 December 2022. It also established the UN Compensation Fund (UNCF) to pay compensation for claims.
The process functioned in a hybrid way covering political, legal, and administrative areas. The UNCC divided reparation claims into six categories: four for individuals (covering death, injury, property loss, and mental pain and anguish); one for corporations; and one for governments and international or regional organisations along with environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources.
The UNCC Governing Council mirrored the membership of the Security Council, and its secretariat operated within that institutional framework. Claims were evaluated by panels of commissioners from different backgrounds and combining diverse qualifications and expertise, in accordance with the relevant Security Council Resolutions and provisions of international law. Ultimately, the commission awarded $52.3 billion in compensation across approximately 1.5 million successful claims out of the 2.69 million submitted.
Iran’s demand for war reparations not only draws attention to these historical precedents but also raises questions about the likely response from the US to them. Some early indications, based on media reports, have suggested that Washington may consider counterclaims, including compensation for the victims and families of attacks allegedly linked, whether directly or indirectly, to Iran, as well as the possible reopening of claims related to the 1979-1981 American Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran.
These could include demands for compensation for physical and psychological suffering, as well as damage to US property.
The forthcoming rounds of the American-Iranian negotiations may help to clarify whether Iran’s demand for war reparations represents a firm and non-negotiable position and one of its main demands or instead is intended to serve primarily as a bargaining tool to strengthen its leverage in securing other more important objectives, such as maintaining its nuclear programme, protecting its ballistic missiles arsenal, maintaining its network of regional allies, among other possible objectives.
The writer is a commentator.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 30 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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