In recent years, renaming streets and squares in the Middle East has often reflected deeper transformations in political power. Changing street names serves to entrench the legitimacy of a new ruling power, signal tension in bilateral relations following regional shifts, respond to external pressures, mark the end of eras of political guardianship by neighbouring states, shape collective memory or maintain a domestic sectarian balance.
The process of changing street names is typically carried out through municipalities or governorate councils. In the Middle East, it is customary to name streets after national, Arab or regional political figures who have presided over turning points in the history of their societies. Streets are also named after prominent figures in medicine, engineering, the judiciary, law, journalism, the arts, literature and religion, or to commemorate historical events, or to mirror street names in other Arab regions. In many countries, such names remain embedded in popular memory and national identity.
But in recent years the politicisation of street names has become increasingly evident, particularly following major transformations. In Syria, following the fall of the Al-Assad regime on 8 December 2024, the new political elite associated with Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham decided in April 2026 to rename Homs’ Abdel-Moneim Riad Street – named after the late Egyptian chief of staff who was martyred during the War of Attrition on the Suez Canal front – to 18 April Street. The change commemorates the 2011 sit-in at Al-Saa Square, and it was part of a broader campaign to rename streets after local symbols associated with the city’s revolutionary identity, according to the governor, Abdel-Rahman Al-Aama.
The new street name was also part of the restructuring of Syria’s national holidays during a transitional period. It cannot be separated from the Syrian government’s decision to cancel the celebrations marking 6 October, previously observed as a national day, as well as Martyrs’ Day on 6 May. The decision provoked widespread disapproval, particularly in Egypt, as it erased the commemoration of a decisive joint battle against Israel. Some went so far as to question the extent of Syria’s contribution – under the rule of Hafez Al-Assad – to achieving victory. The removal of the name of Abdel-Moneim Riad from one of Syria’s streets, along with the cancellation of 6 October, arguably lends weight to the Israeli narrative that the events of that date do not constitute a victory at all.
Street names are also used as direct diplomatic signals between states. In Iran, for instance, the street bearing the name of Khaled Al-Islambouli, the assassin of former Egyptian president Anwar Al-Sadat, was changed to Hassan Nasrallah, the former secretary general of Hizbullah. The decision, taken by Tehran’s city council in mid-June 2025 as part of an initiative to rename 11 places in the capital, was seen by observers as reflecting a gradual improvement in Egyptian-Iranian relations. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty told ON TV on 1 July 2025 that Egypt welcomed the move, hoping “the momentum in the relationship will lead to the restoration of full diplomatic ties.” He added that Egypt is establishing a mechanism for consultations with Iran at a sub-ministerial level, alongside discussions on expanding cooperation in the commercial, economic and tourism sectors.
The spokesperson for Tehran’s municipal council, Ali Reza Nad, noted that the decision reflected Iran’s desire to strengthen relations with Egypt, particularly following the visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Cairo in early June 2025, during which he met President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi and senior Egyptian officials. The renaming of the Tehran street signalled that relations between Egypt and Iran were about to develop into “full diplomatic ties”, but the outbreak of the US-Israel war on Iran – followed by Iranian strikes on targets in Gulf states, including airports, ports, hotels, oil and gas facilities, and residential areas – has made it more likely that Cairo will adhere to a “silent formula” in its dealings with Tehran, particularly amid uncertainty surrounding the post-war landscape, whether in terms of the structure of the Iranian regime or potential shifts in Iran’s foreign behaviour.
Changing street names may also reflect tensions in bilateral relations following structural political transformations. This is evident in the case of Egyptian-Turkish relations, which were strained after the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt. In February 2018, Egypt decided to rename Selim I Street in eastern Cairo. The decision was based on research proposed by Mohamed Sabry Al-Dali, professor of modern history at Helwan University, to former Cairo governor Atef Abdel-Hamid. The name of Selim I is associated with the Ottoman leader who made Egypt a province of the Ottoman Empire after killing thousands of Egyptian fighters resisting the invasion, and executed the Mameluke Sultan Tuman Bay, the last of the Mameluke rulers, and dismantled the Egyptian army. The move sparked political debate, coinciding with a marked deterioration in relations between Cairo and Ankara, alongside repeated rhetoric from Turkish leaders invoking Ottoman grandeur.
This provided Cairo with an opportunity to revisit historical narratives and reopen contentious issues, including street names. The alternative name was proposed through public dialogue with residents of the area, in coordination with the Supreme Naming Council, a committee comprising academics in history and education, as well as representatives of the Cairo Governorate. The name of the martyr Ahmed Mansi, a symbol of the Egyptian Special Forces, was adopted. Some, however, denied any direct link between the renaming and tensions with Turkey, noting that earlier efforts by historians, including legal cases filed against the Cairo Governorate, had been under consideration in the courts for several years.
The same approach can be seen in the case of Turkey-UAE relations. In January 2018, the Ankara municipality named the street hosting the UAE embassy after Fakhreddin Pasha, an Ottoman commander, following remarks by UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan that were perceived as offensive to the historical figure on social media. Likewise, in August 2016, Iranian authorities renamed Tehran’s Naz Street, in which the Saudi embassy is located, after the Saudi Shia cleric Nimr Al-Nimr, following his execution by Saudi Arabia on terrorism-related charges. The move reflected a tension between Riyadh and Tehran that has lasted for years.
In 2025, several streets and squares in Lebanon that had borne the names of figures associated with the former Syrian regime – particularly Hafez Al-Assad – were renamed. This reflected changing domestic power balances and a decline in Syrian influence. The decision had been rejected by municipalities under the influence of Hizbullah in Beirut’s southern suburbs, such as Ghobeiry and Burj Al-Barajneh, attitude that stemmed from the close alliance between the group and the former Syrian regime. The change, however, did in fact extend to all symbols associated with Syria’s presence in Lebanon. Moreover, Beirut changed Hafez Al-Assad Avenue into Ziad Rahbani Avenue, in honour of the late musician and son of the renowned singer Fairuz, one of the most influential figures in Lebanese music and theatre in recent decades.
The decision, approved by the Traffic Management and Street Naming Committee of Beirut Municipality, was based on the view that Rahbani represents Lebanon as a whole. It prompted mixed reactions. While some people welcomed the decision, supporters of the former Syrian regime and Hizbullah opposed it given the symbolic weight of the previous name. Further changes to street names in Lebanon, especially those associated with Iranian figures or the Syrian regime, may still take place, depending on achieving a political consensus, which is always a complex goal in the Lebanese context.
Renaming is also a means of managing collective memory, whereby older names are replaced with new symbols that reflect the political identity of the current authority while erasing the legacy of previous regimes. This is evident in the policies pursued by the Iranian authorities following the Iranian Revolution, when the names of street, squares, parks and other public spaces were changed to embody the values and figures of the Islamic Revolution, erasing symbols of the past. Iran-affiliated militias sought to replicate this model beyond Iran’s borders during the Al-Assad era in Syria, renaming a number of long-established streets originally associated with Syrian geographic locations or national symbols after Iranian and sectarian figures, in both Arabic and Persian, particularly in the city of Al-Mayadin in eastern Deir Al-Zor. Anas bin Malik Street was renamed after Ruhollah Khomeini, while Army Street was changed to Imam Abbas Street, in reference to a militia brigade operating in the area at the time. Abu Ghuroub Street was renamed Qassem Suleimani Street, and Saqiyat Al-Ray Street became Fatemiyoun Street. The changes were part of the effort to consolidate Iranian influence in areas under the control of Iran-affiliated militias.
In Lebanon, some municipalities have taken into account the country’s sectarian composition when selecting street names. At times, however, such considerations are deliberately disregarded as a form of political provocation, whether between states or among domestic political factions. Such was the case when controversy erupted in 2018 following the naming of a street in Ghobeiry, in southern Beirut, after Mustafa Badreddin, the principal suspect in the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri in 2004. The designation was described by then prime minister Saad Al-Hariri as “the very embodiment of sedition”.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 30 April, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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