The upcoming polls, set for Egyptians abroad on 7–8 November and for domestic voting in two phases on 10–11 November and 24–25 November 2025, will determine the composition of the 596-member chamber, split almost equally between 284 individual seats and 284 filled via the absolute closed party list system, with a further 28 members appointed by presidential decree.
Voting in Egypt will be held across 5,606 polling stations and 70 counting committees.
The first phase of the two-stage election will cover 14 governorates: Giza, Beni Suef, Fayoum, Minya, Assiut, New Valley, Sohag, Qena, Luxor, Aswan, Red Sea, Alexandria, Beheira, and Marsa Matrouh, with 284 parliamentary seats contested. The remaining governorates will take part in the second phase.
Four coalition lists—the Popular List, Your Voice for Egypt List, Call of Egypt List, and Generation List—were disqualified for failing to meet the legal and procedural requirements set by the National Election Authority (NEA).
Consequently, the National Unified List for Egypt was the only coalition list approved to contest in all four designated electoral constituencies, according to the NEA.
Egypt is divided into four party-list constituencies comprising 284 seats: Cairo and the Central and Southern Delta (102 seats); North, Central, and South Upper Egypt (102 seats); Eastern Delta (40 seats); and Western Delta (40 seats).
Another 284 seats will be contested by individual candidates across 143 constituencies.
That nearly 2,625 individual candidates and a single coalition list have successfully registered was met with mixed reactions, welcomed by some political observers and criticised by others.
The mechanics of the vote
For critics, the electoral design is the core controversial issue.
Amr Hashem Rabie, a political analyst at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, argues that the closed party list system is “a kind of appointment,” particularly given the absence of genuine competition. He goes further, suggesting that it could undermine voters’ will, and noting that its use is virtually unique to Egypt, Singapore, and Djibouti.
Minister of Parliamentary and Legal Affairs and Political Communication Mahmoud Fawzy has previously stated that the absolute closed-list electoral system is not perfect, but it is the most suitable for the Egyptian context in light of the constitutional requirements related to the representation of the seven groups specified in the constitution: women, youth, workers, farmers, Christians, people with disabilities, and Egyptians abroad.
During his participation in the National Dialogue sessions, where participants favoured a mixed electoral system of closed and open proportional lists, Fawzy explained that this system is the only one capable of fully ensuring those constitutional quotas.
The minister added that the discussion on the electoral system witnessed broad differences of opinion within the dialogue sessions, and no final consensus was reached. Therefore, all opinions and proposals—both those supporting the list system and those calling for its amendment—were submitted to the President of the Republic.
He pointed out that the absolute closed list does not represent a political alliance but rather an electoral alliance, the goal of which is to enable political forces and parties to participate in the elections within arrangements that guarantee representation. He clarified that after the election process concludes, each party is free to set its own political agenda and program.
Fawzy emphasized that the goal of the system is to achieve fairness in representation and ensure parliamentary stability within a framework of political pluralism and respect for the constitution. He noted that an electoral system should not be judged by its perfection but by how well it suits the political and social conditions of each country.
Meanwhile, Rabie asks why there isn’t more than one list to foster competition and engagement, suggesting the current landscape is one of a “frozen public sphere” where people and faces may change, but real political momentum is absent.
The exclusion of opposition figures such as Haitham al-Hariri, whose appeal against disqualification was rejected, is cited as a move that strips the political process of much-needed dynamism.
Closed lists and political controversy
Party leaders offer a split diagnosis. Tarek El-Tohamy, a former senator and prominent figure in the Wafd Party, sees no genuine renewal, only “change under the title of fixed politics,” a constant rotation of elites within a “closed political framework.”
On the other hand, parliament member Mostafa Bakry said he sees no justification for the criticism directed at the absolute closed-list electoral system, affirming that it was the result of a broad consensus and ensures the participation of all political forces.
“The absolute closed-list electoral system achieves stability within the legislative institution and guarantees compliance with the constitutionally mandated quotas, foremost among them the 25 percent allocation for women, in addition to the quotas for youth, Copts, and people with disabilities,” Bakry told Ahram Online.
Bakry added that the current closed electoral lists include 12 political parties alongside the Coordination Committee of Parties’ Youth Leaders and Politicians, ensuring them parliamentary representation through an electoral—not political—alliance, which allowed them to participate in parliament that might not have been available through competition for individual seats.
El-Tohamy laments the dominance of the “four pro-state parties,” arguing that it has reduced the opposition to clinging to a constitutional quota for survival, especially in the face of poor funding.
This, he suggests, fosters a culture of “contentment, not competition.” He points to his party’s meagre representation in the last Senate (six seats) and projected House results as evidence of a “feeble representation” achieved only through participation in the pro-government bloc, currently headed by the Nation’s Future Party.
For Bakry, political parties are partly responsible for the criticism directed at the lists, explaining that some parties nominated candidates from outside their constituencies, sparking controversy over the selection criteria.
Hossam El-Khouly, Vice-President of the dominant Nation’s Future Party (Mostaqbal Watan), defends the closed-list system as a mechanism to ensure balanced representation for women and youth, mandated by the constitution, without the friction of open competition.
Lessons from the Senate
The recent Senate elections, which saw 200 members elected and 100 appointed, offer a case study. Rabie points out that the results confirmed the established power structure: Nation’s Future secured 118 seats, followed by Homeland Defenders with 72, the National Front with 45, and the Republican People’s Party with 14.
The rise of the National Front to join the core pro-government bloc was notable, yet Rabie suggests the situation is “comfortable enough for things to pass by acclamation,” rather than through multiple, competing lists.
He notes the marginal presence of emerging groups such as Bassem Adel’s Awareness Party, which secured only one seat, underscoring the enduring control of the major state-aligned entities.
In contrast, El-Khouly frames the rotation of faces as “part of the law of life,” insisting that political stability necessitates “party discipline and a unified decision.”
Historical context and the path ahead
Political campaigns expert Mahmoud Ibrahim traces the current political architecture back to the first legislative term of 2015–2020. Despite the presence of over 80 political parties, he argues, a lack of effective grassroots organisation left the field open to state-led “cosmetic alliances.”
The initially dominant Support Egypt coalition steadily eroded, ceding the centre of party power to the Nation’s Future Party, which ended the term as the undisputed force.
By the second legislative term (2021–2025), Support Egypt had vanished, and legislative power was effectively centralised in a single party, with all other groups “reproduced as ‘supporting’ rather than ‘competing’ parties.”
Ibrahim describes this process as an organic but potentially troubling power transfer, which has left the country’s party system with “no horizon and no vision.”
Rabie concludes that as the election approaches, the change in faces will not alter the fundamental dynamics of the game. The lines on the chessboard remain meticulously drawn, he argues.
However, Bakry noted that the closed-list system does not pose an obstacle to independents, affirming that the number of candidates for individual seats has reached over 2,000, reflecting the breadth of participation and competition.
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