Surprise, Surprise! The most ossified region of the world is experiencing a massive democratic revolution. The “Arab exception” — a concept introduced by Western scholars for the Arab world being immune to democratic waves sweeping the globe — is gone. Years and decades passed with old Arab leaders enjoying the comfort of power. Suddenly, Tunisia witnessed the fall of its leader, Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali, who flew out of Tunisia 14 January, and on 11 February it was Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian president, who was out of Cairo and into exile in Sharm El-Sheikh. Democratic revolutions have also been rolling in Algeria, Yemen, Bahrain and finally, Libya where Muammar Gaddafi fell from his people’s favour. The echoes of democracy are spreading further in Kuwait, Oman, Sudan, with the winds of change hovering over the entire region.
What is really happening in the region? Egypt provides a good example. It was thought that Egyptians would never revolt but they finally did. A fully-fledged revolution in millions, in a country of 86 million, and in all provinces, in a country of 28 provinces was made. For 18 days, Egyptians were in revolt, demanding the end of a regime that controlled the country, with changes here and there, for six decades since 23 July 1952. This time, the revolution was not by the army supported by the people, but by the people themselves, aided by the army later to achieve a peaceful political transition.
Revolutions usually happen for structural reasons, and circumstantial ones. Add to that the mismanagement of the revolutionary event by the governing elite. First, the structural reasons are located ironically in the successes of the falling regime. More healthy Egyptians have been going through a youth bulge by which those between the ages of 18 to 30 years old constituted 25 per cent of the population. This youth was well educated and more connected to the world. Second, the youth have been the sons of a growing middle class that was the result of economic growth and economic reforms of the last two decades. This middle class was new, different from the old middle class of the bureaucracy that was diminishing in wealth and in power. The shift to a market economy created more freedoms and independence from the state, which lost its monopoly over economic power. Third, the IT revolution in Egypt has been unprecedented in range and scope. Some 22 million Egyptians, mostly youth, have access to the Internet, adding that to about 600 publications and 700 Arab speaking TV channels with ferocious political talk shows. Fourth, put all of the above in an ossified political system monopolised by the National Democratic Party (NDP) that does not allow much in the way of a progressive political agenda and the result will be a stage ready for the revolution.
Here come the circumstantial reasons. First, it was the results of the last parliamentary election, which gave the NDP a vast and unprecedented majority in elections often accused of being rigged. The Muslim Brotherhood was not only vanquished, but also all other civic parties. A large coalition of the opposition that included all political forces in the country, save none formal or informal, arrayed against the regime and its party. Second, President Mubarak gave signals that he was likely to go for a seventh term; and there were signs that if he failed to do so because of his health, his son Gamal would take his place. Third, in the last few years Egyptians started to learn and become sophisticated in the art of protests. In 2004, there were about 222 acts of protest; by 2009 they became 690. The youth started to test the street, and combine it with the media and Internet. The first national strike was on 6 April 2010 called by the youth, and in their own way they mixed with political movements like Keffaya, or Enough.
The structural and the circumstantial prepared the stage for the call to demonstrate on 25 January — a holiday to commemorate the heroes of the police who fell in resistance to the British occupying forces in 1952. For the next 18 days, the strategic political elite failed to manage the crisis. First, the demonstrators were much larger than any calculations. The vanguard youth was soon to be joined by other political forces, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Although at the beginning the demands of the youthful revolutionaries were modest, the regime response was always lacking. Police corruption was soon to show in the field, and in response to hundreds of thousands, turned millions later, the police force disintegrated. By the third day, the police force disintegrated and police stations were burned in Cairo and other cities. Mubarak was out of touch with the size and abilities of the revolutionaries when he decided to put the army on the street on 28 February. In reality, a new political force was added on the table with the mission to protect the state not the regime. The state was in danger and the army was ready to deal with revolutionaries in the street, but was not ready to shoot them.
A de facto coalition was formed to avoid a further deterioration of human security, the economy, and public order. Mubarak continued to be behind the moment: his new cabinet, appointing Vice President Omar Suleiman, his reform programme; all were late and behind developments in the street. The fate of Mubarak’s regime was sealed; after delegating powers to his vice president failed to convince the revolutionaries that the regime was gone, Mubarak transferred his authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. On Friday, 11 February, Mubarak left Cairo for Sharm El-Sheikh and the revolution declared its victory.
Egypt will never be the same again, nor, I suspect the Middle East. Only details might differ, but the story will have the same elements. History is still unfolding in a region where it was inert for too long.
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