The Middle East is not seen as a stable regional system. Rather, it has been repeatedly characterised as a region “under reconfiguration” and reflecting a state of strategic fluidity.
The absence of a stable regional system means the absence of stable and institutionalised regional-security arrangements. The Middle East does not operate according to a coherent regional model based on shared rules or clear collective security structures. Instead, it is an open arena for overlapping interactions among multiple regional and international powers.
The prevailing security culture in the Middle East is governed by a logic of “spheres of influence”, with a clear prioritisation given to hard power and militarisation as the guarantees of security and regional status. This reality is reflected in several indicators.
First, there is the map of regional conflicts and crises. According to the 2026 Global Peace Index, at least eight countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region fall within the “risk level” category, namely Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and Israel.
Second, there is the military expenditure indicator. The American-Israeli war against Iran is likely to push military spending in the Middle East to unprecedented levels. This is reflected in the scale of defence budgets, emergency allocations responding to the repercussions of the Iran war, major arms deals, military modernisation programmes, and the costs associated with automating defence technologies and acquiring deterrence systems.
Third, there is the spread of armed non-state actors. Over a full decade of conflicts, culminating in the peak of regional tensions in 2025, the Middle East witnessed the spread of more than 5,000 militias and armed groups, according to United Nations reports.
Syria alone accounted for nearly 70 per cent of these before the change of the Syrian regime in December 2024, while the remainder were distributed across countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. Iraq hosts more than 220 armed groups, while Libya has around 110. Although the regime change in Syria contributed to a decline in this phenomenon, it has not disappeared completely.
Fourth, there is the economic and geopolitical cost of conflicts. International estimates place losses resulting from regional conflicts during 2025 at between $120 and $194 billion. Meanwhile, more than one third of the territories in states experiencing conflicts or security tensions remain outside state control, revealing the depth of security fragility and the declining ability of the states concerned to monopolise force and maintain authority.
Fifth, there are the transformations in terrorism, which continues to represent one of the most prominent security challenges in the Middle East despite the changes it has undergone in recent years. Among these developments is the dismantling of the so-called “caliphate” associated with the Islamic State (IS) group. But the phenomenon has since reproduced itself through decentralised patterns based on transnational networks and lone-wolf operations.
Sixth, there is the resurgence of certain security phenomena, reflected in warnings regarding the gradual return of maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa. The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency recently warned of this trend following reports of the hijacking of three vessels during April and May this year, the oil-tanker MT Honor 25, the Sword, and the oil-tanker Eureka.
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE: The security policies of several regional powers are based on a conception of “spheres of influence” and the extension of these beyond national borders, often in ways that violate international law on the assumption that such expansion is a condition for security, power, and regional status.
One of the clearest examples of this today is Iran’s militarisation of the Strait of Hormuz, and it is reflected in initiatives proposed by Iranian elites, including in the writings of former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, on collective security from an Iranian perspective. These initiatives are based on building regional alignments under the banner of dialogue but on the basis of Iranian interests and Tehran’s regional perspective.
The same logic can be observed in Israel’s discourse following the war on Gaza and extending into the war with Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to speak about changing the Middle East through the concept of a sphere of influence and the narrative of “Greater Israel”. Other perspectives have also emerged warning against the rise of a Sunni axis led by Turkey after Israel weakened the Iranian-led Shiite axis, a view promoted by Amos Yadlin, head of MIND Israel, an Israeli think tank.
Turkish elites have proposed similar models, such as the “blue homeland” doctrine developed by Cem Gürdeniz and the “strategic depth” theory associated with Ahmet Davutoğlu. It is noticeable that each power seeks to exclude or weaken the other. Moreover, most of these visions originate from non-Arab regional powers, overlooking the position, role, and regional influence of the Arab states.
The transformations in the Middle East today are taking place against this background and coincide with changes in both the international and regional systems. This makes the restructuring of regional security more complex than simply managing separate local or regional crises.
While the United States remains the only power capable of acting as the principal organiser of security interactions in the region, a number of its regional allies and partners have developed reservations regarding the nature of the American role, the extent of Washington’s commitment to allied security, and its broader approach to regional-security issues.
At the same time, the recent transformations have deepened China’s presence in the Middle East. However, despite its expanding interests in trade, energy, and commerce, Beijing continues to rely on a policy of “quiet containment” to avoid becoming a direct party to regional security crises, recognising that military involvement could transform China from an economic partner into an active participant in a highly unstable security environment.
From the perspective of realist international relations theory, state behaviour is shaped by considerations of power, interest, and survival. Regional security therefore becomes a direct reflection of balances of power rather than the product of stable cooperative arrangements.
The existence of threats and conflicts does not necessarily imply the existence of a collective will to address them within a cooperative or institutional framework. The absence of collective security and clear regional-security arrangements is therefore likely to remain the defining feature of the Middle East in the light of the current nature of its security interactions.
The writer is head of the Security Studies Department at Future for Advanced Research & Studies, a UAE-based think tank.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 14 May, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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