About four and a half decades ago, the Centre for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS) published The Arab Regional Order: A Study in Arab Political Relations by Ali Al-Din Hilal and Ahmed Jameel Matar. In addition to examining relations between Arab states at the time, this seminal work situated the study of inter-Arab relations within the broader global framework of “regional thought”, an approach that treats regionalism as an avenue to understanding world affairs and international relations. The authors, like CAUS in general, stressed the ties that bound Arabs together and distinguished them from forces threatening them within the larger “Middle Eastern regional system”, in which the Arabs exist in close proximity to historical power centres.
Essentially, relations within the Arab region and relations between Arab states and the surrounding regional framework have not changed much in terms of shifting patterns and degrees of cordiality or tension and conflict. But there were critical turning points, perhaps the most important of which was the so-called Arab Spring. The consequent upheaval and confusion within the Arab region and between it and neighbouring powers paved the way for those powers’ regional projects. Iran’s project relied on a strategy of “forward defence” through its affiliated militias. Israel stepped up its systematic settlement expansion in the West Bank and territorial encroachment into Lebanon and Syria. Turkey turned the “Kurdish question” into a gateway for expanding its influence in Iraq and Syria through military intervention.
The current war between Israel, US and Iran reflects, in different ways, the political, economic, and strategic projects pursued by states that have no compunction about using military force and other forms of coercion to achieve their ends. What makes this particularly dangerous is that regional security in this already fragile part of the world poses an increasingly complex challenge due to the erosion of its most fundamental pillar: the state. In some cases, this entity has crumbled altogether; in others, even in the most well-established example of that political entity, it remains exposed to severe risks.
International and regional alliances and coalitions do not mean that disagreements and contradictions between their members have been resolved. They just mean that these states recognise that they share common challenges sufficiently serious to compel them to work together and, if necessary, to use military force to ensure their collective security. Unfortunately, in the Arab region, little effort has been made to forge a strategic framework for a regional security order and even less to create the institutional foundations needed to define objectives, establish priorities, and formulate policies. Worse yet is the shortage of mechanisms to track and assess the challenges posed by non-Arab powers, such as the Israeli project to reshape the Middle East or the Iranian project to reshape the Arab world, ultimately forcing it to choose between adopting Tehran’s priorities or descending into civil war.
The outbreak of the current war has come as no surprise. Nor was it astonishing how the conflict shifted from one stage to the next. At no point was there a reason to deny the importance of establishing an Arab security framework among those Arab states that are free from militias and civil war, pursuing projects for national development and advancement, and shouldering the responsibility to confront the many challenges they face. But there was a sense of shock and bewilderment accompanied by an immediate outcry against violations of international and humanitarian law in Gaza and, simultaneously, by accusations levelled against other Arab and Islamic states for failing to provide help in other cases.
It is time to conceive an “Arab project” for the Arab region – one that builds regional security together with the region’s non-Arab actors within a climate conducive to the establishment of a balance of power necessary for effective negotiations in both war and peace. The fact is that all mature Arab states had maintained good relations with Iran following the AlUla Declaration in January 2021, but they received nothing in return but military and economic hostility. Likewise, six Arab states have peace agreements with Israel, yet they have not gained stability along their borders due to fears of the forced displacement of Palestinians, which Israel has long sought.
By mature Arab states, I am referring to the six Gulf states together with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Together, they must, first, deepen their understanding of the urgent challenges, whether originating from Iran or Israel; and, secondly, they must develop a strategy weaving their diverse diplomatic, communications, economic, and military dimensions into a coherent fabric that reflects each state’s national interests. The central lesson of the regional experience since the outbreak of the Iranian war is that both Iran and Israel have crossed all acceptable limits of violence and destruction. Some parts of the Arab region have never experienced this devastation; others – especially Palestine – have endured it for decades.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 7 May, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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