The world today is witnessing what may be described as a third Cold War.
The period since the end of World War II can be broadly divided into three phases: the first Cold War, from 1947 to 1989, which ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall; a period of “cold peace” from 1990 to 2014, marked by relative stability until Russia’s annexation of Crimea; and a second Cold War that continued until 2024.
This latter phase was characterised by growing alignment between Russia and China in the face of escalating pressure, as well as the diversification of arenas of confrontation and intense competition beyond the military sphere, extending into digital and technological infrastructure, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and the weaponisation of financial systems and payment networks as seen in the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT system.
At the same time, this second Cold War retained features of the first, including nuclear deterrence and proxy wars in certain regions, like in Ukraine and earlier on Syrian territory before the fall of its former regime.
It would have been possible to describe the current period, which began with the second term of US President Donald Trump, as a continuation of the second Cold War. However, according to Barry Buzan, a professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, the fractures that have emerged within the Western bloc, along with rising economic and political tensions among its members, have made it qualitatively different.
Geoeconomic disputes have expanded, reflected in the continuation of trade conflicts among parties that once constituted what was known as the Western camp, while geopolitical tensions have worsened, including threats of invasion of territories belonging to ‘former’ allies.
These developments were summarised by journalist Gideon Rachman in a recent article in the UK Financial Times, in which he describes the development of a trans-Atlantic “divorce” that has been prevented only by the fact that both sides remain locked in a marriage that is no longer happy.
It is shaped by the historical reality that the United States became a global power in part by responding to the European invitation to maintain a military presence on the continent after World War II, a presence that continues to this day with more than 40 military bases hosting approximately 85,000 troops forming the backbone of Europe’s defence system in the absence of a viable alternative.
But it is a constant of international relations that alliances do not last forever, making it conceivable, even if not imminent, that this arrangement may eventually come to an end.
Meanwhile, the centre of gravity of the global economy continues to shift eastward, reflecting the rising relative weight of China, India, and the rest of Asia, including the association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) grouping. These countries are not seeking to provoke either a global cold or hot war, since peace and stability are essential for sustaining their growth and advancing their development goals. Nevertheless, like the countries of the Global South more broadly, they remain cautious in the face of potential risks, particularly in the fields of technology, finance, monetary systems, and demographic imbalances.
Observers of recent international conferences and forums will also note recurring themes despite the diversity of topics discussed. Over the past month, the annual meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Forum on Financing for Development, and the Santa Marta Energy Conference, alongside preparatory sessions for upcoming international and regional conferences on development, water, food, debt, investment, innovation, and technology, all saw the frequent use of the term “uncertainty” to describe current global conditions and attempts to anticipate the future.
This description is fitting given the present global context and its complexities. Three criteria repeatedly appear in defining priorities for addressing the most pressing issues affecting human livelihoods: security, sovereignty, and sustainability. These themes have been particularly evident in discussions of five key sectors: water, energy, food, technology, and finance, including debt and the future of international currencies.
Energy provides a clear example, particularly in the light of recent developments associated with the war in the Middle East. This issue was discussed by representatives from 57 countries at the Santa Marta Energy Conference held in Colombia last week. The discussions addressed the acceleration of the energy transition through the development of national and regional roadmaps linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as coordination on trade policies and engagement with financial dimensions, including fiscal space, subsidies, and debt traps that hinder this transition.
Despite repeated commitments to phase out fossil fuels by 2050, speakers at the conference emphasised that the issue is not limited to addressing climate change alone but also relates to “energy sovereignty and economic security”, as noted by Brazilian official Ana Toni. Similarly, British climate envoy Rachel Kyte pointed out that the current crisis demonstrates the need to move away from dependence on fossil fuels as a means of addressing instability and insecurity.
While the priorities of sovereignty, security, and sustainability may overlap in some of such discussions, their underlying motivations differ, as do the means of achieving them. Sovereignty is the broader concept, referring to control over energy through diversified sources and reliable supply chains from production to end use. Energy security is achieved through the availability of sufficient supply at acceptable prices without disruptive volatility. Sustainability integrates environmental and climate considerations with economic dimensions and the rights of future generations.
It is evident that each of these three priorities – sovereignty, security, and sustainability – requires distinct policies and institutions, which must be coordinated to avoid contradictions and the dissipation of resources. However, in the light of the global conditions described at the beginning of this article, marked by a deficit of trust and uncertainty in political trajectories, compounded by the complexities of what may be a third Cold War, and further strained by the number of crises affecting the global economy, the gap between rhetoric and reality has become increasingly wide.
This applies to sovereignty and its practice, security and its requirements, and sustainability and its demands, whether in the fields of energy or water or other vital issues.
This article also appears in Arabic in Wednesday’s edition of Asharq Al-Awsat.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 7 May, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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