How the conflict with Iran reshaped Israel’s internal landscape

Mariam Salah , Friday 27 Jun 2025

The Israel-Iran confrontation has redefined regional risk calculations and temporarily reshuffled Israel’s political dynamics. Yet beneath the appearance of unity lies a fragile social contract, unaddressed domestic crises, and a public whose patience may soon wear thin.

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The view from a living room of a residential building that was destroyed in an attack by Israel. Photo : AFP


In a defining moment for Middle Eastern geopolitics, Israel launched a large-scale military operation against Iran on 13 June 2025, codenamed Operation Rising Lion. The offensive, which struck key elements of Iran’s nuclear programme and eliminated high-ranking scientists and security officials, marked a dramatic escalation in Israeli strategic doctrine. While early assessments anticipated a limited show of force, the scope and precision of the strikes revealed months of planning, culminating in a temporary ceasefire announced by US President Donald Trump following American airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear sites.

This development has reshaped the regional strategic balance and jolted Israel’s political and security landscape. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government now faces urgent questions about the war’s internal costs—political, institutional, and societal. This article examines the domestic fallout of the confrontation, focusing on Netanyahu’s leadership, shifting public opinion, and the contested state of national preparedness.

Strategic aims cloaked in domestic calculations
 

Israel’s operational goals extended beyond immediate security concerns. While framed as a defensive measure to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear breakout capacity, Operation Rising Lion pursued broader political aims—dismantling Iran’s precision missile systems, degrading its drone and cyber capabilities, and weakening proxy networks in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.

Aware of the limits of military power in toppling the Iranian regime, Israel instead targeted its symbols of strength. Official messaging portrayed the operation as a confrontation with Tehran’s ruling establishment—not with the Iranian people. Aimed at both international and domestic audiences, Israeli media reinforced a narrative of righteous defense and regional stabilization.

The timing of the operation offered Netanyahu political reprieve amid protests over judicial reforms, rising living costs, and divisive conscription legislation. He used the war to redirect public discourse, blunting criticism by capitalizing on a surge of nationalist sentiment and a security-driven consensus that reshaped the political agenda and revived his image as a decisive wartime leader.

A brief window of unity
 

Perhaps the most striking domestic outcome was the temporary dissolution of internal political divisions. Key opposition figures such as Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz publicly endorsed the government’s actions. Lapid, typically a fierce Netanyahu critic, declared, “Iran seeks Israel’s destruction. In the face of this threat, there is no division—only unity.” Gantz hailed the US response as “a strategic stabilizer” that “made Israel and the region safer.”

Behind closed doors, officials confirmed that the operation had been in the planning stages for months, with approval granted only by a narrow security inner circle. The war effectively paused coalition disputes, including potential Knesset dissolution and tensions with ultra-Orthodox parties. Political and religious leaders rallied behind the campaign, framing it as a historic effort to safeguard Israel’s future.

Yet this unity may prove fleeting. Analysts warn that Netanyahu’s popularity is a “spring of strength” that could quickly dry up if the war drags on or fails to yield lasting results. Questions over post-war reconstruction, hostages in Gaza, and the mounting costs of conflict remain unresolved—and could reignite internal fractures.

Public support with lingering doubts
 

A poll by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), conducted shortly after the strikes, showed that 73 percent of Israeli Jews supported the operation, with 76 percent viewing it as justified on security grounds. However, 70 percent expressed concern about future escalation, and nearly half doubted the nuclear threat had been neutralized.

Approval for the military’s handling of the war was high, with 74.5 percent satisfied and 89 percent rating communication efforts as clear and effective. Yet only 27.5 percent of respondents reported feeling secure, and confidence in the government remained modest at 30 percent.

This contrast reflects a broader dynamic: public admiration for military competence coexists with deep skepticism toward political leadership. Many Israelis believe the state excels in battlefield execution but struggles to address deeper governance and social cohesion challenges.

A fragile home front
 

Despite its operational successes, the war exposed serious vulnerabilities in Israel’s civil defense infrastructure. More than 2.6 million citizens lack access to standard protection facilities. Only 38 percent have reinforced safe rooms (Mamads) at home, leaving most reliant on aging public shelters—many of which are locked, neglected, or repurposed.

The government announced a 100-million-shekel plan to renovate 500 shelters and deploy 1,000 mobile units. However, many Israelis view these measures as reactive and inadequate. The complexity of retrofitting older buildings, combined with the absence of proactive planning, has further deepened public frustration.

Civil society groups and municipal leaders, particularly in Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan, expressed outrage over inadequate infrastructure. Makeshift conversions of parking lots into shelters and reliance on mobile alerts underscored a system operating on improvisation rather than preparedness.

While the Home Front Command used digital platforms effectively, the disconnect between official rhetoric and lived experience has eroded public trust.

Gaza: the war that never paused
 

Though rhetorically designated the “secondary front,” Gaza continued to witness heavy military activity. Between 13 and 24 June, over 840 Palestinians were killed, including 193 waiting in food lines. Despite the US-brokered ceasefire with Iran, Israel has not de-escalated its campaign in Gaza.

Pressure is mounting on the Israeli government to conclude the Gaza operation, particularly after the recovery of three Israeli hostages’ bodies. Polls suggest that 75 percent of the public would support a ceasefire in exchange for the remaining captives—indicating waning faith in the military campaign’s effectiveness.

Nevertheless, Netanyahu and senior ministers remain resolute. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich stated that once the Iranian threat is fully neutralized, Israel will “complete the mission” in Gaza. This signals a likely continuation—or escalation—of hostilities, justified by recent strategic gains.

The return of strategic delay
 

Even if the Iran conflict ends favorably, it does not resolve the internal structural crises facing Netanyahu’s government: judicial turmoil, economic stagnation, religious-secular tensions, and the unresolved hostage issue. Netanyahu has long used calibrated escalation to deflect from domestic troubles, casting himself as “Mr. Security.” But this strategy is yielding diminishing returns. With corruption trials ongoing and public patience thinning, his room to maneuver is shrinking.

Many observers expect he may exploit another crisis—most likely in Gaza—to reset the political narrative once more. His signature tactic of strategic procrastination may no longer suffice. As social, economic, and institutional pressures mount, the post-Iran war period could prove his most politically volatile yet.

As ceasefires take hold and battlefields fall silent, the deeper question remains: can Israel’s leadership convert tactical victories abroad into lasting stability at home?

* The writer is a researcher at the Egyptian Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS)

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